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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
AND FIRM-STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIPS

Tony L. He
Witold J. Henisz

This dissertation examines the nonmarket strategies that firms use to respond to and to create
change in the social and political environment. In the first chapter, I document the extent of
corporate political connections across Europe and analyze the institutional contingencies of their
impact. I find that a political connection increases the annual value of public procurement
contracts awarded to firms, but that this positive impact is moderated by accountability institutions
that enable different bodies of government to check one another’s power. When accountability
institutions are weaker, firms become more likely to hold political connections, and the
competition between rival firms to form political connections intensifies, suggesting that
nonmarket competition in the political arena becomes increasingly consequential as the
constraints of political patronage are weakened. In the second chapter, I analyze the grantmaking
behavior of private foundations in the United States and find evidence consistent with
philanthropy being used as a tax-advantaged method to influence politics through grantmaking to
politically active nonprofits. In the third chapter, co-authored with Brian Ganson and Witold J.
Henisz, we develop theories to explain how a firm’s relational strategies might impact the
structure of relationships, and hence conflict risk, between groups in conflict-affected areas. Firms
can affect broader societal outcomes when their actions, such as the unequal distribution of
benefits to majority groups over minority groups, change the tenor of conflict and cooperation
between identity groups delineated by ethnic, class, geographic, cultural, or other divides. As
such, firms become implicated in shaping how they and their stakeholders reach mutually
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acceptable settlements in response to collective challenges. In the fourth chapter, co-authored
with Anne S. Jamison, we propose a set of a methods to map the structure of relationships
between firms and stakeholders in conflict-affected areas. We utilize geo- and time-tagged data
from media reports and apply natural language processing techniques to construct a network of
relationships between political figures, civil society actors, and firms in Rwanda.
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PREFACE

This dissertation investigates how firms respond to and create change in the social and
political environment. A common thread connecting the chapters is the idea that firms are
embedded within a web of relationships (Granovetter, 1985) with social and political actors whose
ties with one another shape—and can be shaped by—firms’ nonmarket strategies. To sustain
competitive advantage against rivals and to manage conflict risk between social groups,
managers must be attentive not only to their own relationships with stakeholders, but also to the
relationships between stakeholders and other actors in the broader societal network.
From a managerial perspective, customers, suppliers, local communities, and other
stakeholders who are considered salient to a firm according to their power, legitimacy, and
urgency (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) might be modeled as the relational spokes of a hub
centered at the firm. Managers are encouraged to maintain cooperative business ties with these
stakeholders in order to secure knowledge, goodwill, and other resources that improve
operational performance. However, these actors do not define themselves primarily in relation to
the focal firm. Instead, they are the centers of their own familial, professional, and identity group
(e.g., racial, ethnic, class, and regional) relationships, holding rich histories of cooperation or
conflict with each other and with other societal actors who possess no direct ties to the focal firm.
These histories in turn shape the various constraints, challenges, and potentially unintended
consequences that managers can face when building firm-stakeholder relationships. For
example, when a multinational firm enters a conflict-affected region in which neighboring
communities have collided over competing historical land claims, managers must decide how to
allocate the benefits of private sector development, such as jobs, contracts, and new
infrastructure, across different parties without provoking feelings of marginalization. Absent the
understanding of how certain firm-stakeholder partnerships might be perceived across identity
groups, managers risk echoing historical grievances and fueling intergroup conflicts to the longterm detriment of markets and society at large. In addition to presenting challenges that

x

managers must navigate, the relationships between social and political actors can also create
opportunities for managers to influence political outcomes to gain competitive advantage (e.g.,
Chapters 1 and 2) and to encourage cooperation between the firm and diverse groups to solve
problems of collective concern (e.g., Chapter 3).
Scholars of management have emphasized the importance for managers to recognize
the institutions—the rules, beliefs, norms, organizations, and processes that together generate
expected behaviors (Greif, 2006)—governing the private sector in order to design effective
nonmarket strategies to achieve competitive advantage (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Mellahi,
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). In the first two chapters, I contribute to this literature in nonmarket
strategy and institutional theory by examining how firms might alter their strategies depending on
the quality of these institutions. In the last two chapters, I argue that firms’ relational strategies
with stakeholders can also impact the functioning, and even the nature, of the institutions that
govern the capacity of societal actors to engage in collective action to resolve challenges of
common concern. In doing so, this dissertation highlights that while firms are embedded in a web
of relationships with other social and political actors who likely do not consider the firm as a
central concern in their own experiences, managerial actions in building ties with and between
stakeholders can nonetheless impact the evolution of those relationships. Although most studies
in stakeholder theory take stakeholders’ preferences and behaviors as exogenous determinants
of firm behavior (e.g., studies around the need for firms to exhibit corporate social responsibility to
gain legitimacy), I contribute to a growing scholarship that emphasizes how actors in the private
sector can also alter the sentiments, narratives, or cognitive framing that actors in the greater
public utilize for sensemaking and problem-solving (Mukand & Rodrik, 2018). For managers,
investors, and civil society actors who are attentive to the role of the private sector in addressing
grand societal challenges that require building institutions for collective action, the second half of
this dissertation in particular examines how firms might help construct cooperation across identity
groups under the rubric of legitimate business interests.
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To examine firms’ relationships with social and political actors, my research falls under
two themes. The first examines the political strategies that firms leverage under different
institutional environments to impact business and policy outcomes. The second explores how
managerial decisions in the normal course of business can affect intergroup relations and
collective action among stakeholders in conflict-affected areas of the world.
On corporate political activities, firms since the 1970s have leveraged political strategies
more frequently and through more sophisticated means to influence political and civil society
actors (Werner, 2018), transforming the political and social context in which the firm, its
competitors, and other societal actors are all embedded. Scholars across disciplines have
documented a rise in political campaign donations (Liang & Renneboog, 2017), lobbying (Borisov,
Goldman, & Gupta, 2016), participation in industry associations (Papaioannou, Watkins,
Mugwagwa, & Kale, 2016), strategic charitable donations (Bertrand, Bombardini, Fisman, &
Trebbi, 2020), and (in my research) interpersonal corporate political connections. However,
empirically, it is difficult to determine the firm-level outcomes of these political strategies, and
researchers have reported conflicting findings (Cui, Hu, Li, & Meyer, 2018).
In the first chapter of this dissertation, titled “The Value and Constraints of Corporate
Political Connections: Evidence from European Firms”, I add to this literature by using novel data
and an identification strategy leveraging “shock connections” to document the extent of corporate
political connections across Europe and to analyze the institutional contingencies of their impact. I
construct a novel dataset by linking (1) the identities of top managers and board members from
6,530 public firms; (2) proprietary data on politically connected persons; and (3) information on
public procurement contracts worth about €92.6 billion in Europe from 2009 to 2017. I find that on
average, a political connection increases the annual value of awarded contracts by €3.7 million.
This positive impact is moderated by accountability institutions that enable different bodies of
government to check one another’s power, with the model suggesting a €10.7 million difference in
the effect of a connection on awarded contracts between countries with the weakest and
strongest of such institutions in 2017. This effect appears to be driven by variation in the
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discretionary criteria used in contracts allocation. In addition, when accountability institutions are
weaker, firms become more likely to hold political connections, and the competition between rival
firms to form political connections intensifies.
The second chapter, “Private Philanthropy and Political Influence,” examines how private
philanthropy might be used to support politically active nonprofit organizations that engage in
political spending to affect the outcome of elections in the United States. In the U.S., Federal
Election Commission (FEC) v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007) and Citizens United v. FEC
(2010) gave nonprofit organizations the freedom to engage in direct spending on mass media
communications to influence elections. Using a dataset on the universe of grants given by private
foundations since 2000, I find evidence consistent with private philanthropy being used as a taxadvantaged method to influence politics through grantmaking to politically active nonprofits.
Following Citizens United v. FEC, a private foundation that had donated to influence policy or
voting outcomes in the past donates more per year to politically active nonprofits. In addition,
donations to nonprofit organizations are sensitive to the political landscape: a nonprofit that is
legally allowed to engage in direct political spending receives more funding in donations when its
home state’s margin of victory decreases in the previous presidential election. The findings
suggest that grantmaking behavior is partly driven by non-altruistic, political motives.
On firm-stakeholder relationships, I study how firms’ strategies to alter the structure of
relationships with and between their primary stakeholders, such as local communities, customers,
suppliers, employees, and shareholders, can change the sociopolitical environment in which they
operate. Firms can affect broader societal outcomes when their actions, such as the unequal
distribution of benefits to majority groups over minority groups, change the tenor of conflict and
cooperation between identity groups delineated by ethnic, class, geographic, cultural, or other
divides. As such, firms become implicated in shaping how they and their stakeholders reach
mutually acceptable settlements in response to collective challenges.
In the third chapter, titled “Business and Peace: The Impact of Firm-Stakeholder
Relational Strategies on Conflict Risk” and co-authored with Brian Ganson and Witold J. Henisz,
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we develop a set of theories to examine how firms can shape the social and political environment
in which they are embedded by impacting not only firm-stakeholder relationships but also
stakeholder-stakeholder relationships. We explain how a firm’s relational strategies impact
conflict risk in the broader network of societal relations. To make this contribution, we highlight
how managerial decisions are evaluated, and acted on, not only by the firm’s stakeholders, but
also by others attentive to their group’s access to, and control over, economic, political, and social
assets in comparison to other groups with whom they are in conflict. We show that when firm
actions that form or break ties in its stakeholder network inhibit the ability of groups to reach
mutually acceptable settlements on the relative distribution of the costs and benefits from firm
operations, conflict risk in the broader societal network increases. We thereby emphasize that
managerial decisions in the normal course of business can impact conflict risk, even if
unintentionally, by changing the structure of relationships between groups in conflict-affected
areas.
To enable the empirical study the structure of relationships between stakeholder groups,
the fourth chapter, titled “Mapping Conflict Environments with Media Data: An Application of
Natural Language Processing to Construct Networks of Firm and Stakeholder Relationships” and
coauthored with Anne S. Jamison, aims to develop a method to quantify such relationships. To
construct measures of cooperation and conflict between actors, we utilize geo- and time-tagged
metadata of media reports in the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone’s Global
Knowledge Graph (GDELT-GKG). We examine a conflict environment’s key actors by extracting
named entities from GDELT-GKG, scraping the entire text of web articles involving such actors,
and applying natural language processing to map the level of conflict or cooperation between
political actors, civil society actors, and firms. This method provides an advantage over existing
databases on global conflicts, such as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
(ACLED) and the Urban Social Disorder Dataset (USD), by examining variation in the tenor of
relationships between entities to detect changes in conflictual sentiments that do not necessarily
culminate into (but sometimes do result in) actual physical conflict. We demonstrate the use of
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this method by mapping the network of relationships between actors in Rwanda and examine
how the network reflects the country’s political environment in 2015 to 2020.
Together, these four chapters provide a set of empirical and theoretical contributions to
the nonmarket strategy scholarship. The first two quantify the extent of, and identify the effects of,
firms’ corporate political activities; and the latter two highlight how both market and nonmarket
strategies shape, and are shaped by, the network of relationships involving firms, their primary
stakeholders, and other societal actors to whom they are connected via identify group affiliations.
These chapters advance our understanding of the various strategies that firms can deploy to
improve their performance not only by responding to opportunities and challenges in the
nonmarket environment but also by actively shaping the environment through their influence on
political processes and their relational strategies with stakeholders. In doing so, I explore how
firms’ actions can affect broader societal outcomes in both developed and emerging markets,
such as the allocation of public resources in Europe (Chapter 1), electoral competition in the U.S.
(Chapter 2), and conflict risk between identity groups in conflict-affected areas such as the Niger
Delta in Nigeria and the Canyon de las Hermosas in Colombia (Chapters 3 and 4). For scholars,
managers, and policymakers who are attentive to the private sector’s role in addressing grand
societal challenges, I hope that this dissertation offers useful insights on how everyday
managerial decisions in the pursuit of profit can, whether intentionally or not, shape social and
political outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1: The Value and Constraints of Corporate Political Connections: Evidence
from European Firms
Tony L. He

1.1 Introduction
Corporate political connections (CPCs), defined as the interpersonal ties that connect a
firm’s managers or board members to agents with political power, can help firms navigate
institutional voids and political uncertainties (Henisz, 2000; White III, Boddewyn, & Galang, 2015),
gain preferential treatment by the government (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012; Frynas, Mellahi, &
Pigman, 2006; Hillman, 2005), or attain political or social legitimacy (Bucheli & Salvaj, 2018;
Hillman & Wan, 2005). Once formed, CPCs may become a source of competitive advantage for
the connected firm in extracting economic rents through the management or exploitation of the
political environment (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008). In accordance with this reasoning, a number of
studies in management, finance, and economics have provided evidence to show that CPCs are
associated with superior financial or operational performance (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001;
Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009; Hillman, 2005; Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999; Khwaja &
Mian, 2005; Luechinger & Moser, 2014).
However, several empirical studies have also found that CPCs can lead to no effect or
even detrimental effects on performance (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2018; Hadani
& Schuler, 2013; Li, Xia, & Zajac, 2018; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Siegel, 2007). To explain these
seemingly contradictory findings, scholars have theorized that the value of CPCs is contingent
upon the nonmarket environment (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012),
which includes political institutions that enable or constrain the ability of political agents to
influence market outcomes (Choi, Jia, & Lu, 2015; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Dorobantu, Kaul, &
Zelner, 2017; Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, & Bonardi, 2012). Because the abilities of political agents
vary with the institutional environment, so do the benefits that firms might gain from cultivating
relationships with such agents. Despite this theorized importance of institutions in determining the
1

value of CPCs, a “large share of recent CPC research relies on evidence from single-country
contexts” (Cui, Hu, Li, & Meyer, 2018: 393), of which many concern firms in the United States or
China. Furthermore, past empirical papers generally consider a political connection to be a former
or current head of state, cabinet-level minister, or national legislature member 1 (Brockman, Rui, &
Zou, 2013; Faccio, 2006)—very high-level politicians who comprise a small subset of political
agents, which suggests that the prevalence of CPCs might be underestimated in the literature.
In this paper, I address these research gaps by constructing a novel dataset with an
extensive coverage of the political connectedness of European firms to examine how national
institutions impact the value and use of CPCs. I link the names of 118,252 top managers and
board members from 6,530 public firms across 28 European countries with proprietary data on
the identities of so-called politically exposed persons (PEPs), defined as political agents entrusted
with public functions, as well as their immediate relatives and close associates, who fall under the
definitions provided in the European Union (EU) 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Section 312
of the USA PATRIOT Act, and recommendations of the multilateral Financial Action Task Force.
Because PEPs include not only heads of state, cabinet-level ministers, and national legislature
members but also government agency officials, diplomats, political party figures, senior ministerial
staff, political advisors employed by the executive government, and the relatives and close
associates of these political agents, my linked dataset provides a much more comprehensive
coverage of political connectedness than previously available in the literature.
I examine a direct mechanism that political agents can use to influence outcomes in the
private sector: public procurement contracts (Broms, Dahlström, & Fazekas, 2019; Titl & Geys,
2019). A set of EU directives standardize the public procurement process and reporting among
member states (and a few non-EU countries), thus providing for a multi-country empirical setting
in which the impact of institutions on a channel by which CPCs generate financial value can be

1 Some empirical papers also include the relatives and close associates of high-level politicians. However,
the existing data sources and methods used to measure connections to these relatives and close associates
are not comprehensive and thus provide an “incomplete picture” of CPCs (Faccio, 2006, p. 371). The Data
and Empirical Approach section provides more discussion about these data details.

2

uniformly measured and compared. By matching the names of contract winners with the firms in
my sample, I identify 17,709 awarded contracts from 2009 to 2017 worth a total of €92.6 billion.
To determine the impact of CPCs on public procurement contracts, I exploit variation in
the political connectedness of firms’ top managers and board members across time. I define a
“shock connection” as an occurrence in which one of the firms’ top managers or board members
becomes a PEP at least one year after being hired (e.g., an executive-level manager who was
not a PEP at the time of hiring, but who later becomes a PEP while still at the firm because a
relative enters public office); and I employ a model with year and firm fixed effects to examine the
effect of these shock connections on the value of public procurement contracts awarded to firms.
This econometric approach, in essence a generalized differences-in-differences model with
variable treatment intensity, provides two advantages over studies that employ matching methods
to compare politically connected firms with their unconnected peers (Boubakri, Guedhami,
Mishra, & Saffar, 2012; Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006). First, by
including firm fixed effects, I measure the effect of CPCs while controlling for time-invariant firm
heterogeneity, which includes unobserved characteristics that matching methods cannot account
for. Second, by analyzing CPCs through shock connections, I identify the impact of CPCs while
providing some control of the human capital hypothesis (Li, Meng, Wang, & Zhou, 2008), which
suggests that the financial value of CPCs might be inflated (deflated) if firms hire PEPs who also
tend to be more (less) capable persons than the general population of managers.
I find that on average, a political connection increases the annual value of public
procurement contracts that firms win from government agencies by about €3.7 million. This
impact appears to be driven primarily by connections to political agents in executive- and cabinetlevel positions, their senior aides and advisors, and officials overseeing infrastructure sectors but
not by connections to municipal officials, ambassadors, military figures, or judges. Furthermore,
this value of political connectedness is moderated by stronger national institutions that enable
different bodies of government to check one another’s power, with the model suggesting an
annual €10.7 million difference in the effect of a political connection on public procurement
3

contracts between countries with the weakest (Malta) and strongest (Denmark) of such
institutions in 2017. I find some evidence that political agents in a low accountability environment
use more subjective criteria when awarding contracts to politically connected firms.
In addition, I show how firms adjust their personnel strategies in response to the
institutional environment. When institutional constraints on the power of political agents
deteriorate, firms become more likely to hire and retain politically connected managers or board
members, and within-industry competition between firms to form political connections intensifies,
suggesting that nonmarket competition in the political arena becomes increasingly consequential
as the constraints of political patronage are weakened. To the extent that government-business
ties in weak institutional environments facilitate reciprocal resource exchange for both political
and corporate actors in ways that entrench their positions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012), the
expansion of CPCs in response to rent-seeking and competitive pressures implies that
institutional decline and government-business patronage might be mutually reinforcing.
My contributions to the literature provide strong evidence for the contingent value of
CPCs that can support and extend theory in three research streams. First, I answer calls from the
strategy scholarship to examine how the nonmarket environment impacts the economic rents
generated from a particular nonmarket strategy (Doh et al., 2012; Dorobantu et al., 2017; Sun et
al., 2012). Specifically, I draw from the political science literature to distinguish between
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal accountability institutions (Lührmann, Marquardt, & Mechkova,
2020) and examine how they differentially impact the value and use of CPCs. Second, I respond
to international business scholars who, recognizing the spectrum of evidence on the value of
CPCs in single-country studies, have encouraged research to “examine the contextual
contingencies of [CPCs] by conducting multi-country comparative research” (Cui et al., 2018:
393). As such, I provide a bridge that might reconcile some of the seemingly conflictual findings
on the relationship between CPCs and firm performance. I do so not only by showing that a
country’s institutional environment can moderate this relationship, but also by demonstrating the
statistical importance of separately identifying a measure of political connectedness that is not
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confounded with firm characteristics or other managerial qualities that determine the likelihood of
hiring a PEP. Third, I contribute to the study of political economy by extending evidence on the
constraining power of institutions on political agents to influence the competition for economic
rents (Choi et al., 2015; Galang, 2012; Henisz & Zelner, 2006).

1.2 Theoretical Background
1.2.1 Corporate political connections in nonmarket strategy
A strand of research in nonmarket strategy examines how firms leverage corporate
political activities to manage the political environment (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011; Mellahi,
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). These political activities include lobbying efforts, campaign
donations, and cultivating CPCs (Sun et al., 2012), this last of which is the subject of this paper.
The scholarship has explored a variety of reasons to explain why firms might seek CPCs
as a component of their nonmarket strategies. First, from the perspective of institutional theories
and transaction cost economics (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000), when existing institutions that
shape the market are weak or captured—i.e., when the rules that govern market transactions are
incomplete or strongly favor select interest groups—certain transactions become very costly or
risky to undertake (Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Williamson, 1999). As such, firms might seek CPCs to
acquire superior information about the government (Cui et al., 2018; King, 2015) and utilize their
influence to adapt to, transform, or augment the institutional environment (Dorobantu et al.,
2017). By doing so, firms can lower the cost and uncertainties of market transactions.
Second, the resource-based view suggests that firms can cultivate and deploy CPCs as a
political resource to capture economic rents (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), defined as “excess returns”
that are inconsistent with competitive market outcomes (Tollison, 1982: 575). Opportunities to
pursue economic rents can emerge when there are “government restrictions upon economic
activity”, such as barriers to market entry and the discretionary authority to award or punish firms
(Krueger, 1974: 291). When such opportunities arise, firms might strategically use CPCs to
acquire favored access to (or even control over) political bodies to capture those rents, which can
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take the form of special contracts, licenses, rules, or exceptions (Dieleman & Boddewyn, 2012;
Frynas et al., 2006; Hillman, 2005).

1.2.2 The contingent value of corporate political connections
Consistent with the arguments above, scholars have provided evidence that CPCs
increase firm value (Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2009; Hillman et al., 1999; Luechinger &
Moser, 2014). Studies that probe the underlying mechanisms find that connected firms, relative to
unconnected peers, receive more government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006); are allocated more
government resources (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013); and shelter
more taxes strategically due to better information about future regulatory changes (Kim & Zhang,
2016).
However, other studies also indicate that CPCs can lead to no effect or even detrimental
effects on financial performance (Bertrand et al., 2018; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Li et al., 2018;
Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Siegel, 2007). To explain these seemingly contradictory findings, Sun,
Mellahi, and Wright (2012) theorize that the value of CPCs is contingent upon various
organizational factors (e.g., ownership structure and managerial ability) and environmental factors
(e.g., industry characteristics and national institutions). Depending on these variables, the costs
of CPCs can outweigh the benefits, because the ties can create “lock-in” (Sun et al., 2012: 73) by
which firm resources are spent on sustaining relationships that offer few advantages instead of
being used to develop other market-based capabilities, such as cost control and improvements in
product quality (Bertrand et al., 2018). In addition, as the power and constraints of political agents
vary across institutional contexts, so do their capacities to create value for connected firms.
The scholarship increasingly supports this contingency perspective, with evidence
showing that CPCs are more valuable in regulated industries (Hadani & Schuler, 2013) and that
the type and composition of CPCs, interacted with intraorganizational variables, impact the
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connections’ usefulness (Yan & Chang, 2018; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015). 2 However, there
is limited inquiry into how national institutions alter the value of CPCs, because the majority of
extant analyses on CPCs come from single-country studies (Cui et al., 2018).

1.2.3 Institutional constraints on the power of political agents
Institutions, as a “system of rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together
generate a regularity of (social) behavior” (Greif, 2006: 30), constitute an important part of the
nonmarket environment. Particularly salient for firms in the use and effectiveness of CPCs are
political accountability institutions that constrain the power of political agents to make decisions
by requiring that they “justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct”
(Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999: 17). The political science literature distinguishes between
three types of accountability institutions: horizontal, vertical, and diagonal.
Horizontal accountability institutions limit the power of any single political agent to make
independent decisions by empowering different political bodies to access information, constrain
unilateral actions, and punish misconduct (Lührmann et al., 2020). These institutions distribute
decision-marking power across multiple government entities. Horizontal accountability institutions
include the division of power among government branches; an independent judiciary; the ability of
opposition parties to investigate or impede the majority; and the existence of political entities,
such as ombudsmen, inspector generals, and comptroller generals, that provide oversight of
other political bodies by keeping records of and auditing their actions. By enabling political agents
to check one another, horizontal accountability institutions reduce the power of any single political
agent to accommodate the demands of interest groups (Lührmann et al., 2020; O’Donnell, 1998).
These institutions lower the benefits of CPCs by simply diminishing the effectiveness of political
agents in supplying connected firms with resources or favorable policies.
Vertical accountability institutions are essentially democratic institutions that enable
citizens to participate in electoral processes (Kelly, 2003). Vertical accountability institutions
2 A related literature shows that institutions impact the value of corporate political lobbying (Choi, Jia, & Lu,
2015).
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include free and fair elections and the freedom to create or join political parties. When effective,
vertical accountability institutions leverage the threat of potential removal to restrain elected
officials from exercising power for private gain or to appease special interests (Kelly, 2003).
Diagonal accountability institutions consist of “civil society organizations, an independent
media, and engaged citizens [who] can use a broad range of actions to provide and amplify
information about the government, thereby holding it accountable” (Lührmann et al., 2020: 813).
When effective, these institutions enable citizens to receive timely, accurate information about the
government’s administrative, regulatory, and allocative decisions and their outcomes. Diagonal
accountability institutions include free and independent media; protections for journalists; and
freedoms for civil society organizations to engage in social mobilization. By making the actions of
political agents more difficult to hide or obfuscate, these institutions constrain misconduct through
reputational and other social pressures (Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2011). In particular
where citizens can hold officials accountable through the electoral process, diagonal
accountability institutions limit the value that firms can extract from CPCs, because political
agents might wish to avoid the electoral repercussions of publicly revealed patronage (Lindstedt
& Naurin, 2010).
These accountability institutions impact not only the power of political agents but also,
consequentially, the nature and extent of firms’ rent-seeking activities. Because institutions “are
akin to the rules of a game and so, sanction and prohibit certain activities” (Choi & Storr, 2019:
102), they “determine both the feasible range of rent-seeking methods and the net returns from
private investment in rent-seeking contests” (Congleton, Hillman, & Konrad, 2008: 30). When
accountability institutions are weaker, rent-seeking opportunities are more numerous, because
political agents have fewer constraints to set policies or allocate resources according to their own
preferences (Auriol, Straub, & Flochel, 2016; Keefer & Knack, 2007). Firms might therefore find it
more profitable to invest in CPCs when institutions are weaker due to the greater capabilities of
public officials to grant favors using government resources. Empirical studies affirm that firms do
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respond to variation in institutional environments by strategically altering their investments in rentseeking capabilities (Dong, Wei, & Zhang, 2016; Galang, 2012; Spencer & Gomez, 2011).

1.3 Testable Hypotheses
1.3.1 Research setting
Although the theoretical scholarship has emphasized the importance of the nonmarket
environment in affecting the outcomes of nonmarket strategies (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Sun et al.,
2012), there remains a lack of investigation into how a country’s political institutions impact the
value and use of CPCs. A multi-country setting with variation in institutions across space and time
is ideal for examining the relationship between institutions and CPCs. But of the empirical studies
about CPCs cited thus far, only a small minority (Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et
al., 2006) are multi-country studies; and of the single-country papers, most consider firms in the
United States and in Asia (primarily China).
In this paper, I study how national accountability institutions moderate the value and use
of CPCs across 28 European countries. Specifically, I examine a source of financial value that (1)
is allocated by public officials to private firms and (2) can be directly compared between
countries: public procurement contracts. Due to EU directives 3 that govern the contracts between
public authorities and firms for public works (i.e., construction projects) and for the purchase of
goods and services, all member states of the EU, as well as a few non-EU countries in the
European Free Trade Association, follow the same basic procedures and reporting requirements
for their public procurements. In general, a public authority that seeks to make a purchase from a
private firm must first release a public notice that specifies the authority’s needs, after which a
period is provided for firms to submit bids. The public authority selects a winning bidder based on
some combination of price and quality criteria, and a contract award notice must then be
submitted for publication in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU.

3 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC, 2009/81/EC, 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU, 2014/25/EU, and their associated
amendments.
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Although the EU’s public procurement directives, which establish the general steps and
principles of the procurement process, have been transposed into national laws, the actual
implementation is administered by public authorities that operate in their own capacities, such as
regional governments and various public agencies. As such, the EU’s directives provide room for
implementing authorities to choose the specific details of each procurement from a basket of
allowed practices. Therefore, political agents possess “the ability to influence procurement
contract allocations via a number of mechanisms” (Titl & Geys, 2019: 447). Scholars of corruption
suggest that despite the EU’s de jure rules, political agents can shape the outcome of contract
awards at multiple points in the public procurement process: (1) in the selection of bidding
procedures, such as changing the timeframe, exclusivity, or nature of the auction to favor certain
parties; (2) during the bidding process, such as providing information to select firms to improve
their competitive position; and (3) in the evaluation of bids, such as putting higher weight on
evaluation criteria that benefit favored parties (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013; Baltrunaite, 2020;
Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2016). Political agents can thus influence the procurement process
directly if they can exercise power within or over the contracting authority; and indirectly if they
possess unique knowledge about the authority (that can be passed onto their favored firms to
help with designing an attractive bid) or are associated with the authority via party or other
affiliations.

1.3.2 Hypotheses
In accordance with the various mechanisms described above by which political agents
can affect the public procurement process, I expect that politically connected firms would secure
a greater value of public procurement awards than unconnected firms.

Hypothesis 1: Corporate political connections increase the value of public procurement
contracts awarded to firms.
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However, accountability institutions would constrain this influence of CPCs on public
procurements. Whereas horizontal accountability institutions lessen the impact of CPCs by
directly limiting the ability of political agents to act according to their own preferences or to
interest groups’ demands, vertical and diagonal accountability institutions make acts of favoritism
less appealing to political agents due to the threat of potential social or electoral repercussions
(Lührmann et al., 2020).

Hypothesis 2(a/b/c): The positive impact of corporate political connections on the value
of public procurement contracts awarded is weakened by stronger (a) horizontal, (b) vertical, and
(c) diagonal accountability institutions.

I also hypothesize about the impact of institutions on the prevalence of CPCs. When
accountability institutions are weak, rent-seeking opportunities (in general, not just in public
procurements) become more plentiful and easier to exploit (Congleton et al., 2008). The lack of
intragovernmental, public, or media oversight on the allocation of public resources not only
strengthens the ability of political agents to redirect a greater amount of public funds to “bribegenerating spending […] such as capital, construction, [and] highways” (Liu & Mikesell, 2014:
346), which increases the overall amount of rents available, but it also results in less scrutiny into
how those funds are allocated, which enhances the political agents’ capability to exert patronage.
However, when accountability institutions are strong, they curtail such availability of rent-seeking
opportunities and constrain the power of political agents to allocate resources to favored parties.
By inserting transparency and oversight into government-business relations, accountability
institutions thus reduce the benefits of CPCs, while cultivating such connections can remain
costly, as firms must invest resources to sustain those ties and respond to the connected agents’
preferences or demands (Bertrand et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2012). Therefore, strong accountability
institutions would limit the attractiveness of holdings CPCs as an ongoing corporate political
strategy (Choi & Storr, 2019).
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Hypothesis 3(a/b/c): Firms have fewer hired corporate political connections when (a)
horizontal, (b) vertical, and (c) diagonal accountability institutions are stronger.

Scholars of nonmarket strategy have long examined the strategic response of firms to
their competitors’ corporate political activities (Henisz & Zelner, 2012; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler,
2004). For example, rival automakers in the United States match one another’s the political action
committee (PAC) donations to electoral candidates (Hersch & McDougall, 2000), and a firm’s
likelihood of combining PAC contributions with in-house lobbyists and external lobbyists is
positively correlated with its industry’s overall political activities (Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer,
2002). Firms might pursue these political strategies to compete for rents, to seek favorable
regulations, and/or to protect against unfavorable policies supported by market rivals, such as the
lobbying competition between import-competing domestic firms (seeking import protections) and
foreign firms (seeking tariff reductions) (Cai & Li, 2014). When political accountability institutions
weaken, these reasons for political competition might grow more compelling. The lack of
constraints on political agents both increase the amount of rents available to private parties (Liu &
Mikesell, 2014) and increase the ease of regulatory capture by lowering the cost of political
access (Carpenter & Moss, 2014). As such, when faced with politically connected competitors in
a weak institutional environment, an unconnected firm might not only fail to compete for rents that
bolster rivals’ market positions but also suffer from the unfavorable policies supported by the
connected firms. Therefore, I hypothesize that weak institutions strengthen the correlation
between a firm’s CPCs and those of its rivals, because failing to respond to the competitors’
political strategies might grow increasingly consequential as institutional quality declines.

Hypothesis 4(a/b/c): The positive correlation between the number of hired corporate
political connections of a firm and of its competitors is stronger when (a) horizontal, (b) vertical,
and (c) diagonal accountability institutions are weaker.
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1.4 Data and Empirical Approach
1.4.1 Data
I use four datasets for my analyses. The first dataset is the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Orbis
dataset, which contains annual financial information and the names of top managers and board
members of firms worldwide. BvD collects data from official business registries, annual reports,
company websites, press news, and other information providers. My study sample consists of
6,530 publicly listed companies with headquarters in 28 European nations 4 between 2009 and
2017 (this date range is bounded by data availability). The average 2017 market capitalization of
firms in my sample is €1.7 billion. Table 1.7.1 provides a descriptive summary of these firms.
The second dataset consists of information sourced from Opentender, a data collection
and research project funded by the EU’s Horizon 2020 that structures all of the public
procurement data in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU. I extract from the
Opentender dataset all public procurement contracts covered by the EU directives discussed
previously. 5 I then match the supplier’s name in these contracts to the names of firms in my study
sample. I find that 1,146 firms (17.5%) have won at least one contract between 2009 and 2017,
and that the total value of all 17,709 matched contracts in this period amounts to about €92.6
billion (Table 1.7.1). 6
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.1 about here
--------------------------------------------------------------------

4 The 28 nations in my study include 26 EU countries (including the United Kingdom, which was part of the
EU during my study period), plus Norway and Switzerland, which are non-EU countries that belong to the
European Free Trade Association and publish public procurement notices in the Supplement to the Official
Journal of the EU along with the EU member states. Iceland and Liechtenstein also belong to the European
Free Trade Association, but due to limitations in data availability, firms form these two nations—as well as
from EU members Bulgaria and Luxembourg—are not incorporated in this study.
5 Each contract is also referred to as a “lot” between a supplier (firm) and a buyer (contracting authority). In
my study period, the EU’s directives apply to all lots above the following thresholds: Public works lots above
€5,225,000; utilities lots above €418,000; supplies/services lots from sub-central government entities above
€209,000; and supplies/services lots from central government entities above €135,000.
6 Among the firms in my study sample, about 97% of their contracts are made with a contracting authority
that is of the same country as the firm’s (the supplier’s) country of headquarters. I do not include any crosscountry contracts (the remainder 3%) in my main results, but this study’s empirical results are robust to their
inclusion.
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The third dataset consists of novel, proprietary data provided by BvD’s Regulatory Data
Corp (RDC), a provider of screening and risk solutions for many of the world’s largest financial
institutions. RDC combines global information from government lists, over 3 billion news articles,
and other researched collections to develop a database of politically exposed persons (PEPs),
defined as political agents entrusted with public functions, as well as their immediate relatives and
close associates, who fall under the definitions provided in the EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering
Directive, Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and recommendations of the multilateral
Financial Action Task Force. 7 Examples of political agents with positions covered under these
definitions include heads of state, cabinet members, senior ministerial staff, political advisors
employed by the executive government, members of parliament, military officials, judges,
governors of national/central banks, government agency officials, diplomats, regional officials,
and political party figures. Relatives and close associates include spouses or partners, parents,
grandparents, siblings, adult children, adult grandchildren, parents-in-law, and siblings-in-law. As
an example, a political agent who holds public office, and that agent’s known spouse and adult
children, are all included in the RDC database as PEPs, with a date specifying when the agent
begins office (and hence the date when the agent, the agent’s spouse, and the agent’s adult
children all become classified as PEPs).
Relative to studies that consider only the very top political officeholders (heads of state,
ministers, and members of parliament), relatives who share the same family name, and close
associates identified in prior academic papers 8 or other select media (Boubakri et al., 2012;
Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006), RDC’s PEPs database consists of about 2 million profiles
and is considerably more comprehensive than previously available in the nonmarket strategy
literature in its coverage of political agents and their relatives and close associates. From the
Orbis database, I extract the names, dates of birth, and addresses of 118,252 persons in top

Being classified as a PEP does not suggest that the individual is connected to any financial or legal
misconduct. The PEP classification is a technical definition that financial institutions use to monitor financial
activities.
8 For example, Faccio (2006) leverages data from prior studies about politicians and their close associates
in Indonesia, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, the United States.
7
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management and board positions in the sample of firms. I then use the RDC database and find
that 8,231 (7.0%) of these managers and board members have been classified as PEPs at some
point within the study period. 9,10 Aggregating this data to the firm level, I find that 3,925 (60.1%) of
firms in my sample have been politically connected at some point within the study period, where a
firm is classified as being politically connected if one of its managers or board members is a PEP
(Table 1.7.2).
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.2 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------Across all countries, the percentages of politically connected firms that I have identified
are higher than those reported in previous studies (Boubakri et al., 2012; Brockman et al., 2013;
Faccio, 2006). Appendix Table 1.9.A1 provides a comparison between this study and Faccio
(2006)’s seminal study of CPCs across countries. The reported percentages of political
connectedness are much higher in this study than those in Faccio (2006) due to two potential
reasons: First, this study utilizes a comprehensive database that systematically tracks PEPs
according to standard legal definitions. Second, the prevalence of political ties within firms might
simply have increased over time. For instance, in 2002, changes in parliamentary regulations in
the United Kingdom removed restrictions on the corporate interests of Members of Parliament,
leading to a significant increase in the likelihood that they join the boards of private firms (Green
& HomRoy, 2018). Consistent with this development, Appendix Table 1.9.A1 shows that whereas
Faccio (2006) finds that only 7.2% of public firms in the United Kingdom were politically
connected between 1997 and 2001, I find that 74.5% were politically connected between 2009
and 2017.

9 In compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), I do not possess a copy of the
RDC PEPs database. Instead, RDC provides a platform that scans for PEPs, and all outputted results
(matches) are then aggregated to the firm level. Following communications with the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), I follow its guidelines on data protection and scientific research and do not
report any personally identifiable information in this study. For more information on the appropriate usage of
such data for scientific research, refer to the GDPR’s Articles 85 and 89, as well as this opinion from the
EDPS: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/20-01-06_opinion_research_en.pdf
10 Each of these 8,231 PEPs is politically connected in the same country as the country of their firm’s
headquarters.
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The fourth and final dataset that I employ is the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset,
which contains methodologically rigorous indices of horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
accountability institutions developed by a group of leading political science and country experts
and have been used in top political science publications (Coppedge et al., 2020; Knutsen et al.,
2019; Lührmann et al., 2020). Table 1.7.3 provides a description of each index. 11 The three
accountability indices range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger accountability
institutions. Figures 1.8.1-3 illustrate the across- and within-country variation in these indices.
Although member states of the EU should, in theory, exhibit institutional convergence, Figures
1.8.1-3 show that variations in accountability institutions do exist across countries, and that within
some countries—notably Hungary, Romania, and Poland—there is considerable variation in
these institutions across time.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.3, Figure 1.8.1, Figure 1.8.2, and Figure 1.8.3 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.4.2 Empirical approach and measures
Hypothesis 1 posits that CPCs have a positive impact on the value of public procurement
contracts awarded (main effect), and Hypotheses 2a-2c posit that accountability institutions
moderate this relationship (interaction effect). The central identification challenge, then, is to
capture a source of variation in the political connectedness of firms that is exogenous to their
hiring decisions to avoid confounding political connectedness with managerial ability. I employ the
following baseline specification to identify the main effect of CPCs on contracts value:

A recent study published by Lührmann et al. (2020) in the American Political Science Review provides a
convergent validation of the V-DEM horizontal, vertical, and diagonal accountability indices and finds that
the indices correlate strongly with the World Bank Voice and Accountability Index (0.85, 0.87, and 0.87,
respectively) and with the Freedom House/Polity scores (0.82, 0.88, and 0.90 respectively).
11
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In the model above, i indicates a firm and t indicates year. Firm fixed effects are denoted
by ai and year fixed effects are denoted by at. The dependent variable, Awardi,t, is the total value,
in Euros, of public procurement contracts awarded to firm i in year t. The main explanatory
variable, ShockConnectionsi,t, is the number of “shock connections” that a firm i has in year t. A
shock connection is defined as a manager or board member who was not classified as a PEP
when hired, but who later during their tenure at the firm becomes classified as a PEP. For
example, consider a person A who was hired by firm i as a manager in 2010. Person A had no
known political ties at the time of hiring (person A was not a PEP in 2010), but then became
classified as a PEP in 2015 because a close relative entered political office as a government
minister. If person A continued working at the firm and if the firm had no other managers or board
members who were classified as PEPs in the study period, then ShockConnectionsi,t equals 0 for
all t ≤ 2014 and equals 1 for all t ≥ 2015. In contrast, if a person B were already classified as a
PEP in the year of hiring, then their tenure at the firm does not contribute to ShockConnectionsi,t.
Instead, person B would be classified as a “hired connection”.
The control variables Xi,t include total assets, market capitalization, number of
employees, and the number of “hired connections”, defined as the number of managers or board
members who had been hired with known political connections. Shock connections and hired
connections are mutually exclusive and together comprise a firm’s total political connections. The
country-specific time trends act allow for the nonparallel evolution of country-level trends in
Awardi,t across firms—for example, the possibility that some countries experience secular growth
in contracts awarded over time due to a period of development associated with large public works
projects.
The baseline specification identifies the impact of a firm’s political connectedness on the
value of contracts awarded (𝜆𝜆) under the assumption that firms do not have control over whether
a non-PEP manager or board member becomes a PEP. However, firms do exercise control over
whether to keep and use such a connection once the shock has been actualized. Therefore, 𝜆𝜆 is

more appropriately interpreted as the financial impact of a shock connection that is deployed by a
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firm to influence the value of contracts awarded. To analyze how accountability institutions
moderate this financial value (𝜆𝜆) of CPCs (Hypotheses 2a-2c), I add V-DEM’s accountability
indices into the baseline specification and interact them with ShockConnectionsi,t . 12
By including firm fixed effects to exploit only within-firm variation in ShockConnectionsi,t, I
control for unobserved firm characteristics that do not vary across time but that impact Awardi,t,
such as some baseline firm-specific propensity to bid for public procurement contracts. This use
of fixed effects in the study of CPCs is similar to that used in Khwaja and Mian (2005), which
“allows for cleaner identification of the political preference result” (Khwaja & Mian, 2005: 1371),
because matching methods can only control for observable firm characteristics.
In addition, my separation of CPCs into shock connections and hired connections, the
latter of which is used as a control variable, allows for some control of the human capital
hypothesis (Li et al., 2008), a critique in the CPCs literature that stipulates that a positive
(negative) correlation between political connectedness and general management abilities that
influence the likelihood of hiring might lead to an overestimate (underestimate) of the value of
CPCs. Because managers or board members who gain shock connections were not hired with a
known political connection, the variable ShockConnectionsi,t aims to capture only the increase in
political connectedness. This distinction of a firm’s political connectedness between shock
connections (the explanatory variable) and hired connections (a control variable) and the use of
firm fixed effects are central to my identification strategy because I aim to estimate the value of
political connectedness that is independent of baseline managerial ability or firm-specific
propensity to bid for contracts and hire PEPs. However, my empirical approach nonetheless
cannot completely discount the human capital hypothesis critique, because it is still possible that
general management abilities are correlated with future politically connectedness (e.g., highability managers who are not politically connected at the time of hiring might nonetheless be likely
12 As expected, the accountability indices—though measuring distinct institutions—are highly correlated with
each other: across all countries, the correlation between horizontal and vertical accountability is 0.72,
between horizontal and diagonal accountability is 0.83, and between diagonal and vertical accountability is
0.83 (Lührmann, Marquardt, & Mechkova, 2020). As such, I do not include a model that includes all three
indices together due to strong multicollinearity issues that lead to highly imprecise estimates and high type II
error likelihood (Hayes, 2018).
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to have family members with strong potential of entering public office), and that firms’ hiring
decisions might take into account the likelihood of a person’s potential for future political
connectedness.
Relative to Hypotheses 1 and 2a-2c, the empirical approach to testing Hypotheses 3a-3c
is rather straightforward, because the explanatory variables (national accountability institutions)
are exogenous to firm actions. To test Hypotheses 3a-3c, I regress the number of hired political
connections on each of the V-DEM accountability indices (with year fixed effects, firm fixed
effects, and control variables) to examine how accountability institutions impact firm choices in
hiring politically connected managers or board members.
For Hypotheses 4a-4c, I calculate, for each firm-year observation, the Fraction of
Politically Connected Competitors (FPCC) as a measure of the political connectedness of a firm’s
rivals. The FPCC is calculated as (the number of rival firms in the same country and industry with
at least one political connection) ÷ (total number of rival firms in the same country and industry). 13
The FPCC’s scale thus ranges from 0 (none of the firm’s rivals are politically connected) to 1 (all
rivals are politically connected). I obtain the correlation between a firm’s and its competitors’
political connectedness by regressing firms’ hired CPCs on their FPCC, and I test for Hypotheses
4a-4c by estimating the interaction effect of the V-Dem accountability indices with the FPCC.

1.5 Results
1.5.1 The value of corporate political connections
Table 1.7.4 reports the empirical relationship between CPCs and the value of awarded
public procurement contracts. Column (1) shows that shock connections, the main explanatory
variable, is positively correlated with annual contracts value (β = 3,824,892; p = 0.006). Column
(3) reports the results of the full baseline specification with firm fixed effects, year fixed effects,
and control variables; Column (2) reports the results of the same model without firm fixed effects.
A comparison of Column (2) with Column (3) underscores the purpose of firm fixed effects in my
13

Firms are in the same industry if they share the same NACE (Level 1) industry classification code.
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empirical strategy to identify the impact of a firm’s political connectedness: Whereas Column (2)
shows that hired connections have a positive relationship with contracts value (β = 1,192,299; p =
0.001), Column (3) shows a statistically insignificant relationship (β = −41,899; p = 0.949),
indicating that the firm fixed effects have fully absorbed the variation in contacts value that was
previously explained by hired connections in Column (2). This result therefore suggests that
unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristics are likely confounded with both the value of
contracts won and the likelihood of hiring PEPs. For instance, firms that are more likely to bid for
contracts because they offer goods or services desired by the government (e.g., construction
materials or healthcare services) might be more likely to hire PEPs for managerial or board
positions to take advantage of their political ties. Or, firms with capabilities that make them more
likely to win contracts might attract highly competent persons to join the board, and this baseline
competency might be positively correlated to the likelihood of being a politician (e.g., a Member of
Parliament) or being related to one. Either way, the null effect of hired connections on contracts
value upon the introduction of firm fixed effects in Column (3) implies that certain firm-specific
characteristics are correlated with both the likelihoods of hiring of PEPs and winning contracts. 14
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.4 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------In contrast to hired connections, the shock connections variable aims to capture a
measure of political connectedness that is independent of unobserved factors that determine
whether a firm chooses to hire a PEP, under the assumption that a firm cannot control which and
when an individual enters political office. Column (3) shows that on average, a shock connection
increases the annual value of total public procurement contracts won by €3.7 million (β =
3,722,013; p = 0.041). This result supports Hypothesis 1 by providing evidence that political
connectedness, independent of baseline managerial abilities related to the likelihood of an
individual being hired (accounted for by the distinction of shock connections from hired
14 This is not to say that the political ties of hired connections offer no value to the firm. The point here is that
given firm fixed effects, one cannot separately identify the impact of the political connectedness itself—
independent of other managerial or firm qualities—by simply regressing contracts value on the number of
hired connections.
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connections) and of firms’ time-invariant propensity to bid for contracts and hire PEPs (accounted
for by firm fixed effects), do provide financial value to firms in the form of greater public
procurement contract awards.
Appendix Table 1.9.A2 provides a decomposition of the “Shock Connections” variable in
Column (3) of Table 1.7.4 by PEP category in a subsample of 2,917 firms in 7 countries: Austria,
Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom. 15 Appendix Table
1.9.A2 suggests that the impact of a shock connection on the annual value of contracts won
might be driven by connections to political agents in executive-level positions, cabinet members,
and their senior aides and advisors (β = 904,056; p = 0.060) and to officials overseeing
infrastructure sectors (β = 12,802,091; p = 0.087), such as transportation systems,
telecommunications, and water supply management. Connections to officials overseeing noninfrastructure sectors (β = 1,203,121; p = 0.113) and to legislators (β = 2,566,025; p = 0.124) are
also positively associated with the annual value of contracts won, but neither estimate is
significant at the 10% level (possibly due to an underpowered subsample). Connections to
municipal/regional officials (β = -383,858; p = 0.820), ambassadors (β = 567,802; p = 0.694),
military figures (β = -2,620,190; p = 0.499), and judicial figures (β = -841,435; p = 0.259) have no
impact on the value of contracts won. Together, these findings are consistent with the rentseeking mechanisms discussed in Section 3.1 (Titl & Geys, 2019), in that political agents with
actual power over the allocation of public funding to firms have the greatest impact on the value
of contracts awarded, but that those without such powers, such as ambassadors and judges,
have no impact. In particular, the large effect of a connection to officials overseeing infrastructure
sectors is consistent with almost every contract in the largest quintile (by value) of awards in the
sample being designated for projects in infrastructure or public works—highlighting the sizable
impact of the alignment of the rent-seeking channel with the nature of the connection. Because
data constraints prevent this PEP decomposition across all countries in the main sample,
estimates of the “Shock Connections” variable presented in Table 4, which average the effect of

15

Due to data limitations, this decomposition is not possible across all countries’ PEPs in the full sample.
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heterogenous connections (including those to political agents with little or no direct influence over
public procurements, such as ambassadors), likely underestimate the impact of specific political
agents with the greatest capabilities to influence public funding allocations.
In Table 1.7.4, Columns (4)-(6) test whether accountability institutions moderate the
financial value of CPCs. In Column 4, the negative interaction effect between shock connections
and horizontal accountability institutions (β = −27,048,115; p = 0.042) indicates that stronger
horizontal accountability institutions weaken the effect of CPCs on the value of contracts
awarded, thus supporting Hypothesis 2a. However, from the results in columns (5) and (6), I find
no statistically significant evidence that vertical (β = 2,708,881; p = 0.917) or diagonal
accountability institutions (β = −2,045,425; p = 0.910) have the same moderation effect.
Therefore, Hypotheses 2b and 2c are not supported.
One potential explanation for these results in Columns (4)-(6) is that in the context of this
study, the power of citizens to hold government officials accountable via free and fair elections
(vertical accountability) and the power of civil society organizations or the media to apply
pressure on the government (diagonal accountability) are simply irrelevant or ineffective
constraints on how contracting authorities award public procurement contracts. Although
information on public procurements is publicly available, the results suggest that limiting the
government’s favoritism towards private firms in public procurements is perhaps not a critical
issue that determines how citizens cast their votes; and that neither civil society organizations nor
the media are consistently scrutinizing the actions of myriad contracting authorities. Particularly if
public procurements were not a salient issue to the electorate, then the media’s efforts to report
cases of favoritism would not be impactful. However, because horizontal accountability
institutions include oversight entities (i.e., ombudsmen, inspector generals, and comptroller
generals) and procedures that record and check the decisions of public authorities, they directly
increase the difficulty for any single political agent to exert influence on the government’s
allocative decisions in favor of private parties. Thus, the differential impact of institutions on the
financial value of CPCs found in this study should be interpreted as specific to the context. In
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other contexts—for other types of political strategies and for other channels by which the
strategies can generate economic rents—the impact of institutions could be very different.
To help visualize the results of column (4) in Table 1.7.4, Figure 1.8.4 plots the predicted
value of a CPC on public procurement awards using the model’s parameter estimates and each
country’s V-DEM Horizontal Accountability Index in 2017. The model suggests that there is an
annual €10.7 million difference in the effect of a political connection on procurement contracts
between countries with the least (Malta) and most (Denmark) horizontal accountability in 2017.
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1.8.4 about here
--------------------------------------------------------------------

1.5.2 Mechanisms of influence
Scholars of corruption have examined various methods that contracting authorities can
employ to exert favoritism towards private parties. Contracting authorities, even while acting in
compliance with the EU’s public procurement directives, can influence the outcomes of a public
procurement process by limiting fair competition between firms during the bid submission phase
and the award evaluation phase (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020; Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2013):
(1) Although most public procurement tenders undergo an open procedure in which any firm can
submit a bid, contracting authorities can also conduct non-open procedures that restrict the type
of suppliers who can make bids, thus limiting competition outright. (2) Contracting authorities set
the length of the bid submission period, with especially short periods posing potential challenges
for “unwanted” suppliers to prepare a bid in time. Indeed, a contract won through a tendering
process that only yielded few bidders under a short submission period is suggestive of a corrupt
bidding process with “premediated assessment” (Fazekas & Tóth, 2016: 326) by the purchasing
agency. (3) Contracting authorities can make corrections to a tender’s specifications, such as the
quantity or quality demanded, that create uncertainty for non-favored parties and plausible
grounds to reject their bids. (4) Finally, during the award evaluation phase (after all bids are
submitted), contracting authorities can deem a certain bid to be uncompetitive or even ineligible
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for consideration by citing that it fails to satisfy a technical requirement or some other criterion
regarding the quality of the goods or services offered. Tender documents with especially long lists
of technical requirements and award criteria thus provide contracting authorities with greater
latitude to influence outcomes using subjective measures (Fazekas et al., 2013).
Table 1.7.5 provides a descriptive analysis of the contracts in my sample to explore these
mechanisms behind how CPCs might influence the public procurement process. Columns (1)-(3)
show that (1) the use of a non-open bidding procedure, (2) the bid submission period length, and
(3) the number of bids submitted are not statistically correlated with whether the contract was won
by a politically connected firm or with the horizontal accountability of the country to which the
purchasing agency and the firm belong. However, Columns (4) and (6) show that contracts in
countries with stronger (weaker) horizontal accountability institutions have fewer (more) tender
corrections (β = −6.23; p < 0.001) and discretionary award criteria (β = −7.29; p < 0.001); and
Column (5) shows that in countries with stronger (weaker) horizontal accountability institutions,
contracts won by firms with a shock CPC have shorter (longer) technical requirements than those
without (β = −5,620.99; p = 0.034). Put together, these results suggest that political agents might
not be influencing the bid submission phase to the extent that fewer companies are able or willing
to submit bids. Instead, political agents in a low accountability environment might be relying on
the subjective criteria applied during the evaluation phase to benefit firms with CPCs.
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.5 about here
--------------------------------------------------------------------

1.5.3 Empirical results in relation to previous studies
To explore how my results connect to extant scholarship on the value of CPCs, I analyze
the relationship between CPCs and contract awards using empirical approaches that echo
previous studies. In Appendix Table 1.9.A3, Columns (1)-(3) regress Award i,t on a dichotomous
variable, where a firm i is politically connected (=1) in year t if at least one manager or board
member is classified as a PEP regardless of whether the person was hired with a known
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connection. This dichotomous measure is similar to that used in previous studies in that there is
no distinction between hired connections and shock connections—a firm is politically connected if
it holds either form of connections.
In Appendix Table 1.9.A3, Column (1) includes only year fixed effects and shows a
positive correlation between Awardi,t and political connectedness (β = 1,561,057; p < 0.001).
Column (2) includes industry fixed effects, country (of firm’s headquarters) fixed effects, and
various firm-level controls. This specification in Column (2) is akin to those in previous studies
(e.g., in Brockman et al., 2013 and Faccio et al., 2006) that match connected firms with
unconnected firms based on observed variables. 16 Consistent with those studies, Column (2)
finds that political connectedness is associated with greater financial benefits when controlling for
firms’ observed characteristics (β = 834,616; p = 0.020).
However, with the introduction of firm fixed effects in Column (3), the relationship
becomes statistically insignificant (β = −1,014,873; p = 0.422). One explanation is that firms with
certain unobserved time-invariant characteristics—such as a greater propensity to bid for or win
contracts—are more likely to hire PEPs; and that these variables better explain the data’s
variation in Awardi,t than a simple measure of firm connectedness that is confounded with
baseline managerial capabilities (i.e., the qualities that determine hiring likelihood). The results of
Column (3) are consistent with those in Bertrand et al. (2018): the authors also include firm fixed
effects to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics (though there is no distinction
between hired and shock connections), and they find that CPCs do not enable any preferential
access to government resources.
Columns (4)-(6) repeat the same exercise with a continuous variable for the number of
connections and show similar results. Therefore, Appendix Table 1.9.A3 has reproduced results
reflecting both the studies showing a positive impact of CPCs on firm outcomes—in Columns (2)
and (4)—and those showing a null impact—in Columns (5) and (6). These analyses thus

If the control variables of an OLS regression model and the matched variables of a matching design are
the same, the two empirical methods differ simply in the unequal weighing of observations (Angrist &
Pischke, 2009: 73).

16
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demonstrate that controlling for unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristics that are
confounded with both the likelihood of hiring PEPs and the study’s dependent variable(s) of
interest can strongly impact our estimates of the impact of CPCs. Together with the main findings
in Table 1.7.4, my results highlight that to separately identify the impact of a firm’s political
connectedness, both firm fixed effects and the distinction of hired connections from shock
connections—of which the latter’s formation is arguably exogenous to firm choice—are
imperative.

1.5.4 Accountability institutions and personnel decisions
Exerting influence to win a public procurement contract is one of the myriad ways in
which a firm can utilize CPCs to obtain economic rents. If rent-seeking opportunities, in general,
are indeed more plentiful or easier to exploit in weak institutional environments, then we should
expect firms to strategically respond to weaker institutions with the hiring of more PEPs.
Table 1.7.6 provides models that test whether accountability institutions impact firms’
personnel decisions regarding CPCs. Columns (1)-(3) are linear probability models that regress a
dichotomous indicator of political connectedness through a hired connection on the three
accountability indices. The models show that when horizontal (β = −0.354; p < 0.001), vertical (β
= −1.720; p < 0.001), and diagonal (β = −0.377; p < 0.001) accountability institutions are stronger
(weaker), firms have fewer (more) managers or board members hired with a known political
connection, with the impact of vertical accountability institutions to be particularly strong. Columns
(4)-(6) take a continuous measure of the number of politically connections as the dependent
variable and show similar results. These findings support Hypotheses 3a-3c.
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.6 about here
-------------------------------------------------------------------The results in Columns (1) and (4) of Table 1.7.6 are consistent with those in Column (4)
of Table 1.7.4: If political connectedness is more valuable in the public procurement process
when horizontal accountability institutions are weak, then we should expect firms to strategically
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respond to weaker horizontal accountability institutions by hiring more PEPs. Table 1.7.6
additionally shows that firms are responsive to variation in vertical and diagonal accountability
institutions in their hiring of PEPs. Even though I find no evidence that vertical and diagonal
accountability institutions moderate the value of CPCs on public procurements specifically (Table
1.7.4), they likely moderate the value of CPCs on other rent-seeking opportunities not examined
in this study’s main results about public procurements. Overall, Table 1.7.6 is consistent with the
rent-seeking literature predicting that firms alter their political strategies in response to weaker
institutional environments that make economic rent-seeking more feasible and effective (Choi &
Storr, 2019).
Table 1.7.7 provides additional details about firms’ rent-seeking behavior vis-à-vis their
competitors in weak institutional environments. Column (1) shows that a focal firm is more likely
hire PEPs as managers or board members (β = 0.025; p < 0.001) if its competitors are also more
politically connected. (Because a focal firm’s hiring decisions can also impact its competitors’
hiring decisions, and vice versa, this estimate should be interpreted as a correlation, not
causation.) Columns (2)-(4) indicate that this correlation is stronger (weaker) when horizontal (β =
-0.010; p < 0.072), vertical (β = -0.016; p < 0.005), and diagonal (β = -0.008; p < 0.045)
institutions are weaker (stronger), thus supporting Hypotheses 4a-4c. These findings suggest that
firms’ strategic response to institutional decline might stem not only from rent-seeking incentives
but also from competitive pressures. As the constraints of political patronage are weakened, firms
increase their focus in nonmarket competition in the political arena and expand their governmentbusiness relationships.
-------------------------------------------------------------------Insert Table 1.7.7 about here
--------------------------------------------------------------------

1.5.5 Evidence of existence of political lock-in
A post-hoc analytical decomposition of firms’ strategic response to institutional quality
provides evidence that some firms might be engaged in structural or cognitive lock-in (Sun et al.,
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2012) wherein a political tie is strengthened not as a strategic response to environmental
variables but as an obligation to sustain the relationship (Uzzi, 1997). Appendix Table 1.9.A4
decomposes the findings of Table 6 into “unrelated” and “related” PEP hires. An unrelated PEP
hire is a manager or board member who, when hired, is not related to any other PEP already
working at the firm. By contrast, a related PEP hire is a manager or board member who, when
hired, is related (as a family member or close affiliate) to another PEP already working as a
manager or board member at the firm. 17
Columns (1)-(3) show that firms respond to stronger (weaker) horizontal (β = −0.421; p =
0.007), vertical (β = −3.153; p < 0.001), and diagonal (β = −0.372; p = 0.014) institutions by hiring
fewer (more) unrelated PEPs. However, Columns (4)-(6) show that the hiring of related PEPs
exhibits no such sensitivity to horizontal (β = 0.026; p = 0.397), vertical (β = 0.029; p = 0.797), or
diagonal (β = 0.028; p = 0.367) institutions. These results are consistent with a model of a socially
embedded firm that strategically responds to the nonmarket environment while being constrained
by the relationships in which it is embedded (Uzzi, 1997): When institutions are weaker, the firm
hires more unrelated PEPs to take advantage of more plentiful rent-seeking opportunities.
However, once a political tie has been formed, the firm might become obligated to strengthen the
existing connection by hiring a related PEP, which is not a strategic response to the nonmarket
environment but instead the consequence of structural or cognitive pressures to reinvest in the
same connection (Sun et al., 2012).

1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, I find that across 28 European countries, horizontal accountability
institutions moderate the positive impact of CPCs on the value of public procurement contracts
awarded. I contribute to an empirical bridge between studies that have produced mixed results on
the value of political connections. I do so not only by showing the importance of the institutional

17 For example, consider that after the spouse of a sitting minister joins a firm, the sibling of the same
minister also joins the firm. The sibling would be classified as a related PEP hire.
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context in determining the value of CPCs, but also by demonstrating the statistical importance of
separately identifying a measure of political connectedness that is not confounded with other
baseline managerial qualities or time-invariant firm characteristics. In addition, I find that firms
respond strategically to the institutional environment by hiring and retaining more PEPs when
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal accountability institutions are weaker, and that institutional
decline intensifies the competitive response to rivals’ political connections. These results advance
the nonmarket strategy literature by providing insight into how a specific set of institutions that
make up the overall nonmarket environment impact the value and use of CPCs.
In addition, my results motivate future research to investigate the various channels by
which CPCs and other political strategies enable economic rent-seeking. Even though vertical
and diagonal accountability institutions do not moderate the impact of CPCs on public
procurement contracts, firms’ decisions about hiring and retaining CPCs are sensitive to all three
forms of accountability institutions, suggesting that vertical and diagonal accountability institutions
alter the feasibility or effectiveness of rent-seeking and regulatory capture via political
connections in contexts outside of the public procurement process. For example, firms can utilize
CPCs to advance favored policies or the selective enforcement of market regulations; but these
means of patronage might be quite visible to the electorate and hence quite sensitive to vertical
and diagonal accountability institutions. Future research to uncover how institutions moderate the
ability of firms to leverage CPCs in such regulatory capture might yield useful insights for public
accountability advocates, political actors, and other stakeholders in identifying the usefulness of
different kinds of political constraints.
More speculatively, this study’s evidence of the sensitivity of firms’ political connections to
institutional quality implies that institutional decline and government-business patronage might be
mutually reinforcing. Research in political economy suggests that weak institutions can enable
political and economic elites to sustain each other’s dominance through reciprocal support: the
political actor supplies the firm with rents and favorable policies, while the firm can provide
resources to help politicians maintain control (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). This paper provides
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suggestive evidence that institutional decline, coupled with competitive pressures between rival
firms in the nonmarket arena, can motivate firms to expand their CPCs. In turn, if political agents
can leverage these ties to entrench their positions, such as by pressuring firms to increase
employment beyond efficient levels to support their re-election (Bertrand et al., 2018), the political
incentive to sustain or further degrade the weak institutional environment is strong (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2012). Thus, although this paper finds that institutional decline can facilitate rentseeking by large public firms, the potential entrenchment of political and corporate incumbents
might result in market barriers that disadvantage entrepreneurs, small firms without the means to
sustain political ties, and other entrants or disruptors. As such, there exists a business case for
various private sector actors to align with civil society actors in supporting stronger accountability
institutions to prevent the shift of competitive focus towards the political arena.
There are several limitations to this research. First, despite responding to calls for
research into CPCs in a multi-country context, this study considers only European countries.
Thus, the results should be interpreted as specific to democratic nations of the West where
accountability institutions are generally quite strong. I provide some evidence that accountability
institutions matter in much of Europe, but future research is needed to consider which and how
institutions matter in non-democratic and emerging market contexts. Second, this study does not
consider the impact of transnational political ties on rent-seeking by multinational firms. Third, I do
not consider the interaction between CPCs and other nonmarket strategies, such as how firms
combine CPCs with other political activities and corporate social responsibility into a portfolio of
nonmarket activities that drive performance (Jia, 2014; Liu, Yang, & Augustine, 2018). Fourth, I
do not consider how heterogeneity in firms’ market capabilities (Jia, 2016) or in the type of
political connections (Zheng et al., 2015) determine the effectiveness of CPCs. Finally, although I
examine how checks on political agents impact CPCs, the greater public can also punish
businesses for their political activities, such as through protests and boycotts (McDonnell &
Werner, 2016). Examining how electoral capabilities and activist campaigns can be combined to
pressure both sides of government-business relationships could enrich our understanding in the
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ways that stakeholders can constrain rent-seeking via political means and perhaps even
incentivize (or force) both the public and private sectors to address important societal challenges.
Despite the aforementioned limitations, this paper offers a set of contributions. For
scholars of nonmarket strategy, I contribute to evidence that the institutional environment is a key
determinant of the benefits that a political strategy might provide. My results thus emphasize the
need to contextualize our research and understanding of political strategies within the institutional
context of each study. My empirical approach to identifying the value of CPCs—by using shock
connections and firm fixed effects—also underscores the importance of controlling for firmspecific propensity to hire connected managers, as failing to do so might lead to estimates that
confound political connectedness with managerial ability, firm characteristics, and the dependent
variable(s) of interest. In addition, I highlight the scholarship on accountability institutions in the
political science literature and emphasize that horizontal, vertical, and diagonal institutions
compose distinct aspects of the nonmarket environment. The differential impacts of these
institutions on the value of CPCs and firm behaviors suggest that future research on which and
how institutions impact the value or use of political strategies can produce much useful insight.
Finally, for practitioners, this study provides evidence that horizontal accountability
institutions can be effective at curbing the private influence of business on the allocation of public
resources. Business practitioners might wish to exercise caution in weak institutional
environments amidst competitors who might utilize CPCs to seek rents, and civil society actors
who want to limit the influence of special interests on the allocative decisions of political agents
might consider targeting horizontal accountability institutions for reform or reinforcement.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.7.1: Firm Characteristics and Public Procurement Contract Awards by Country

Austria
Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Netherlands
Norway

Total
number
of
contract
s won by
firms
between
2009
and
2017

Total
value of
contracts
won by
firms
between
2009
and
2017 (€
millions)

Number
of firms
with
available
data

Average
market
capitalization (€
millions)
in 2017

Average
total
assets (€
millions) in
2017

Average
number
of
employee
s in 2017

Number
of firms
that have
won at
least 1
contract
between
2009 and
2017

60

1,500

2,273

6,603

10

65

595

132

2,353

2,778

4,768

13

87

193

152

128

119

709

35

471

749

87

72

227

1,342

8

14

79

15

1,450

1,823

2,862

3

447

1,557

124

2,553

1,481

7,327

25

96

1,686

17

153

221

1,133

1

20

256

140

1,344

1,398

3,894

37

347

1,919

675

2,656

3,897

11,569

235

4,074

17,526

620

2,707

4,265

9,583

61

779

1,414

192

185

423

802

11

36

75

33

526

684

2,247

5

100

2,083

77

7,768

6,541

19,557

0

0

0

293

1,238

2,436

2,652

101

1,317

6,372

23

26

56

396

6

73

244

29

154

189

903

4

81

969

25

344

121

574

1

1

1

122

4,991

6,437

12,861

8

20

68

172

1,462

1,526

1,971

22

244

1,832
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Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
All Countries

710

136

219

950

185

5,777

20,619

47

1,072

2,109

6,052

7

23

91

356

40

72

317

97

1,062

3,977

82

36

58

191

15

164

2,134

24

175

363

2,302

8

158

203

217

2,309

3,403

6,900

52

1,454

6,427

767

789

659

2,093

65

238

2,949

198

5,613

3,547

9,231

16

112

980

1,141

1,968

2,567

6,355

115

449

17,565

6,530

1,676

2,109

5,322

1,146

17,709

92,561

Notes: The number of firms with available data is the number of public companies found in the
BvD Orbis database with headquarters located in the specified country that were publicly listed on
any stock exchange between 2009 and 2017.
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Table 1.7.2: Corporate Political Connections by Country

Number of
firms with
available
data

Austria
Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland

60
132
152
87
15
124
17
140
675
620
192
33
77
293
23
29
25
122
172
710

Number of
politically
connected
firms
between
2009 and
2017

Number of
firms
connected
via a top
officer who
is/was a
government
member

Number of
firms
connected via
a top officer
who is/was a
relative of a
government
member

Number of
firms with a top
officer who
gained a
connection at
least 1 year
after joining
(shock
connection)

23

22

6

1

51

49

20

8

76

72

16

15

41

37

13

8

7

7

2

0

74

61

41

26

10

9

5

2

101

97

21

51

361

354

101

84

305

293

63

52

63

63

11

4

25

24

14

5

61

56

28

19

190

184

81

22

12

10

9

1

16

13

10

3

17

17

5

1

71

69

23

16

134

132

107

41

396

368

96

68
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Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
All Countries

47
356
82
24
217
767
198
1,141
6,530

42

40

21

11

137

122

40

33

10

8

3

0

12

12

2

6

157

153

62

42

546

535

273

123

137

133

51

42

850

814

495

235

3,925

3,754

1,619

919

Notes: The number of firms with available data is the number of public companies found in the
BvD Orbis database with headquarters located in the specified country that were publicly listed on
any stock exchange between 2009 and 2017. A firm is politically connected if at least one top
officer—defined as a manager or a board member identified in the BvD Orbis database—is
classified as a PEP in the RDC database between 2009 and 2017.
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Table 1.7.3: Descriptions of Measures of Accountability Institutions

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

0.92

0.08

0.59

0.99

Vertical
Accountability
Index

Vertical accountability captures the extent to
which citizens have the power to hold the
government accountable. The mechanisms
of vertical accountability include formal
political participation by citizens—such as
being able to freely organize in political
parties and participate in free and fair
elections, including for the chief executive.

0.93

0.02

0.83

0.96

Diagonal
Accountability
Index

Diagonal accountability covers the range of
actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil
society organizations, and an independent
media can use to hold the government
accountable. These mechanisms include
using informal tools such as social
mobilization and investigative journalism to
enhance vertical and horizontal
accountability.

0.94

0.05

0.64

0.98

Measure

Horizontal
Accountability
Index

Description

Horizontal accountability concerns the
power of state institutions to oversee the
government by demanding information,
questioning officials, and punishing
improper behavior. This form of
accountability ensures checks between
institutions and prevents the abuse of
power. The key agents in horizontal
government accountability are: the
legislature; the judiciary; and specific
oversight agencies such as ombudsmen,
prosecutors, and comptroller generals.

Notes: The description of each measure, as provided by documentation of the V-DEM dataset in
Coppedge et al. (2020), are reproduced in this table. The three accountability indices range from
0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger accountability institutions. The mean, standard
deviation, minimum, and maximum of each institutional measure reported in this table are
calculated using all available country-year observations from 2009 to 2017. For a visual
breakdown of each country’s index scores, please see Figures 1, 2, and 3.
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Table 1.7.4: Institutional Constraints on the Value of Corporate Political Connections
(Dependent Variable: Total Annual Value of Public Procurement Contracts in Euros)

Shock
Connections

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

3,824,892
(0.006)

3,244,283
(0.013)

3,722,013
(0.041)

3,691,791
(0.041)

3,732,170
(0.041)

3,700,101
(0.041)

1,192,299
(0.001)

-41,899
(0.949)

-57,649
(0.930)

-40,495
(0.950)

-46,402
(0.944)

Hired
Connections
Horizontal
Accountability

9,705,914
(0.212)

Shock
Connections ✕
Horizontal
Accountability

-27,048,115
(0.042)

Vertical
Accountability

17,787,787
(0.555)

Shock
Connections ✕
Vertical
Accountability

2,708,881
(0.917)

Diagonal
Accountability
Shock
Connections ✕
Diagonal
Accountability
Year fixed effects
Control variables
Firm fixed effects
Observations

4,276,265
(0.687)
-2,045,425
(0.910)
Yes
No
No
52,415

Yes
Yes
No
52,415

Yes
Yes
Yes
52,415

Yes
Yes
Yes
52,415

Yes
Yes
Yes
52,415

Yes
Yes
Yes
52,415

Notes: Parentheses contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level.
Control variables include total assets, market capitalization, number of employees, and countryyear time trends. The three accountability indices, which range from 0 to 1 (with higher values
indicating stronger accountability institutions), have been mean-centered in specifications 4, 5, 6
to help with interpretation of the main effects and interaction parameter estimates.
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Table 1.7.5: Mechanisms of Influence in the Public Procurement Process: A Descriptive Analysis
of Winning Contracts
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Length of the
Technical
Requirements
Document
(Number of
Characters)

Number of
Discretionary
Contract
Award
Criteria
Associated
with the
Tender

Whether
a Nonopen
Bidding
Procedure
Was Used

Length
of
Bidding
Period
(Days)

Number
of Bids
Submitted
for the Lot

Number of
Tender
Corrections
Submitted
by the
Purchasing
Agency

Firm with
Shock
Connection

-0.01
(0.778)

-8.30
(0.242)

0.34
(0.284)

0.02
(0.872)

-196.59
(0.173)

0.19
(0.164)

Firm with Hired
Connection

-0.02
(0.362)

-1.60
(0.704)

0.23
(0.404)

-0.18
(0.182)

-93.62
(0.518)

-0.21
(0.188)

Horizontal
Accountability

0.13
(0.500)

-45.08
(0.535)

-2.84
(0.371)

-6.23
(0.000)

-688.37
(0.787)

-7.29
(0.000)

0.04
(0.883)

198.37
(0.151)

-3.58
(0.488)

-6.28
(0.131)

-5,620.99
(0.034)

-2.72
(0.198)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

17,369

13,093

17,369

17,369

17,369

17,369

Firm with
Shock
Connection ✕
Horizontal
Accountability
Year fixed
effects
Control
variables
Firm fixed
effects
Observationsa

Notes: The dependent variable of each model is indicated under the model number. Parentheses
contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level. The explanatory
variables are 1) whether the contract was won by a firm with a shock connection; 2) whether the
contract was won by a firm with a hired connection; 3) the horizontal accountability of the country
to which the purchasing agency and the firm belong; and 4) the interaction of a shock connection
with the horizontal accountability of the country associated with the contract. Control variables
include total assets, market capitalization, and the number of employees of the firm that won the
contract. The horizontal accountability index, which ranges from 0 to 1 (with higher values
indicating stronger accountability institutions), has been mean-centered.
a
Each observation is a contract (lot) between a contracting authority and a firm. Although my data
contains 17,709 contracts, some of these contracts contain missing data on the dependent
variable used in these models.
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Table 1.7.6: The Impact of Accountability Institutions on Firms’ Personnel Decisions

Horizontal
Accountability

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Whether
Firm Has
≥1
Manager
or Board
Member
Hired with
a Known
Political
Connectio
n

Whether
Firm Has
≥1
Manager
or Board
Member
Hired with
a Known
Political
Connectio
n

Whether
Firm Has
≥1
Manager
or Board
Member
Hired with
a Known
Political
Connectio
n

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
Political
Connection
s

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
Political
Connection
s

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
Political
Connection
s

-0.354
(0.000)

Vertical
Accountability

-0.405
(0.010)

-1.720
(0.000)

Diagonal
Accountability
Year fixed
effects
Control
variables
Firm fixed
effects
Observation
s

-3.198
(0.000)

-0.377
(0.000)

-0.379
(0.013)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression model is indicated under the model number.
Parentheses contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level. Control
variables include total assets, market capitalization, and number of employees. The three
accountability indices range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger accountability
institutions.
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Table 1.7.7: Institutional Moderators of Firms’ Response to Within-Industry Competition for
Corporate Political Connections
(Dependent Variable: Number of Managers or Board Members Hired with Known Political
Connections)

Fraction of Politically
Connected Competitors

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.025
(0.000)

0.026
(0.000)

0.027
(0.000)

0.026
(0.000)

Horizontal Accountability

-0.397
(0.005)

Fraction of Politically
Connected Competitors ✕
Horizontal Accountability

-0.010
(0.072)

Vertical Accountability

-3.281
(0.000)

Fraction of Politically
Connected Competitors ✕
Vertical Accountability

-0.016
(0.005)

Diagonal Accountability

-0.384
(0.037)

Fraction of Politically
Connected Competitors ✕
Diagonal Accountability

-0.008
(0.045)

Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
41,512
41,512
41,512
41,512
Notes: Parentheses contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level.
Control variables include total assets, market capitalization, and number of employees. This
subsample (N=5,259 firms) excludes firms without within-country competitors in the same
industry according to the NACE (Level 1) industry classification codes. The Fraction of Politically
Connected Competitors for each firm-year observation is constructed as [(number of rival firms in
the same country and industry with at least one political connection) / (total number of rival firms
in the same country and industry)]. The three accountability indices, which range from 0 to 1 (with
higher values indicating stronger accountability institutions), have been mean-centered in
specifications 4, 5, 6 to help with interpretation of the main effects and interaction parameter
estimates.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.8.1: Variation in Horizontal Accountability Between 2009 and 2017

Notes: The accountability index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger
accountability institutions. The diamonds indicate the average score, and the lines indicate the
range (minimum to maximum) from 2009 to 2017.
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Figure 1.8.2: Variation in Vertical Accountability Between 2009 and 2017

Notes: The accountability index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger
accountability institutions. The diamonds indicate the average score, and the lines indicate the
range (minimum to maximum) from 2009 to 2017.
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Figure 1.8.3: Variation in Diagonal Accountability Between 2009 and 2017

Notes: The accountability index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger
accountability institutions. The diamonds indicate the average score, and the lines indicate the
range (minimum to maximum) from 2009 to 2017.
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Figure 1.8.4: Predicted Impact of a Corporate Political Connection on Public Procurement Awards
in 2017

Notes: The accountability index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger
accountability institutions. The predicted value of a CPC is calculated using the country’s
Horizontal Accountability Index in 2017 and the parameter estimates from column (4) in Table
1.7.4.
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1.9 Appendix
Appendix Table 1.9.A1: Comparison of Political Connectedness of Public Firms with Faccio
(2006)

Austria
Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
All Countries

(1)
This study:
Number of firms
with available
data

(2)
This study:
Percent of
politically
connected firms

(3)
Faccio (2006):
Number of firms
with available
data

(4)
Faccio (2006):
Percent of
politically
connected firms

60
132
152
87
15
124
17
140
675
620
192
33
77
293
23
29
25
122
172
710
47
356
82
24
217
767
198
1,141
6,530

38.33%
38.64%
50.00%
47.13%
46.67%
59.68%
58.82%
72.14%
53.48%
49.19%
32.81%
75.76%
79.22%
64.85%
52.17%
55.17%
68.00%
58.20%
77.91%
55.77%
89.36%
38.48%
12.20%
50.00%
72.35%
71.19%
69.19%
74.50%
60.11%

110
157

0.91%
3.82%

63
228

0.00%
3.07%

132
914
840
153
27
82
233

1.52%
2.19%
1.55%
0.65%
3.70%
2.44%
10.30%

238
206
57
101

0.42%
0.00%
0.00%
2.97%

200
280
243
2,149

1.50%
1.07%
2.47%
7.17%

Notes: In Column (1), the number of firms with available data is the number of public companies
found in the BvD Orbis database with headquarters located in the specified country that were
publicly listed on any stock exchange between 2009 and 2017. In Column (2), A firm is politically
connected if at least one top officer—defined as a manager or a board member identified in the
BvD Orbis database—is classified as a PEP in the RDC database between 2009 and 2017.
Columns (3) and (4) are reproduced from Table 2 of Faccio (2006), which studies the CPCs of
publicly listed companies between 1997 and 2001.
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Appendix Table 1.9.A2: Impact of Shock Corporate Political Connections by PEP Category
(in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, and United Kingdom)
Dependent Variable: Total Annual Value of Public
Procurement Contracts in Euros
Executive-Level Positions, Cabinet
Members,
and Their Senior Aides and
Advisors

904,056
(0.060)

Officials Overseeing
Infrastructure Sectors

12,802,091
(0.087)

Officials Overseeing
Non-Infrastructure Sectors

1,203,121
(0.113)

Legislators

2,566,025
(0.124)

Municipal/Regional Officials

-383,858
(0.820)

Ambassadors

567,802
(0.694)

Military Figures

-2,620,190
(0.499)

Judicial Figures

-841,435
(0.259)

Other/Uncategorizable

566,025
(0.510)

Year fixed effects
Control variables
Firm fixed effects
Observations

Yes
Yes
Yes
23,463

Notes: This table presents a decomposition of the “Shock Connections” variable in Column (3) of
Table 1.7.4 by PEP category in a subsample of 2,917 firms in 7 countries. (Due to data
limitations, a decomposition of PEPs by category is not available across all countries in the full
sample). Parentheses contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level.
Control variables include hired connections, total assets, market capitalization, number of
employees, and country-year time trends.
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Appendix Table 1.9.A3: How a Simplified Measure of Connectedness Might Confound Political
Connectedness with Manager or Firm Characteristics
(Dependent Variable: Total Annual Value of Public Procurement Contracts in Euros)

Firm is Connected
(Firm has at least
one political
connection, with no
distinction between
shock and hired
connections)

(1)

(2)

(3)

1,561,057
(0.000)

834,616
(0.020)

-1,014,873
(0.422)

Number of
Connections
(Number of shock
and hired
connections
combined)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1,583,068
(0.000)

1,034,170
(0.001)

32,575
(0.957)

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry fixed
effects
Country fixed
effects
Control variables

No

Yes

Absorbed

No

Yes

Absorbed

No

Yes

Absorbed

No

Yes

Absorbed

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Firm fixed effects

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

Observations

Notes: Parentheses contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level.
Control variables include total assets, market capitalization, and number of employees. In this
table, a political connection is defined as having a manager or board member who is classified as
a PEP, regardless of whether the manager or board member was already classified as PEP at
the time of hiring (i.e., there is no distinction between shock and hired connections).
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Appendix Table 1.9.A4: Firms’ Hiring of Related Politically Exposed Persons is Not Sensitive to
Accountability Institutions

Horizontal
Accountability

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
CPCs
Unrelated
to Another
Manager or
Board
Member

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
CPCs
Unrelated
to Another
Manager or
Board
Member

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
CPCs
Unrelated
to Another
Manager or
Board
Member

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
CPCs
Related to
Another
Manager
or Board
Member

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
CPCs
Related to
Another
Manager
or Board
Member

Number of
Managers
or Board
Members
Hired with
Known
CPCs
Related to
Another
Manager
or Board
Member

-0.421
(0.007)

Vertical
Accountability

0.026
(0.397)

-3.153
(0.000)

Diagonal
Accountability
Year fixed
effects
Control
variables
Firm fixed
effects
Observations

0.029
(0.797)

-0.372
(0.014)

0.028
(0.367)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

52,415

Notes: The dependent variable of each regression model is indicated under the model number.
Parentheses contain p-values. Robust standard errors were clustered at the firm level. Control
variables include total assets, market capitalization, and number of employees. The three
accountability indices range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger accountability
institutions.
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CHAPTER 2: Private Philanthropy and Political Influence
Tony L. He

2.1 Introduction
Governments commonly encourage private philanthropy by providing donors with tax
benefits. While the stated goal is often the promotion of social welfare, philanthropy can be used
by donors as a tax-advantaged method to purchase social or political influence (Bertrand,
Bombardini, Fisman, & Trebbi, 2020) when the resources that are pledged to public and
charitable goals generate private gains for the donor. 18 In this paper, I investigate a specific
channel of such influence by examining how private philanthropy might be used to support
politically active nonprofit organizations that engage in political spending to affect the outcome of
elections in the United States.
In the U.S., two landmark Supreme Court cases, Federal Election Commission (FEC) v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. in 2007 (henceforth Wisconsin RTL) and Citizens United v. FEC in
2010 (henceforth Citizens United), greatly expanded the ability of third-party organizations—
businesses, nonprofit organizations, labor unions, and other associations—to spend money on
political communications to influence the outcomes of elections (Gerken, 2013). In particular,
because nonprofit organizations 19 are not required to reveal their donors to the public, the two
Supreme Court decisions enabled them to purchase advertisements on print media, radio, and
television that directly endorse or oppose candidates while masking the sources of their funding.
Table 2.6.1 shows that this kind of direct spending in federal elections by nonprofits that do not
have to reveal their donors—colloquially referred to as “dark money” in politics—rose from $5

As an example, the Donald J. Trump Foundation was shut down on December 18, 2018 under court
supervision while the New York Attorney General’s Office investigated the organization for various accounts
of illegal self-dealing under the guise of philanthropy, such as the purchase of goods and services for
personal benefit with foundation money, diverting business income as donations, and coordinating grants to
benefit Trump’s presidential campaign (Goldmacher, 2018).
19 In this paper, a “nonprofit” organization refers to a 501c organization that is not a private foundation.
Political action committees (PACs), though also tax-exempt, are also not considered as “nonprofit”
organizations.
18

55

million in 2004 to $113 million in 2008 and $312 million in 2012 (=7% of total spending in the
2012 election by all groups). 20,21
Nonprofit groups do not have to disclose their funders, but certain funders—private
foundations in particular—must disclose their grantees on annual tax forms. Using a proprietary
dataset on the universe of grants given by private foundations since 2000, this project aims to
explore whether private philanthropy is used as a tax-advantaged method to influence politics
through grantmaking to politically active nonprofit groups. I find evidence showing that private
philanthropy is used as a tax-advantaged method to influence politics. Following Citizens United,
an operationally active private foundation 22 that had donated to influence policy or voting
outcomes in the past donates an average of $992 more per year to politically active nonprofits.
For a corporate foundation—that is, a foundation that receives most of its funding via taxdeductible contributions from an affiliated firm, and whose board generally consists of the firm’s
executives—the effect size is stronger at $3,650 per year, suggesting that firms also leverage the
use of philanthropy as a corporate political strategy. In addition, donations to a nonprofit are
sensitive to the political landscape: a nonprofit that is legally allowed to engage in direct political
spending receives an additional $289 per year in donations for every 1% decrease in its home
state’s margin of victory in the previous presidential election. These empirical findings suggest
that grantmaking behavior is partly driven by non-altruistic, political motives.
The following sections proceed as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
campaign finance in U.S. elections, legal context about U.S. nonprofit organizations, and a
discussion of related literature. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy, Section 4

20 Due to data limitations, Table 2.6.1’s analysis is restricted to 501c(4-10) organizations that spent at least
$50,000 in direct political spending during an election year. The sum total of spending by these
organizations comprise over 90% of all spending by all nonprofit organizations that do not have to report
their donors to the public.
21 The Supreme Court decisions also gave rise to “super” political action committees (PACs) that can accept
unlimited contributions from any entity and engage in unlimited political spending. However, because 1)
PACs are required to reveal the identities of their donors to the public, 2) there are no tax advantages in
donating to PACs, and 3) private foundations are prohibited from contributing to PACs, this paper does not
consider the role of PACs in how private philanthropy might influence politics.
22 This paper considers only private foundations that have been operationally active, defined here as having
made an average of at least $100,000 in grants per year over a period of 5 years during the study period.
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provides the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes with a discussion on the implications of
the findings and future research directions.

2.2 Background
2.2.1 Nonprofit Organizations
In the U.S., nonprofit organizations classified under the 501c umbrella are exempt from
most federal income taxes and do not have to reveal their donors to the public. There are 29
types of 501c organizations, but the great majority of them are classified as 501c(3), which are
“organized and operated for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals” (Office of the Federal
Register, 2011). Donations to all 501c(3) organizations are deductible on the donor’s income tax
return. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) further classifies 501c(3) organizations into two
different types: public charities and private foundations. Public charities primarily receive money
from donors or the government in order to provide a service to society. Examples of 501c(3)
public charities include United Way, American Cancer Society, homeless shelters, most religious
organizations, private universities such as the University of Pennsylvania, and nonprofit hospitals
such as Massachusetts General Hospital. In contrast to public charities, private foundations
generally do not provide a service to the public and primarily operate as a grantmaking entity; and
the IRS has a different set of tax advantages and rules for private foundations that public charities
do not have to follow (see Section 2.2.3 below).
Another prominent subclass of nonprofits is the 501c(4) organization, which must be
“operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” (Federal Register Office, 1997). While
the IRS acknowledges that social welfare is “inherently an abstruse concept that continues to
defy precise definition,” the IRS does specify that 501c(4)s must exist “primarily to further the
common good and general welfare of the people,” not for private benefit (Internal Revenue
Service, n.d.). Examples of 501c(4) organizations include civic organizations such as Kiwanis
Club, Rotary Club, and the Miss America Organization; environmental groups such as the Sierra
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Club; and advocacy groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle
Association, and Americans for Prosperity. 23
In addition to 501c(4)s, other similar but less common 501c subclasses include 501c(5)s,
which are labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations; 501c(6)s, which are business
leagues, real estate boards, and chambers of commerce; 501c(7)s, which are social and
recreation clubs; 501c(8)s, which are fraternal beneficiary societies and associations; 501c(9)s,
which are voluntary employee beneficiary associations; and 501c(10s), which are domestic
fraternal societies and associations.
Of note, donations to 501c(4-10) organizations are generally not tax-deductible. In other
words, individual donors can reap tax deductions by donating to a 501c(3)—either a public charity
or a private foundation—but not by donating to a 501c(4-10).

2.2.2 501c Organizations and Third-Party Spending in Elections
All third-party nonprofit organizations that aim to influence elections are prohibited from
coordinating with the campaigns of candidates, but they are legally allowed exert influence
independently via indirect and, for some groups, direct methods. Indirect spending, as defined in
this study, refers to a nonprofit group’s expenditures on activities that seek to influence electoral
outcomes without being legally required to be report the spending to the FEC, an independent
regulatory agency that enforces campaign finance laws in U.S. federal elections. Essentially,
indirect spending is composed of activities that exclude any direct mention of candidates or
political parties, but that nonetheless might influence electoral outcomes. Examples of indirect
spending include strategic get-out-the-vote drives 24 and disseminating information on issues that
target certain voter profiles. For both 501c(3) and 501c(4-10) organizations, there are essentially

Some groups have both a 501c(3) arm and a 501c(4) arm. For example, Planned Parenthood Federation
of America (PPFA), which operates health clinics, is a 501c(3) organization. The Planned Parenthood Action
Fund (PPAF), which conduct social advocacy, is a 501c(4) organization.
24 For example, a progressive-leaning nonprofit organization might try to increase voter turnout by providing
election date reminders to neighborhoods that are known to have a high proportion of Democrats.
23

58

no restrictions on indirect spending. Although the magnitude and impact of indirect spending in
elections is of much interest, such spending is difficult to track and not the focus of this study.
Direct spending, as defined in this study, is any spending on communications that directly
mention candidates’ names and/or their political parties. Direct spending can be classified into
two categories defined by the FEC, which requires that organizations engaging in these kinds of
spending to report the amount spent. The first category is called issues ads (also known as
electioneering communications), which are broadcast communications (e.g., television ads) that
mention a candidate’s name but that do not explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of the
candidate. Figure 2.7.1 provides a transcribed example of a television issue ad. The second
category is called independent expenditures, which are broadcast communications that explicitly
advocate for the election or defeat of a spending (e.g., ads that call for the audience to “vote for”
or to “reject” a candidate) (Open Secrets, n.d.). 25
501c(3) organizations are prohibited from engaging in either categories of direct political
spending. 501c(4-10) organizations may engage in direct political spending, but there exists
historical variation in the legal restrictions imposed. Before June 2003, there were no substantial
restrictions on issue ads or independent expenditures. On January 2003, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold Act, came into effect. The
BCRA prohibited both issue ads and independent expenditures by third-party nonprofit
organizations within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary election (Bauer, 2004).
On June 2007, the Supreme Court decided in Wisconsin RTL that the BCRA’s restriction on issue
ads was unconstitutional. Then, on January 2010, the Supreme Court decided in Citizens United
that the BCRA’s restriction on independent expenditures was also unconstitutional.
Thus, to summarize, before January 2003, 501c(4-10) organizations faced no substantial
restrictions on direct political spending (though such spending was uncommon). Between January

There is a third category of direct spending called communication costs, which are the costs incurred by
corporations, labor organizations, and other types of membership associations when communicating with
their own employees or members to express explicit advocacy of the election or defeat of any federal
candidate. This paper does not consider communication costs, because they are economically and politically
insubstantial compared to issue ads and independent expenditures.
25
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2003 and June 2007, 501c(4-10) organizations were restricted from both forms of direct political
spending. Between June 2007 and January 2010, 501c(4-10) organizations were restricted from
making independent expenditures only. Finally, after January 2010, there was once again no
substantial restrictions. In Section 3, I explain how this variation in restrictions over time is used in
an empirical framework to explore whether the lifting of these restrictions has increased the
private philanthropic support of 501c(4-10) organizations, which would underscore that private
philanthropy might be a tax-advantaged channel through which political influence is purchased.
Table 2.6.1 suggests that unsurprisingly, 501c(4-10) organizations responded to the
lifting of restrictions in 2007 and 2010 by increasing their direct political spending. After Wisconsin
RTL, the amount of direct political spending by 501c(4-10)s increased from $5 million in 2006 to
$113 million in 2008. Then, after Citizens United, the amount of direct political spending by these
groups increased to $312 million in 2012. Examples of 501c(4-10) organizations that engaged in
direct political spending in 2012 include Americans for Prosperity ($36.6 million), League of
Conservation Voters ($11.1 million), National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action
($8.6 million), Planned Parenthood Action Fund ($6.5 million), Republican Jewish Coalition ($4.6
million), and Susan B Anthony List ($2.0 million). The source of funds for these politically active
501c(4-10) groups might consist of direct donations from individuals or businesses, which offers
no tax advantages for donors; or funneled via private foundations, which, as explained below,
does enable tax advantages for donors through well-documented loopholes.

2.2.3 Private Foundations
In the U.S., private foundations are funded and controlled by an individual, family, or
corporation. Private foundations are registered as 501c(3) organizations, so they are prohibited
from direct political spending. Examples of large, well-known private foundations include the
Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Charles Koch Foundation, and the Walmart Foundation. Most
registered foundations in the U.S., however, are small family foundations with a narrow
grantmaking focus, such as the Hamilton Family Charitable Trust that was established by a single
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family in 1992 with the stated goal of providing education grants for young people in Greater
Philadelphia. The transparency of private foundations span a considerable range, from highly
open institutions such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which provides unrestricted
access to its data and has established a diversified board composed primarily of outside experts,
to highly opaque organizations that have no website, no grantmaking criteria, and are controlled
by a single person.
Examples of foundations that are not private foundations—and are thus outside the
scope of the current study—include “community foundations” such as the Make-A-Wish
Foundation or The Susan G. Komen Foundation, which are classified by the IRS as public
charities because they derive the majority of funding from broad public support and are not
controlled by a single private entity, even though such organizations focus primarily on
grantmaking instead of providing direct services.
Private foundations provide a suite of tax advantages for the controlling individual, family,
or corporation. First, the donor reaps income tax deductions on federal taxes and most state
taxes. Second, assets parked inside a foundation grow tax-free; the source of any investment
returns (i.e., interest income, dividends, or capital gains) does not matter. In order to maintain
these benefits, private foundations are required by the IRS to distribute 5% of the fair market
value of their assets in the current year by the end of next year as grants to other nonprofit
organizations. Foundations primarily provide grants to 501c(3) organizations to fund their direct
services to the public, though foundations can also make grants to 501c(4-10) organizations, as
long as the money is used to promote “social welfare.” Although the IRS requires that
foundations’ grants be made for the purpose of improving “social welfare,” there is much latitude
in how “social welfare” is interpreted, and how individual nonprofits spend their grant money is
often not tracked (or even impossible to track).
This combination of tax benefits and grantmaking flexibility creates a channel for private
entities to engage in tax-advantaged spending (Gerken, 2013). Suppose an entity aims to engage
in direct political spending to influence an election. This entity may choose to purchase a political
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advertisement directly, but doing so would yield no tax advantages, and the FEC would require
that the purchaser’s identity be revealed to the public. Instead, this entity may choose to donate
to a politically active 501c(4) organization, such as Americans for Prosperity, which would then
use the funds to purchase a political advertisement. 26 Although the FEC requires that Americans
for Prosperity reports to the public about its political spending, it does not require that the donors
of Americans for Prosperity be revealed. Thus, the entity’s identity remains hidden; in other
words, “dark money” is successfully spent. However, because Americans for Prosperity is a
501c(4) organization, the donating entity reaps no tax benefits for the donation.
Another exists for individual entities to not only remain anonymous but also to reap tax
deductions for their political spending (Mayer, 2017). The individual would first “donate” to their
own private foundation. Because private foundations are classified as 501c(3) organizations, the
donor would gain tax deductions for the charitable spending. The private foundation could then
make a grant to a political active 501c(4-10), which would finally engage in the direct political
spending on the original donor’s behalf.
In summary, because 501c organizations are not required to reveal their donors to the
public, and because private entities can reap tax benefits by donating to private foundations,
individuals or corporations that wish to remain anonymous from the FEC and reap tax deductions
for their “donations” can do so by funneling money via private foundations to 501c(4-10)
organizations to make the political purchases on their behalf.

2.2.4 Related Literature
This project relates to several areas of academic literature. The first concerns the impact
of electoral systems on campaign finance (Crisp & Ingall, 2002; Norris, 2004), specifically in how
changes in the rules of political campaigns affect the sources, targets, utilization, and total
amount of money involved in public elections. For example, Hansen, Rocca, and Ortiz (2015)
26 The IRS requires that private foundations make grants to promote social welfare, not for political purposes
or for other kinds of personal gain. However, how recipient organizations utilize their grant money is very
difficult to track. Occasionally, the IRS does mount investigations of grantmaking abuse, but such instances
are rare and limited to the most severe cases.
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show that the 2012 presidential election saw a 594% increase in independent expenditures from
the 2008 election as a result of Citizens United. This paper directly contributes to this literature by
documenting one mechanism by which direct political spending increased as a result of
Wisconsin RTL and Citizens United.
The second strand of related literature explores the use of philanthropy as a form of taxadvantaged spending to purchase social and/or political influence: Su and He (2010) find that
Chinese firms use philanthropy to protect property rights and nurture political connections;
Sánchez (2000) documents the existence of profit-seeking and political motivations behind the
use of philanthropy among Salvadoran companies; and Bertrand, Bombardini, Fisman, and
Trebbi (2020) find that firms deploy their charitable foundations to seek tax-advantaged political
influence in the U.S.
The third strand of related literature explores the political economy of special interests
(Grossman & Helpman, 2001), specifically the private gains that these interests may derive from
exerting political influence, and how the magnitudes of third-party spending might influence policy
or election outcomes. For example, Mian, Sufi, Trebbi (2010) find that special interests that
provide campaign contributions do influence the voting tendencies of U.S. Representatives. In
addition, Da Silveira and Mello (2011) find a causal impact of TV advertising on election
outcomes in Brazil; whereas Levitt (1994) finds that campaign spending has a very small impact
on election outcomes in the U.S., regardless of who does the spending; and Bombardini and
Trebbi (2011) finds that an additional vote costs a politician on average $145. While this paper
does not examine the political impact of third-party spending, the analyses aim to assess the
magnitude of a particular type of “dark money” spent in U.S. elections.
The fourth strand of related literature comes from inquiry in public economics about the
behavior of nonprofit organizations and the motivations of donors. Andreoni and Payne (2003,
2011) explore how government grants reduce nonprofits’ private donations through “fundraising
crowd-out,” because the government’s support may cause charity executives to become less
pressured to raise money from private sources. On the other hand, Heutel (2014) finds that
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government grants can crowd in other sources of funding by serving as a signal of the
organization’s effectiveness. This paper contributes to this literature by exploring how the sources
of nonprofit funding might change as a result of policies that expand or restrict the set of actions
that nonprofits are legally allowed to perform; and how nonprofits might send signals aside from
philanthropic effectiveness to attract donors with motives that are not purely altruistic.
Finally, this paper contributes to scholarship in the nonmarket strategy of firms to
influence the social and political environment. To gain competitive advantage, a firm might use
corporate political activities that include lobbying politicians and contributing campaign donations
in exchange for favorable treatment by elected officials on issues of policy, enforcement of rules,
and public procurements (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011; Mellahi,
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). Recent work has also found that firms’ philanthropic efforts can
also be used as a nonmarket strategy: For example, when firms donate to a nonprofit
organization, the latter is more likely to contribute to comments in the U.S. federal rulemaking
process to advance the former’s interests (Bertrand, Bombardini, Fisman, Hackinen, & Trebbi,
2021). This paper finds evidence to support that firms can also use philanthropy to divert
resources to politically active nonprofit organizations that then engage in political spending to
affect the outcome of elections.

2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Data
Data on the grants made by private foundations to other nonprofit organizations come
from Metasoft Systems, an information technology company. Private foundations in the U.S. are
required to file the tax form 990-PF annually with the IRS, on which all grants made to third
parties must be documented. Private foundations are also required to make their 990-PF forms
public, but there has been no required standardization in how their grants must be reported. To
address this problem, Metasoft Systems has digitized all foundations’ 990-PF forms since 2000
and coalesced the information into a database called FoundationSearch. For each grant,
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FoundationSearch reports the name of the foundation, the federal employer identification number
(EIN) of the foundation, the year of the grant, the name of the recipient organization, the city and
state of the recipient, and the dollar amount of the grant. Additionally, Metasoft Systems imputes
the giving category to which the grant belongs and, for some grants, a short text description about
the grant’s purpose. Although the database includes grants made to international organizations,
only grants made to organizations located in the U.S. from 2000 to 2016 are included in this
study. The sample contains 25,031 private foundations that make an average of at least
$100,000 in grants per year.
All 501c organizations must file the tax form 990 annually with the IRS. All 501c
organizations are also required to make most of the form’s reported financial information publicly
available. For this study, data on the names, addresses, and high-level financial information (e.g.,
total revenue, total expenses, net income, etc.) of all 501c organizations come from the National
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which freely provides digitized data from the tax forms
990 filed between 1990 to 2016. Only organizations classified as 501c(3-10) are included in this
study. As in Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011), I used the NCCS database to construct an
unbalanced panel dataset of U.S. nonprofit organizations operating in the areas of human
service, children and family related service, poverty, housing and food related, and other types of
social service. 27 Nonprofits that are not in this study sample include medical facilities (e.g.,
hospitals), schools, universities, research institutions, religious institutions, and international
organizations. In addition, organizations for which government grants and private donations are
always zero are excluded; and organizations with less than 3 years of observations are excluded.
Data on third parties’ direct political spending come from the FEC. When third parties
engage in direct political spending—i.e., issue ads and independent expenditures—they must
report their own name, the amount spent, the geographic media market affected, the federal seat
for which the spending is targeting, the name of the candidate mentioned to the FEC, and
whether the advertisement is in support of or in opposition to the candidate. Due to current data

27

The study sample consists of nonprofits with NTEE classifications of I, J, K, L, P, and S.
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limitations, I only observe the direct political spending of organizations that spent at least $50,000
during an election year. However, among 501c(4-10) organizations, the sum total of spending by
501c(4-10) that spent at least $50,000 in a given year comprise over 90% of all spending by all
nonprofit organizations that do not have to report their donors to the public.
Finally, data on the outcomes of previous U.S. federal elections come from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Election Lab, which reports the names and parties of
candidates and their margins of victory.

2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The first empirical goal of this paper is to establish whether private entities disguise their
political spending as philanthropy by providing funds via private foundations to nonprofits to
spend for political purposes. The following specification is used to test for the existence of this
channel:

[1]
In this specification, f indicates a foundation and t indicates the year. The outcome
variable

is the total amount of dollars that foundation f granted to politically active 501c(4-10)

organizations in year t; a 501c(4-10) nonprofit is classified as politically active if it has spent
greater than $50,000 in direct political spending for federal elections in year t or year t-1. Thus,
would be positive if, for example, a foundation f donated money to the Planned Parenthood
Action Fund in 2012 and the latter engaged in direct political spending in 2012.
The binary variable policy influencer equals 1 if foundation f has spent money to influence
legislative or public voting outcomes prior to 2007, such as by funding research to provide
information to policymakers and voters or by funding voter registration and get-out-the-vote
efforts. 28 Xft is a set of time-varying control variables, such as total contributions (grants) given to

28 When a foundation makes grants to influence legislative or public voting outcomes (or if the foundation
directly engages in these activities), it is required to report these actions to the IRS on the 990-PF.
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other nonprofit organizations, total contributions received from private entities, net investment
income, and the value of assets and liabilities.

and

are foundation and year fixed effects,

respectively.
This specification tests whether foundations that had spent resources to influence policy
or voters prior to 2007 are more sensitive in responding to Wisconsin RTL (
United (

) and Citizens

) than foundations that had not. Because the policy influencer foundations tend to be

more politically involved or motivated, they might become more attracted to funding politically
active nonprofits once 501c(4-10) organizations gained the ability to purchase issue
advertisements or make independent expenditures. This empirical specification has several
limitations. First, this specification only tests whether grantmaking behavior has changed at the
intensive margin among foundations that were already operational when 501c(4-10) nonprofits
gained the ability to engage in direct political spending. Indeed, this specification does not
examine whether new foundations were established following Wisconsin RTL and Citizens United
so that private entities can take advantage of the new rules (whether the flow of “dark money”
increased on the extensive margin). Second, because the policy influencer variable is not a timevarying measure, this specification does not consider whether existing foundations are becoming
more politically active. In essence, this specification tests whether policy influencer foundations
are more likely than other foundations to divert more funds towards 501c(4-10)s that engage in
direct political spending following the two landmark Supreme Court decisions.
The second empirical goal of this paper is to understand whether 501c(4-10)
organizations in electorally competitive states take advantage of their ability to engage in direct
political spending. Following Wisconsin RTL and Citizens United, 501c(4-10) organizations
gained the ability to run issue ads and make independent expenditures not only in federal
elections, but also in state and local elections (such as seats for state representatives, state
senators, state judges, etc.). Indeed, various sources have noted that the Supreme Court’s
decisions might have influenced state and local elections more than federal elections, because
“dark money” at the state and local level is much harder to track, and small amounts of mass
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communications spending—even at a few thousand dollars for local television ads, radio ads, or
mailed-in flyers—can tip the balance in small elections that ultimately determine which party
controls the state legislature and state courts (La Raja and Schaffner 2014).
Due to current data limitations, I can only track whether 501c(4-10) organizations have
spent $50,000 or more in federal elections (Table 2.6.1). Therefore, I cannot directly identify
which nonprofits have engaged in direct political spending at the state or local level in order to
examine the grantmaking behavior of foundations that donate to such nonprofits (this analysis
was done at the federal level via specification [1] above). Instead, I indirectly investigate the flow
of “dark money” by examining whether 501c(4-10) organizations in electorally competitive states
were given more funds by private foundations following Citizens United, as compared to 501c(3)
organizations in non-competitive states. I use the following specification:

[2]
In this specification, n indicates a nonprofit organization and t indicates the year. The
outcome variable

is the total amount of dollars that nonprofit n received from private

foundations in year t. State electoral competitiveness is defined as (100 - margin of victory of last
presidential election) in the state of nonprofit n; thus, a 1% increase in this variable equals a 1%
decrease in the margin of victory in the last presidential election in the state where nonprofit n is
located. Specification [2] thus examines whether 501c(4-10) organizations were given more funds
by private foundations following Citizens United in electorally competitive states—the main
coefficient of interest is

.

2.4 Results
Table 2.6.2 summarizes the FoundationSearch data for select years. Private foundations
granted more money to other nonprofit 501c organizations over time, from an average of $853
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thousand in 2000 to an average of $2.01 million in 2015. The assets held by private foundations
also increased over time, from an average of $9.52 million in 2000 to $10.93 million in 2015.
Table 2.6.3 provides the main results examining the impact of Wisconsin RTL and
Citizens United on the grantmaking behavior of foundations (Equation [1]). Specifications (1) and
(2) test the impact of Wisconsin RTL and Citizens United on all private foundations in the sample.
Specification (2) shows that although the behavior of foundations might not have changed
following Wisconsin RTL, foundations that had donated to influence policy or voting outcomes in
the past (the “policy influencers”) donate about $992 per year more to politically active nonprofits
following Citizens United. Specifications (3) and (4) find that this effect is stronger for corporate
foundations, with specification (4) showing that corporate foundations that had donated to
influence policy or voting outcomes in the past donate about $3,650 per year more to politically
active nonprofits following Citizens United. Specifications (5) and (6) show that this effect of
Citizens United is also robust in the subsample of non-corporate foundations. Together, these
results suggest that private philanthropy is sensitive to the constraints (or lack thereof) imposed
on the recipients of charitable dollars on how those resources could be spent. In the U.S.,
following Citizens United, private philanthropy that is tax-advantaged (i.e., philanthropy that gives
the original individual or corporate donors tax benefits) might be used to support politically active
nonprofit organizations that engage in political spending to affect the outcome of elections.
As previously discussed, Table 2.6.1 shows that direct spending in federal elections by
nonprofits that do not have to reveal their donors rose from $5 million in 2004 to $113 million in
2008 and $312 million in 2012. Figure 2.7.2 shows descriptive evidence to suggest that a
significant portion of the funds behind this political spending might be funneled from private
foundations. Figure 2.7.2 depicts the average and total private grantmaking receipts of 501c(410) organizations with more than $50,00 in direct political expenditures in federal elections in
2008. For these organizations, in the top panel we see a small jump in both average and total
grants received in 2007 when Wisconsin RTL removed restrictions on issue ads and then a large
jump in 2010 when Citizens United removed restrictions on independent expenditures. The
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bottom panel indicates that the increase in total receipts was about $10 million USD from 2006 to
2007 and $40 million USD from 2009 to 2010. From this descriptive analysis, it appears that
private philanthropy might indeed be responsive to the lifting of restrictions that had prevented
potential grantees from engaging in direct political spending.
The remaining analyses investigate whether 501c(4-10) nonprofit organizations received
more private philanthropic dollars after Citizens Unites, especially in electorally competitive
states. Table 2.6.4 shows the summary statistics of the nonprofit organizations considered in this
analysis. Comparing Panel A, which presents data on 501c(3) organizations, with Panel B, which
presents data on 501c(4-10) organizations, we see that in 2015, the average 501c(3)
organization tends to be about 6 times larger than the average 501c(4-10) organization in terms
of revenue and assets. In addition, the majority of nonprofits are registered as 501c(3), with
58,284 organizations registered as 501c(3) in 2015 compared to only 8,765 registered as 501c(410).
Table 2.6.5 presents the empirical analysis according to Equation [2]. Specification (1)
shows that controlling for year fixed effects only, 501c(4-10) received $43,931 fewer dollars per
year from private foundations than 501c(3) organizations. This finding is not surprising, because
501c(3) organizations compose the majority of what the public generally regards as public
charities that aim to improve social welfare—such as homeless shelters and food banks—and
thus should be the focus of foundations’ philanthropic giving. Specification (2) shows that
controlling for organization fixed effects, a nonprofit on overage obtains $20,813 more in grant
dollars from private foundations in the years 2010 or after than in the years before. This finding is
also expected as the total amount of grants given by private foundations has steadily increased
over time. Specification (3) finds that when controlling for organization and year fixed effects, the
electoral competitiveness of a nonprofit’s home state has no statistically significant effect on the
amount of grant dollars that it receives from private foundations.
Specifications (4) and (5) are the main specifications of interest, with Specification (5)
being the preferred model with all the relevant control variables included. As per Equation [2],
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Specification (5) shows that

is statistically significant, which is interpreted to mean that after

Citizens United, a 501c(4-10) nonprofit, which becomes legally allowed to engage in direct
political spending, receives an additional $289 per year in donations (compared to a 501c(3)) for
every 1% decrease in its home state’s margin of victory in the previous presidential election.
Interestingly, simply being a 501c(4-10) organization after 2010 does not predict a higher amount
received in private foundation grants (

is not statistically significant). As expected, larger

organizations (those with more assets) and organizations with great operational intensity (those
with more expenses) are also likely to receive more private philanthropic dollars. Together, the
results in specifications (4) and (5) of Table 2.6.5 suggest that nonprofit organizations that are
allowed to engage in political spending are more able to benefit (in their fundraising of money
from private foundations) from the relaxation of regulatory constraints on political spending if they
are located in more electorally competitive areas. These results provide more evidence that
private foundations can be used as a vehicle by both individuals and corporations as vehicle to
exercise political influence.

2.5 Discussion
This paper has established a set of empirical results to suggest that private entities (e.g.,
individual donors and corporations) have used the tax benefits and anonymity of grantmaking via
private foundations as a channel for tax-advantaged political spending. Table 2.6.1 documents
the surge in direct political spending in federal elections by 501c(4-10) nonprofit organizations
after Wisconsin RTL and Citizens United. The empirical results in in Table 2.6.3 provide evidence
to show that private philanthropy is partly driven by non-altruistic, political motivations. Finally, the
analyses in Table 2.6.5 find that the grants made by private foundations to nonprofits are
sensitive to the ability of nonprofits to engage in political behaviors and the electoral
competitiveness of the nonprofit’s home state.
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This paper has several limitations. First, the policy influencer variable in Equation [1] is a
rough differentiator of foundation types prior to 2007. Second, because this analysis is restricted
to foundations that had existed prior to 2007, it only examines whether grantmaking giving
behavior has changed at the intensive margin among foundations that were already operational
when 501c(4-10) nonprofits gained the ability to engage in direct political spending. Third, other
changes in policy or in the charitable sector could have occurred after 2010 to encourage the
policy influencer foundations to give more grant dollars to politically active nonprofits.
Despite the limitations above, this paper provides evidence to show that private
philanthropy is used as a tax-advantaged method to influence politics through grantmaking to
politically active nonprofits. The analyses also point to several promising areas of future research.
In particular, currently, only data on the political spending of nonprofits in federal elections is
collected from the FEC. However, “dark money” might be more important at the state and local
levels than at the federal level because small amount of communication spending for local ads
can tip the balance in local elections (La Raja & Schaffner, 2014). For firms that might benefit
from favorable local policies in taxation, infrastructure, and other issue areas, supporting local
politicians can be an important nonmarket strategy. Future work can thus investigate how private
foundations, through local nonprofit groups, have engaged in direct political spending at the state
and local levels. Doing so might yield additional insights into examining the extent of taxadvantaged political spending via philanthropy.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.6.1: Summary of Direct Political Spending in Federal Elections by 501c(4-10) Nonprofit
Organizations

Election
year

Number of
nonprofits
with >$50k
direct
political
spending

Total

Mean

Max

Min

2000

8

$10,918,448

$1,364,806

$6,599,622

$50,306

2002

10

$4,087,075

$408,708

$1,332,255

$52,692

2004

13

$5,212,577

$400,967

$1,336,361

$51,104

2006

12

$5,151,978

$429,332

$3,158,163

$64,157

2008

53

$112,915,145

$2,130,474

$17,259,645

$51,503

2010

77

$142,995,170

$1,857,080

$32,351,591

$50,280

2012

89

$311,630,532

$3,501,467

$71,181,940

$50,649

2014

65

$159,873,782

$2,459,597

$35,464,243

$55,594

2016

95

$185,140,776

$1,948,850

$35,157,585

$50,000

Note: All dollar amounts are nominal. Due to data limitations, this analysis is restricted to 501c(410) organizations that spent at least $50,000 in direct political spending during an election year.
The sum total of spending by these organizations comprise over 90% of all spending by all
nonprofit organizations that do not have to report their donors to the public.

73

Table 2.6.2: Summary Statistics of Private Foundations

(Units in USD thousands)

2000

2005

2010

2015

N = 12,657

N = 18,603

N = 21,984

N = 23,777

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

853

9,336

984

9,785

1,621

17,178

2,010

26,459

1,326

18,514

1,404

29,070

883

18,323

1,403

29,068

Contributions
received

497

8,359

707

18,773

518

14,854

710

19,773

Net investment
income

801

13,870

591

15,515

343

10,237

626

15,190

Expenses

653

11,653

970

24,245

746

16,810

977

24,245

9,516

187,619

11915

257,408

8,982

220,654

10,932

237,409

587

46,079

455

27,173

393

21,921

446

27,171

Grant dollars given
Revenue

Assets
Liabilities

Note: All dollar amounts are nominal.
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Table 2.6.3: The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Private Foundations’ Contributions to
Politically Active 501c(4-10) Nonprofit Organizations
Outcome variable: Amount given to FEC spender
All private
foundations

Corporate
foundations

Non-corporate
foundations

----------------------

----------------------

----------------------

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(Policy influencer) x

998.20

992.48

3,816.41

3,650.10

854.02

831.12

(Year >= 2010)

(271.96)

(270.04)

(1,562.07)

(1,512.33)

(377.63)

(392.31)

(Policy influencer) x

310.45

258.34

1,954.61

1,998.05

279.55

233.60

(183.57)

(208.01)

(2,383.53)

(2,371.30)

(250.30)

(289.12)

(2007 <= Year < 2010)
Total contributions (grants)
given

Total contributions received

Net investment income

Assets

Liabilities

-0.35

-17.31

-0.34

(0.36)

(28.05)

(0.36)

0.68

0.40

0.68

(0.49)

(0.32)

(0.50)

0.08

0.65

0.08

(0.32)

(0.28)

(0.32)

0.05

-0.01

0.05

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.05)

0.10

0.06

0.10

(0.09)

(0.29)

(0.09)

Foundation fixed effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year fixed effects

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

160,039

160,039

16,517

16,517

143,522

143,522

Observations

Note: Analysis is restricted to foundations that existed prior to 2007. A foundation is tagged as a "policy
influencer" if it had spent a positive amount prior to 2007 to influence legislative or voting outcomes. A
nonprofit organization is tagged as politically active if it spent at least $50,000 in direct political spending in
federal elections in year t or t-1. Total contributions (grants) given, total contributions received, net
investment income, assets, and liabilities are measured in USD thousands and inflated to 2010 USD. All
models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the foundation level (shown in
parentheses).
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Table 2.6.4: Summary Statistics of Nonprofit Organizations
Panel A: 501c(3) Organizations (Public charities
that are not foundations)
2000

2005

2010

2015

N = 39,501

N = 47,391

N = 51,233

N = 58,284

(Units in USD thousands)

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

Revenue

2,310

18,311

2,815

24,508

3,382

12,944

3,948

25,936

1,125

6,887

1,296

9,745

1,697

9,556

1,936

14,829

2,142

17,946

2,676

21,828

3,286

12,753

3,818

25,541

57

809

70

793

8

403

32

213

1,951

18,079

2,167

18,677

2,552

11,353

3,164

17,970

96

1,215

129

1,515

155

753

184

1,519

Contributions received
Expenses
Fundraising expenses
Assets
Liabilities

Panel B: 501c(4-10) Organizations
2000

2005

2010

2015

N = 6,802

N = 6,922

N = 7,694

N = 8,765

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

564

2,742

589

2,560

645

3,542

736

4,084

143

1,328

158

1,439

278

2,913

332

3,366

538

2,655

566

2,602

636

3,377

713

3,954

37

340

42

301

9

94

55

178

Assets

406

3,296

383

1,469

468

1,806

536

2,108

Liabilities

14

90

15

60

28

152

32

163

(Units in USD thousands)
Revenue
Contributions received
Expenses
Fundraising expenses

Note: All dollar amounts are nominal.
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Table 2.6.5: Impact of Citizens United on Private Foundation Grants Received by Nonprofits
Outcome variable: amount of grants received from private foundations
(1)
(501c4-10)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-701.86

-549.81

-282.25

(1,287.04)

(1,128.87)

(653.10)

-3,195.29

-3,155.62

(2,263.62)

(2,263.80)

393.64

316.93

(122.07)

(107.41)

292.23

342.85

(65.69)

(86.32)

271.03

288.98

(91.30)

(90.10)

-43,931.07
(2,351.65)

(Year >= 2010)

20,813.02
(1,651.84)

(State Electoral Competitiveness)

(501c4-10) x
(Year >= 2010)
(501c4-10) x
(State Electoral Competitiveness)
(Year >= 2010) x
(State Electoral Competitiveness)
(501c4-10) x (Year >= 2010) x
(State Electoral Competitiveness)
Total contributions received

7.19
(1.28)

Revenue

-2.79
(2.31)

Expenses

4.55
(1.01)

77

Assets

2.89
(1.09)

Liabilities

6.02
(13.84)

Organization fixed effects

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Year fixed effects

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

776,837

776,837

776,837

776,837

776,837

Observations

Note: Electoral competitiveness is measured at the state level and defined as (100 - margin of victory of last
presidential election). Total contributions received, expenses, net income, assets, and liabilities are
measured in USD thousands and inflated to 2010 USD. All models are estimated with robust standard errors
clustered at the organization level (shown in parentheses).
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.7.1: Transcribed Issue Ad in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007)

[Wedding scene]
PASTOR: And who gives this woman to be married to this man?
BRIDE'S FATHER: Well, as father of the bride, I certainly could. But instead, I'd like to share a
few tips on how to properly install drywall. Now you put the drywall up ...
VOICE-OVER: Sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important decision. But in Washington, it's
happening. A group of Senators are using the filibuster delay tactic to block federal judicial
nominees from a simple "yes" or "no" vote. So qualified candidates don't get a chance to serve.
It's politics at work, causing gridlock and backing up some of our courts to a state of emergency.
Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster.
VOICE-OVER: Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life, which is responsible for the content of this
advertising and not authorized by any candidate or candidates committee.

Note: This advertisement was at the heart of the Supreme Court case FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
Life, Inc. (2007). Wisconsin Right to Life, a conservative advocacy group, had sought to run this
TV advertisement within 30 days of the 2004 primary election, in which Senator Russ Feingold
(D) was running. Notice that there is no explicit call for the election or defeat of a candidate.
Source: (Barday, 2008).

79

0

Average Amount Received ($)
200000
400000

600000

Figure 2.7.2: Private Grantmaking Receipts of 501c(4-10) Organizations with >$50k Direct
Political Expenditures in 2008 (N=53)
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Note: All dollar amounts are nominal. Bars in upper graph are standard error bars.
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CHAPTER 3: Business and Peace: The Impact of Firm-Stakeholder Relational
Strategies on Conflict Risk
Brian Ganson, Tony L. He, and Witold J. Henisz

3.1 Introduction
Early work on business and peace suggests that business-generated prosperity in a
conflict-affected area 29 can be positively associated with greater peace in that area. This work
argued that the positive externalities of business help to address grievances related to the
absolute deprivation or poverty often presumed to underlie violent conflict (Fort & Schipani, 2004;
Oetzel, Westermann-Behaylo, Koerber, Fort, & Rivera, 2009). Subsequent work posits that the
reduction of conflict also depends on the distribution of costs and benefits between conflicting
groups (Joseph, Katsos, & Daher, 2020; Miklian & Schouten, 2019). Absent intergroup
agreement on these distributions, the resources that corporations bring to conflict-affected areas
can increase conflict risk, notwithstanding explicit intentions to deliver a “development dividend”
(Schouten & Miklian, 2018).
However, the general mechanisms by which firm actions affect conflict risk at the societal
level by enabling or inhibiting such intergroup agreements remain unarticulated. Prior work
suggests that groups in conflict are aware of how firm activities shape economic dependence or
interdependence, altering the perceived cost of conflict and resistance to collaboration across
groups (Katsos & Forrer, 2014). Group members’ interactions with firms also influence working
relationships in ways that improve or inhibit the communication capabilities, shared understanding
of the context, sufficient consensus on the fairness of decisions made, and working trust in their
implementation (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016; Miller, Ganson, Cechvala, & Miklian, 2019)
necessary to intergroup agreement. Thus, a firm in its normal course of business may play a
more pronounced role vis-à-vis conflict and peace than through any extraordinary peacebuilding
intervention it undertakes (Bardouille-Crema, Chigas, & Miller, 2013; Miller et al., 2019; Zandvliet
29

“Places marked by, or vulnerable to, serious and systemic violent conflict” (Ford, 2015: 451).
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& Anderson, 2009). Theory that allows us to model how firm actions affect these dynamics and
therefore conflict risk could provide important managerial insights.
We use the tools of social network theory to explain how managerial decisions intended
to create prosperity in a conflict-affected area impact conflict risk in the broader network of
societal relations by forming or breaking stakeholder 30 ties. We draw on the study of horizontal
inequalities in political economy to show how these managerial choices are evaluated, and acted
on, not only by a firm’s stakeholders (Lange, Bundy, & Park, 2020; Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018),
but also by others attentive to their group’s access to, and control over, economic, political, and
social assets (Brown & Langer, 2010; Canelas & Gisselquist, 2018) in ways that influence conflict
risk (Hillesund et al., 2018; Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2011). We develop four propositions linking the
decisions that managers make about the structure of their economic, political, and social
relationships with and between stakeholders to conflict risk in the presence of substantial
horizontal inequalities. In doing so, we explore how business actions that alter the structure of
relationships with and between stakeholders impact the capacity of groups to resolve any
grievances resulting from social comparisons. We thus call attention to how and when these
business actions can propagate conflict risk from a stakeholder network consisting of the firm and
its stakeholders to the broader societal network 31 encompassing the firm, its stakeholders, and
the full set of actors with whom the firm's stakeholders share relationships (Boutilier, 2009).

We use the term stakeholders to refer to those defined by Clarkson (1995: 106) as primary stakeholders
“without whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern." Primary
stakeholders include shareholders, employees, customers, and suppliers, together with the governments
and communities. These primary stakeholders are distinct from secondary stakeholders, “defined as those
who influence or affect, or are influenced or affected by, the corporation, but they are not engaged in
transactions with the corporation and are not essential for its survival” (Clarkson 1995: 107).
31 In our definition of the broader societal network, the “full set of actors” includes, but is not limited to,
secondary stakeholders.
30
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3.2 Prosperity, Networks of Identity Groups, and the Role of Management in ConflictAffected Areas
The fundamental premise of business and peace—“that businesses have a role to play in
maintaining and promoting peace and societal development in conflict-affected parts of the world”
(Miklian & Schouten, 2019: 2)—finds longstanding expression in the management literature. The
first issue of the Journal of World Business argued that business is an unmatched force for peace
(Brown, 1966: 6). Howard V. Perlmutter named “the senior executives engaged in building the
geocentric enterprise ... the most important social architects of the last third of the twentieth
century.” Their “greater universal sharing of wealth” would offer “control of the explosive
centrifugal tendencies of our evolving world community” as companies provided new frameworks
that “could conceivably make war less likely” (Perlmutter, 1969: 9-10). Subsequent works in
management and related disciplines unpack the elements he names: the importance of the
resources that businesses unlock, the centrifugal forces that managers seek to moderate, and the
search for viable structures of relationships for doing so.

3.2.1 Business-Generated Prosperity and Peace
The original theory of business and peace posited a role for direct investment to bring
development to conflict-affected contexts (Fort, 2008) and for ethical leadership in promoting
adherence to international norms and standards on matters such as wages or labor conditions
(Getz, 1990; Kolk & Van Tulder, 2002). The focus was on economic benefits, such as jobs and
tax revenues, that could help to address the presumed root causes of conflict (Fort & Schipani,
2004). This logic suggested that any decision to conduct business ethically in a conflict-affected
area is inherently peace-positive (Ford, 2015; Fort, 2007, 2008; Oetzel & Miklian, 2017; Oetzel et
al., 2009) Yet, empiricists found only weak evidence that the private sector positively impacts
post-conflict reconstruction (MacSweeney, 2008) or peacebuilding (Ford, 2015; Hoffmann, 2014;
Katsos & Forrer, 2014).
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By contrast, there was strong evidence of business as a conflict actor (Drohan, 2010;
Ganson, 2019a) that has unintended negative consequences on conflict risk (Bardouille-Crema et
al., 2013; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). Attempts to promote private sector investments were
often found to have perverse impacts (Miklian & Schouten, 2019), as the new resources unlocked
by business were associated less with development or conflict reduction than they were with the
entrenchment of winning and losing groups engaged in economic and political competition
(Miklian, 2019). Corporate operations in volatile environments thus prolonged or exacerbated
conflict by increasing grievances or marginalization (Obenland, 2014), notwithstanding explicit
intentions to deliver a “development dividend” (Schouten & Miklian, 2018). 32

3.2.2 Identity Groups, Horizontal Inequalities, and Conflict
Insights from the study of horizontal inequalities, a defining construct in the literature on
the political economy of conflict, have helped to explain the contingencies behind these perverse
impacts of business-generated prosperity. Put simply, horizontal inequalities are differences in
the distribution of economic, political, and social resources between groups (Stewart, 2000). The
scholarship on horizontal inequalities differs from the more typical study of income inequality,
which “captures the distribution of income across participants in a collective” (Cobb, 2016: 326),
in two important respects. First, horizontal inequalities capture differences between groups rather
than the distributions within them or the larger society. Second, the measures of horizontal
inequalities are multidimensional, encompassing not only income and economic assets but also
access to critical infrastructure (e.g., education, healthcare, and housing), social status, cultural
identity, and political voice. Importantly, horizontal inequalities focus on disparity in distribution
between groups, rather than each group’s absolute or average level.

A related literature examining the resource curse (Karl, 1997) has similarly explored the drivers through
which the availability of economic rents from natural resources may have perverse outcomes for economic
development. The heterogeneous role of firms’ relational strategies and managerial agency that we seek to
bring to the fore is, however, either absent or second-order within that literature. For an important exception,
see Amengual (2021).

32
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Horizontal inequalities shape group identities in the broader societal network. People
group themselves and others into a variety of collective identities (“identity groups”), including
ethnicity, religion, culture, race, political ideology, class, gender, age, geography, and
organizational affiliation (Stewart, 2008). Group boundaries form in part through interactions in
which one “group has control of the means of production utilized by another group” or in which
groups are characterized by “differential control of assets that are valued by all groups” (Barth,
1969: 27; Canelas & Gisselquist, 2018). Collective disadvantages experienced by members of a
group further reinforce group cohesion and identity (Brown & Langer, 2010; Gurr, 1993). Thus,
the broader societal network can be understood as comprised in part of groups whose members
are attentive to their collective access to, and control over, economic, political, and social assets.
Horizontal inequalities also shape conflict and cooperation between groups. Pronounced
horizontal inequalities increase the propensity for collective action within identity groups to
address perceived injustices (De Juan & Wegner, 2019). Additionally, group membership
facilitates social control in ways that keep members aligned (Gubler & Selway, 2012; Humphreys
& Weinstein, 2008). At the same time, perceived inequalities reduce social cohesion between
identity groups and the willingness to socialize across group boundaries (David, Guilbert,
Leibbrandt, Potgieter, & Hino, 2018; Hino, Leibbrandt, Machema, Shifa, & Soudien, 2018). Each
group increasingly defines justice in its own way (Schmidt-Catran, 2014), with members of
advantaged groups mobilizing in turn to protect their interests (Stewart, 2002).
These effects of horizontal inequalities on conflict escalation may be exacerbated by the
influx of economic resources (Asal, Findley, Piazza, & Walsh, 2016; Hunziker & Cederman, 2017;
Joseph et al., 2020; Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015) as the distribution of those resources becomes an
additional source of intergroup contestation (Ganson, 2019b; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009).
Therefore, in conflict-affected areas marked by a high level of preexisting horizontal inequalities,
business-generated prosperity may contribute to perverse impacts that include the reinforcement
of identity group boundaries, increased perceptions of comparative injustice, and the escalation of
intergroup conflict.
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3.2.3 Intergroup Relationships in Conflict-Affected Areas
Growing primarily out of case studies, a body of work explores how managers improve
intergroup relations in conflict-affected areas (Hoben, Kovick, Plumb, & Wright, 2012; Idemudia,
2014; Miller et al., 2019). This work finds that the role of a firm in conflict mitigation rarely relies
on its ability to remedy horizontal inequalities or economic grievances directly, which are often too
deep and broad for any one business to address. Rather, the most important impact involves the
incentives created by the business for each identity group to change the nature of their
engagements with each other and to work, over time, towards mutually acceptable settlements on
the issues that divided them (Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011). The increased density of
social networks around business operations may also help to normalize relations between
conflicting groups (Humphreys, 2005).
Related works in political economy of conflict also point to the peacebuilding effects of
facilitating cooperative relationships between identity groups in conflict-affected areas. Peacepositive settlements typically require a set of relationships between conflicting groups that
enables them, despite their differences, to jointly analyze the context, develop solutions, and plan
for their dependable implementation in a mutually acceptable manner (Ganson & Wennmann,
2016). Because extant governance structures that facilitate such interactions are often insufficient
(Hillesund et al., 2018; Stewart, 2011), companies seeking to mitigate conflict in order to advance
business objectives must themselves contribute to the positive reshaping of intergroup structures
and processes (Ganson & Wennmann, 2017; Kolk & Lenfant, 2013).
If managers are to facilitate such improvements in intergroup relationships, they must
remain attentive to the issues and dynamics that divide or connect identity groups (Ganson,
2019b; Miller et al., 2019), not only the relationships between the firm and its stakeholders.
Groups and individuals do not define themselves primarily in relation to the focal firm. Categories
such as “customer” or “supplier” neglect “the social glue, the bonds of group cohesion, identity,
and difference that typically form the basis for claim making in relation to the firm” (Crane &
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Ruebottom, 2011: 77). Therefore, the monitoring of intergroup relations as an ongoing
management function (Ganson, 2014, 2019b) and assessment of how the firm may affect these
(Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013; Hoffmann, 2014; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009) are critical to
avoiding the exacerbation of conflict. However, frameworks for analyzing how a firm’s everyday
managerial decisions can impact conflict risk through specific reconfigurations of the relationships
between identity groups are lacking.

3.2.4 The Impact of Managerial Decision-Making on Intergroup Conflict
Building from previous analyses, we argue that, in the presence of substantial horizontal
inequalities, managerial decisions that change the structure of relationships within the focal firm’s
stakeholder network can impact conflict risk in the broader societal network. Business activities
that involve a firm and its stakeholders, such as the allocation of resources for business
purposes, form the dyads of a network linking a firm to its stakeholders (i.e., a stakeholder
network) (Rowley, 1997). Managerial decisions regarding the structure of this stakeholder
network, the identity of the actors, and the magnitude of the resource flows within it are evaluated
by its stakeholders as well as by other members of the identity groups of which these
stakeholders are members. The stakeholder network is thus embedded in a broader societal
network of identity group relations. Following the work of Nickerson and Zenger (2008) on interfirm allocations and Nason et al. (2018) or Lange et al. (2020) on inter-stakeholder allocations, we
posit that these evaluations are at least partly social. However, in contrast to those arguments,
and more consistent with the literature on horizontal inequalities, the social comparison is made
with primary reference not to the allocations made to other stakeholders of the firm, but rather
with reference to the broader structure of relationships between identity groups and the access to
resources that this structure enables.
Furthermore, managerial decisions will have such impacts whether or not there is
awareness of, or intention to effect, such outcomes. For example, managers of a firm operating in
a conflict-affected area might allocate information, corporate social responsibility programs, jobs,
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contracts, or other opportunities to various stakeholders. The impact of this allocation of
resources on the relationships between the firm’s stakeholders, as well as between other actors
who share relationships with them within the broader societal network, may be direct or indirect.
First, the firm’s allocation may be unequal across members of different identity groups, which can
exacerbate (or reduce) horizontal inequalities across these groups. As or more important are the
indirect channels of influence, including the processes by which resources are allocated and the
inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders “at the table”. These processes of resource allocation and
patterns of inclusion or exclusion can catalyze or inhibit the formation of other relationships
between members of identity groups to which the firm’s stakeholders belong, as well as change
their information and understanding about the economic activity at hand. Whether or not intended
by the firm, the results may thus extend to affective ties and the capability of identity group
members to address the horizontal inequalities that underlie conflict.
Finally, even managers attempting to apply principles of fairness (Phillips, 1997) in
striving to maximize value-added for the firm and its stakeholders (Garcia‐Castro & Aguilera,
2015; Harrison & Wicks, 2013) may exacerbate conflict as they create or restrict access to
important economic, political, and social assets in the broader societal network. For example,
managers might strive to improve the working conditions and wages of the firm’s suppliers’
workforce to address the demands of advocacy groups; but they might fail to recognize that the
suppliers and their workers all come from the same ethnic group in a society characterized by
ethnic tensions. As the benefits flow to only one ethnic group—even as they are more fairly
distributed between supplier firms and their workers within that ethnic group—horizontal
inequalities—and hence conflict risk—increase between ethnic groups.

3.3 Firm-Stakeholder Relational Strategies and Conflict Risk in the Broader Societal
Network
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Because horizontal inequalities shape how members of identity groups perceive and
interact with one another, managerial decisions that change the structure of relationships by
which the firm and other actors distribute economic, political, and social assets can create,
reinforce, or weaken intergroup conflicts. A central question is thus how a firm’s relational
strategies—which we define, in the spirit of Shipilov (2005), as managerial choices that alter the
structure of relationships within its stakeholder network to advance firm goals—increase or
decrease conflict risk between identity groups in the broader societal network characterized by
preexisting horizontal inequalities.
Using the tools of social network theory, we develop four propositions that examine how
managers’ relational strategies can impact conflict risk by reshaping the structure of relationships
between identity groups in conflict-affected areas. Our central aim in this section is not to explore
why a profit-maximizing firm might choose one relational strategy over another, though we do
highlight the potential private benefits and costs of these strategies. Rather, our aim is to uncover
the broader societal consequences of each strategy. Our analysis highlights the contingent (i.e.,
dependent upon the level of horizontal inequalities) impact of these relational strategies, showing
that, in the presence of horizontal inequalities between identity groups of which a firm’s
stakeholders are members, certain relational strategies are more likely to increase (or reduce)
conflict risk in the broader societal network.

3.3.1 Brokerage versus Convening of Identity Groups
We begin by considering how the structure of a firm’s relationships with stakeholders that
span identity groups across distinct network subcomponents in a broader societal network impact
conflict risk. A network subcomponent is a group or subset of actors (nodes) in a network who are
more densely tied to one another than to others in the network. In Figure 3.5.1, we depict three
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distinct subcomponents within a broader societal network of actors. The primary identity group
affiliation of each actor is represented by the node’s color scheme and pattern. 33
When there are weak or nonexistent connections between subcomponents, actors within
a subcomponent are less likely to engage in mutual economic or social exchange with actors in
another subcomponent. Seminal works in social network analysis by Simmel (1950) and Burt
(Burt, 1992, 2000), among others, explain that such a network includes structural holes that
managers may exploit to extract economic rents. When a firm occupies a structural hole (Figure
3.5.1A), defined as a network position that connects otherwise disconnected parties, managers
act as the “brokers” of information with the ability to gather, recombine, and redirect resources to
their advantage (Burt, 2004).
To sustain the advantages of occupying a structural hole, managers can pursue a
disunion or tertius gaudens strategy that keeps network subcomponents disconnected or in
conflict with each other (Obstfeld, 2005). By doing so, the firm maintains access to unique rentseeking opportunities, as managers can “manipulate or exploit” the disconnected parties for the
firm’s benefit (Obstfeld, 2005). For example, in a context of interethnic conflict, a mining firm may
gather knowledge from local elders and officials dominated by one ethnic group to develop its
own proposal for a social and environmental plan negotiated in the capital with national officials of
another ethnic group, which is only then delivered back to the local elders and officials. The firm
thus maintains much greater control over the plan’s terms and conditions, such as resource
commitments for social investments (Ganson & M’cleod, 2019; Ganson & Wennmann, 2016).
A firm’s private benefits and costs from maintaining a brokerage position across
disconnected subcomponents, however, are distinct from the impact of this strategy on the
broader societal network. When managers pursue a disunion strategy that keeps subcomponents

33 We note that our depictions are a simplification of real-world social dynamics, as any given actor can
belong to multiple identity groups, and the interplay of these multiple identities can under some
circumstances even reduce the intensity of conflict (Northrup, 1989). However, as horizontal inequalities
increase, and with them the risk of intergroup conflict, one identity typically takes on particular salience
(Brown & Langer, 2010; Gurr, 1993) as boundaries are reinforced vis-à-vis another group (David et al.,
2018; Hino et al., 2018), creating a dominant cleavage that makes conflict escalation more likely (Scarcelli,
2014).
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apart, social network theory suggests that the sparsity of direct communication channels between
subcomponents would restrict both the speed and accuracy of information flows between them
(Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988). Therefore, when managers negotiate benefits agreements
independently with stakeholders from distinct subcomponents, each stakeholder—and the other
actors belonging to the same subcomponent as the focal stakeholder—might not possess
complete and accurate information about the distributive arrangements of the other firmstakeholder relationships. Research on the political economy of conflict has shown that when
network subcomponents are characterized by horizontal inequalities across identity groups, this
barrier to information can erode actors’ confidence in the fair distribution of the firm’s benefits,
costs, and risks (Paczynska, 2016). In turn, these perceptions of unfairness, amplified by the
firm’s independent agreements, contribute to the reinforcement of boundaries that delineate the
identity groups and increase conflict risk (Stewart, 2008).
Indeed, because a firm’s stakeholders do not exist in a vacuum, disputes fostered by
managers’ actions can extend into the broader societal network through group identities shared
between stakeholders and other societal actors with whom the firm’s stakeholders have
relationships (McKenna, 2015). Ganson and Wennmann (2016) detail that, in the Albertine
Graben region of Uganda, local chiefs had cooperated for many years to prevent conflict with
respect to overlapping colonial-era land claims. As it became clear that oil under the land was
considered commercially viable, each chieftaincy separately asserted its rights to receive a
greater share of royalties from the firm pursuing its development, with management making no
apparent efforts to bring the chiefs together. Collaboration between the chiefs deteriorated to the
point where groups affiliated with one chieftaincy or another engaged in violent and sometimes
deadly conflict with each other over their disputed historical land claims that were now tied to oil
revenues. In another case, Anderson, Fraser, and Zandvliet (2001) evaluate a mining company in
Papua New Guinea that negotiated land usage and compensation individually with 23 local
government entities, each of which was affiliated with a different sub-clan. They found that this
strategy exacerbated group divisions between the broader sub-clans in ways that resulted in
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widespread violence between communities. While managers were reportedly not intentionally
reducing information flow to improve the firm’s negotiating position, the effect was to create the
widespread belief within each identity group that the others were benefiting at its expense.
In contrast to a firm that pursues a brokerage position across disconnected
subcomponents, a firm obtains a different kind of advantage by fostering network closure across
subcomponents within the broader societal network (Figure 3.5.1B), where network closure is
defined as a high density of direct connections between actors from different subcomponents
(Burt, 2000). Coined as tertius iungens by Obstfeld (2005), this type of relational strategy involves
the facilitation of cooperation between two or more stakeholders of the firm. Scholarship in the
business and peace literature has documented this “convening” role that managers can play by
creating a space in which diverse actors can advance dialogue “under the rubric of its legitimate
business interests” (Miller et al., 2019: 43). In this convening role, managers, instead of
maintaining the structural hole and brokering separate benefits agreements with stakeholders of
different subcomponents, attempt to strengthen cooperation between the disparate parties. If the
stakeholders are disconnected, managers can create introductions and propose collaborative
endeavors; and if the stakeholders are in conflict, managers can act as a catalyst or facilitator for
positive dialogue (Ganson, 2019b).
There are potential costs and benefits to the firm when managers choose a convening
strategy over a brokerage strategy. As the joining of groups enables a more active mobilization of
resource flows across the parties, the firm loses potential brokerage rents and incurs the costs of
coordinating across network subcomponents (Obstfeld, 2005). Relative to a firm situated as a
broker across disconnected subcomponents, however, a firm acting as a convener of actors from
different identity groups can enable better communication and coordination that might benefit the
firm and those convened, such as by bringing together actors across subcomponents to develop,
legitimize, and implement solutions to problems of both private and public interest (Lashitew,
Bals, & van Tulder, 2018).
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Furthermore, the convening of actors from distinct subcomponents can strengthen the
bridging social capital of the broader societal network. In his work on social capital, Putnam
(2000) distinguishes between bonding social capital, defined as shared trust, norms, and
understanding between actors of a homogenous identity group; and bridging social capital,
defined as shared trust, norms, and understanding between actors from different identity groups.
Although both types of social capital can be drawn upon as a resource to help actors achieve
mutually beneficial goals, bonding social capital often “only benefits those with internal access”
because it fosters an in-group identity through “tight bonds of trust and solidarity” that are by
nature exclusionary of outsiders (Leonard, 2004: 929). In contrast, bridging social capital, by
strengthening ties across identity groups, fosters the inclusion of actors from diverse backgrounds
in collective social decision-making.
When managers adopt a convening role instead of a brokering role, they build bridging
social capital within the network, because network closure facilitates the volume, depth, and
accuracy of information and resource exchange between actors from different identity groups
(Burt, 2000). As each party can observe and facilitate their partners’ continued cooperation with
each other (Kinne, 2013), managers and the firm’s stakeholders are more likely to develop
collective communication capabilities, such as knowledge about one another’s idiosyncrasies,
shared mental models of cooperation, and mutual understanding of tacit rules and obligations
(Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 2009). As such, an actor is more likely to receive accurate
knowledge about and correctly interpret the interactions of every firm-stakeholder pair, thus
avoiding potential misunderstandings about distributional agreements that might worsen
preexisting conflicts over horizontal inequalities between identity groups within the broader
societal network. In addition, when managers encourage intergroup agreements between the
firm’s stakeholder partners, they gain additional information about stakeholders’ preferred
distributional, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms. This revelation of preferences increases
the likelihood that all parties can find an arrangement where preferences overlap, so that
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members from different subcomponents can converge on mutually favored arrangements through
joint problem-solving rather than contest incompatible outcomes (Kinne, 2013).
Empirical research has found that areas with high (low) conflict are often characterized by
low (high) bridging social capital (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Vervisch, 2011). The impact of bridging
social capital on conflict risk is particularly important in the presence of substantial horizontal
inequalities, as the firm’s stakeholders are, at the same time, members of identity groups whose
members “share criteria for evaluation and judgement” (Barth, 1969: 15), and who make
cumulative choices with respect to intergroup permeability or rigidity based on group interests
(Wimmer, 2008). When managers foster bridging social capital by facilitating mutuallyadvantageous cooperative bonds between stakeholders of different identity groups, they may
reduce conflict risk by instilling a shared sense of justice across groups or reducing the perceived
need to mobilize in self-protection against the other group (Hillesund et al., 2018; Østby, 2013;
Stewart, 2011). They may increase cooperative potential by making the choice to trust, interact,
or cooperate across group boundaries in new ways appear less risky or more advantageous to
group members (David et al., 2018; Hino et al., 2018).
One particularly well-documented case of the myriad positive effects of actors building
bridging social capital across identity groups was undertaken by Chevron in Nigeria, where
intercommunal conflict had been a key cause of the company’s suspension of operations in the
Niger Delta. Chevron’s managers explicitly committed to fostering peaceful coexistence not only
in Chevron’s relationships with its stakeholders, but also in relations between those stakeholders
(Chevron, 2014). Management reorganized the firm’s community relations from dozens of dyadic
agreements into a much smaller number of regional development councils, each of which
represented a cluster of proximate communities that consciously bridged identity groups.
Managers also explicitly supported activities geared towards empowering local actors in
peacebuilding and conflict mitigation within and between those communities, for example, by
helping them to create “rapid response teams” that could intervene in conflicts over land between
neighboring communities. Through councils working on rural development from a regional rather
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than a local community perspective, Chevron’s managers thus fostered the growth of bridging
social capital that served to improve relations between communities. Such approaches that
connected stakeholders from different identity groups characterized by horizontal inequalities
resulted in a “dramatic” reduction in violence, both against company operations and facilities, and,
most notably, between communities that had formerly seen themselves as pitted against one
another (Hoben et al., 2012). Evaluations in 2008 and 2011, including those undertaken by
members of the affected identity groups, documented stakeholders’ perceptions of a “greater
sense of fairness” that “create[d] some of the key conditions for productive interaction and
problem solving” (Hoben et al., 2012: 12).

Proposition 1: The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities, the more a firm
fosters a denser (sparser) network of cooperative ties between identity groups, the more
it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal network.

3.3.2 Exclusion versus Inclusion of Stakeholders
We next consider how the patterns of exclusion and inclusion that determine the
composition of stakeholders with whom a firm builds relationships can exacerbate or moderate
conflict between actors of different identity groups in the broader societal network.
A strand of stakeholder theory argues that resource-constrained managers face
incentives to pursue relational strategies that prioritize one group over another. Mitchell, Agle,
and Wood (1997) suggest that managers prioritize stakeholders by assessing their power,
legitimacy, and urgency. Some of the same institutional factors (e.g., corruption, weak rule of law,
high fractionalization) that contribute to conflict risk can provide incentives to managers to
prioritize stakeholders with greater economic, political, or social resources (Amengual, 2017,
2021; Jones, Felps, & Bigley, 2007; Nartey, Henisz, & Dorobantu, 2018).
The collection of stakeholders that a firm has directly engaged with typically represent
only a subset of the identity groups present in the broader societal network. By building
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cooperative ties primarily with and between stakeholders from one identity group (or a subset of
groups), managers may contribute to other actors’ feelings of relative deprivation or envy
(Nickerson & Zenger, 2008), particularly in regions with high preexisting horizontal inequalities.
Building upon a growing literature in stakeholder theory, Lange, Bundy, and Park (2020) posit that
each stakeholder of a firm may view another stakeholder as “a referent for interpersonal equity
comparisons” and “either a perceived competitor for or facilitator of resources”. Applied more
broadly at the identity group level, these ideas suggest that managers’ preferential engagement
with one group over another would create an additional dimension of inequality that triggers social
comparisons between actors of different identity groups (Stewart, 2008).
Indeed, the composition of a firm’s stakeholder relationships can influence conflict risk
between actors of different identity groups within the broader societal network. This scenario is
depicted in Figure 3.5.2A, which shows that a firm has preferentially engaged with high-power
actors who belong to the same identity group. From the perspective of managers, this relational
strategy might be rational for a profit-maximizing firm (Mitchell et al., 1997), because, for instance,
the firm’s preferential engagement can solidify the political support of influential parties. However,
the firm and its stakeholders do not exist in a vacuum. By distributing benefits to members of one
group over others, the firm impacts horizontal inequalities in the broader societal network. As a
result, group polarization can intensify, deteriorating intergroup communication and leading to
greater conflict risk over institutional arrangements to distribute benefits, costs, and risks (Oliker,
Szayna, Pace, & Wilson, 2003). Empirical evidence also shows that when a firm preferentially
engages with one group over another in conflict-affected areas, the capacity or willingness of
actors across groups to resolve problems together can diminish (Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009).
When actors become more entrenched within their own identity group, they may identify more
strongly with their own group; may process information in a biased manner against the outgroups; may respond more emotionally towards the actions of the out-groups; or may avoid
interactions with the out-groups (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) in ways that increase conflict risk.
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On the other hand, managers can construct the firm’s network of stakeholder
relationships in a manner that convenes the firm with different identity groups (Figure 3.5.2B).
The strengthening of relationships with and between a more diverse set of actors requires the
investment of firm resources. However, the impact of the firm’s economic activities—the
distribution of benefits, costs, and risks—can then be discussed with members of multiple identity
groups. Through such conscious engagement with stakeholders across identity groups,
managers reduce the likelihood of envy or perceptions of relative deprivation from social
comparisons fostered by the selective inclusion for or exclusion from dialogue; avoid the
reinforcement of intergroup differences; and enable the joint development of communication
capabilities and shared norms of behavior (Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). In addition, these
communication capabilities and norms of behavior across identity groups developed within a
firm’s stakeholder network can serve as a “template” for constructive engagement between
societal actors who are themselves connected to and share the same identities as the firm’s
stakeholders—an argument consistent with a growing body of empirical work (Miller et al., 2019)
on business practices aimed to reduce conflict in the operational environment.
These mechanisms can occur through subtle pathways, as when an oil company in
Nigeria faced protests over its practice of administering a competitive exam to select children for
scholarships. Renouard (2013) relates how its managers’ presumably well-meaning actions
surfaced conflict between “traditionalists” who were happy to see the local chief allocate access
to important assets (typically, by awarding the scholarship to a boy from a prominent family whom
he believed could later help lead the community) and “progressives” who believed that there
should be broader fairness in the allocation of valuable resources (and therefore believed that
any boy or girl should have an equal chance to be considered). Managers reversed course,
expanding their network to convene elders, teachers, and government officials who had varying
perspectives on whether boys or girls, more meritorious or more needy students should be
selected. They reached broad agreement on the framework for awarding scholarships, resulting

100

in a modest evolution of local cultural practices and perspectives that reduced conflict between
the traditionalists and progressives competing for control over scarce resources.
The firm’s intentional engagement of identity groups in conflict can also unfold along
more dramatic and systemic pathways. Charney (1999) documents that during the apartheid era
in South Africa, the heads of a few important industrial concerns had the clout to publicly flout
apartheid laws that forbade them from meeting with African National Congress (ANC) leaders
whom the government had declared to be “terrorists”. They did so to encourage further meetings
between white business leaders and mass movement leaders who previously had almost no
contact and who harbored deep mutual suspicions. Some of these leaders went on to co-found
with their civil society counterparts the Consultative Business Movement (CBM). CBM facilitated
countless meetings between business and civil society leaders across racial and political divides,
eventually co-chairing the Secretariat to the convention that birthed the country’s new
constitution. Like the oil company in Nigeria, the South African firms’ intentional bridging of
identity groups in their stakeholder networks opened the door to greater distributional fairness
and the reduction of conflict risk at the broader societal level.

Proposition 2: The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities, the more a firm
bridges identity groups (privileges one identity group over another) when building firmstakeholder relationships, the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal
network.

3.3.3 Managing Faultlines Within a Firm’s Network of Stakeholders
We now consider how a firm, by having bridged identity groups in the construction of its
stakeholder network, may either replicate (and thus reinforce) or diminish conflict between actors
in these identity groups in the broader societal network.
When managers build cooperative ties with stakeholders from different identity groups
(Figure 3.5.2B), the firm’s stakeholder network may simply expand in a way that mirrors the
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societal boundaries between these groups. In Figure 3.5.3A, managers have avoided giving
preferential voice to one identity group by engaging with members of both the more and less
powerful identity groups. However, managers still risk reinforcing their intergroup division if issues
regarding the firm’s distribution of benefits, costs, and risks cause stakeholders to align
themselves across identity group affiliations. If preexisting horizontal inequalities are high, the
likelihood of stakeholders to sort along the identity group boundary on these issues of distribution
increases (Stewart, 2008), as members of each group mobilize to protect their advantaged (or
change their disadvantaged) status (Stewart, 2002).
An identity group boundary that has been reinforced by multiple economic, political, and
social issues or interests that align members along that boundary is referred to as a faultline in
the management scholarship (Heidl, Steensma, & Phelps, 2014; Lau & Murnighan, 1998) or an
overlapping social cleavage in the ethnopolitics literature (Scarcelli, 2014). 34 A strong faultline
within a firm’s stakeholder network can provide an “informal structure” for conflict (Lau &
Murnighan, 2005: 645), because it can foster such strong in-group affinity from common
demographic attributes, roles, and interests that the intergroup boundary becomes a decision rule
for group members for whether or not they can interact on other issues across that boundary
(Scarcelli, 2014). 35 We expect each of these challenges to increase with the level of preexisting
horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2008).
Such faultlines were evident within small enterprises that worked in the city of Drvar in
the Croat-Muslim Federation of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina to bridge divides between
Serbs and Croats who had long competed to advance their own agendas across economic,

34 The management literature and the ethnopolitics literature differ in the scope of their analyses, with the
former more focused on their analyses of employees within a firm and the latter on identity groups at the
broader societal level. However, both literatures point to the idea that a group boundary initially formed
around common attributes (e.g., demographics differences), when reinforced by aligning members within the
same group with similar tasks and roles (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) or issues and interests (Scarcelli, 2014),
can increase intergroup conflict.
35 Empirical research in management has shown that faultlines, by engendering actors’ tendencies to
identify with the norms and priorities of a certain group, can restrict communication across the divide
(Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003); prevent the adherence to and the development of broader norms (Heidl
et al., 2014); create misunderstandings, mistrust, or dislike due to stereotyping of the other (Li & Hambrick,
2005); or increase the potential for perceptions of injustice as members of a group interpret the existence of
distributive differences as discrimination (Spell, Bezrukova, Haar, & Spell, 2011).
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political, and social dimensions. Although the project’s sponsors were well-intentioned in their
attempts to foster amity between the two ethnic groups in a private sector setting, they ended up
replicating the dominant faultline between the identity groups that had existed at the broader
societal level before, during, and after the war. Wanting to commit resources to the development
of workplaces where workers from different identity groups physically sat side by side, they
deprioritized dialogue about workers’ relationships in the context of ethnic identity and the effects
of war, while emphasizing that workers had been chosen on the basis of their ethnic identities.
This arrangement left participants vulnerable to internal conflicts over their feelings about
coexistence, leading in turn to dwindling interest in continuing participation and reduced
willingness to maintain relationships with the other side. One person in a bi-ethnic agricultural
enterprise summed up the broadly expressed resistance to cooperation: “I go to work, I do my
job, that’s all” (Chigas & Ganson, 2003: 80). This example highlights that when a firm reinforces
the faultlines between identity groups within its stakeholder network, the firm may have limited
positive impact on—and potentially magnifies—the preexisting tensions, inequalities, or conflicts
that have divided the groups in other contexts within the broader societal network.
Conversely, managers can make the boundaries between identity groups less visible or
salient by expanding the firm’s stakeholder network in a manner that is more likely to lead to
substantive interactions by actors from different identity groups. In Figure 3.5.3B, managers have
constructed a stakeholder network without a faultline that is as visible or salient. When managers
convene stakeholders affiliated with identity groups delineated by varied boundaries, they may
contribute to the growth of bridging social capital within the network by providing a context for
actors to share perceptions and interests in the course of business pursuits (Reade, 2015).
Scholarship from social network theory suggests that having “common third parties” that cut
across otherwise strong faultlines can help facilitate the sharing of information across parties and
prevent opportunistic behavior by acting as additional monitors (Heidl et al., 2014). In addition,
these “boundary-spanning” stakeholders can serve as peacekeepers or mediators for groups in
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conflict (Zhang & Guler, 2019), because they might be incentivized to help resolve disputes and
sustain mutual cooperation in the distribution of the firm’s benefits, costs, and risks.
Furthermore, these actors may introduce issues and opportunities to the network which
tend to diminish rather than reinforce the dominant faultline by introduction of cross-cutting (and
thus conflict-diminishing) boundaries (Powell, 1976). This is not to say that the dominant faultline
can or should be ignored; rather, the nurturing of mutual interests may allow each group to “revise
its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other” through the internalization
of a more multifaceted relationship (Kelman, 2004: 119). In this way, the firm’s stakeholder
network can act as a platform through which historical grievances and present distributions might
be discussed and managed under a less divisive relational structure than one in which only the
firm and two identity groups are present, thus reducing conflict risk.
As illustrated in the case of the commercial vehicle manufacturer Scania in Iraq (Ganson,
2013), the inclusion of “common third parties” (Heidl et al., 2014) can mitigate in-group
mobilization across faultlines and enhance consensus. As part of its re-entry strategy into the
country after the Second Gulf War, Scania needed to train a new generation of truck mechanics
to international standards of technical sophistication. The project was fraught, as operating a
technical school required cooperation with both national (Iraqi) and provincial (Kurdish)
stakeholders whose relationships had been characterized by violent confrontation since the fall of
the Ottoman Empire. Scania’s management reached out to the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), which provided a trusted bridge between the Kurdish and
national governments. Additionally, an increasingly dense and diverse network of relationships
between the firm, the governments, UNIDO, foreign donors, and technical experts on issues of
vocational education, English language instruction, education of girls, and other issues less
central to the dominant Iraqi/Kurdish conflict faultline increased trust in ways that allowed for
more impactful implementation. Donors, for example, were willing to put money at risk to expand
opportunities at a state-owned facility despite widespread government corruption because of
Scania’s and UNIDO’s involvement. The diverse network of trust also allowed for more complex
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agreements, for example, by bringing the government in Baghdad on board with a plan to pursue
predominantly Kurdish recruitment to the school in early years under a promise that a hostel
would be built to facilitate recruitment from other regions in later years. The increase in common
ties across groups through the emphasis on issues and actors not perceived as favoring one or
another identity group increased communication and mutual trust across the groups (Krackhardt,
1999). This in turn helped to address (in admittedly modest steps) issues of horizontal inequalities
in the provision of education and economic opportunity, and proved that Kurds and Iraqis could in
fact collaborate to their mutual advantage despite their conflict history.

Proposition 3: The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities, the more a firm
erodes (reinforces) the boundary between identity groups within its stakeholder network,
the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal network.

3.3.4 Supplanting versus Supporting Helpful Brokers
Lastly, we consider how a manager’s choice of how to bridge subcomponents
characterized by weak intergroup ties—a structural hole—in the presence of so-called “helpful
brokers” in a conflicted-affected area may impact conflict risk in the broader societal network.
Managers who pursue a relational strategy of bridging structural holes in the broader
societal network may find that, in the presence of acute conflict between network subcomponents
underpinned by horizontal inequalities, there are few extant entry points for the building of
relationships between themselves and the parties or between the parties. The members of two
subcomponents may be geographically proximate and even economically interdependent—
engaging in daily market transactions, for example—but still be characterized predominantly by
distant or conflictual relationships because of strong differences in their membership across
identity groups that contest the distribution of economic, political, and social assets.
Yet it is rare in such situations for there to be no brokers at all between the conflicting
subcomponents. The peacebuilding literature increasingly emphasizes that “many of the systems,
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institutions, attitudes, values, and interests that support conflict prevention are already in place” in
conflict-affected areas (Anderson & Wallace, 2013: 98) and that such existing capacities can
provide the foundation for meaningful progress. These existing capacities may include “helpful” or
“honest” brokers who generate (but do not attempt to capture) value from their position in the
system across some combination of economic, political, and social dimensions (Leonard, 2004).
They may organize dispersed knowledge, provide space for friendly or neutral interactions to
occur, and/or create incentives to motivate cooperative behavior (Halevy, Halali, & Zlatev, 2019).
Such brokers are inherently a part of network subcomponents with members engaged in some
preexisting conflict (Figure 3.5.4A), but they might also possess a degree of embeddedness in
each subcomponent that provides them with some credibility and trust with the members of each
(Stys et al., 2019). These brokers might possess a strong combination of both bonding social
capital with those whom they are primarily affiliated and bridging social capital with those affiliated
with the other identity group. Where such brokers are connected to, and trusted by, important
local constituencies, they can build trust in processes and outcomes where state institutions are
too weak or illegitimate to do so, de-escalating and managing conflict risk (Mason, 2009).
The manager attempting to bridge a structural hole thus faces a choice: whether to
position the firm as an independent broker or convener between the parties, or to work through
helpful brokers who are indigenous to the system. The former strategy may seem more
straightforward: it builds the firm’s own social capital; can keep the agenda more focused on the
business issues of greatest immediate relevance to the firm (and possibly, to other immediate
stakeholders); and maintains greater firm control over processes and outcomes. Yet this strategy
can be highly problematic within the broader societal network. Helpful brokers, although
sometimes difficult for companies entering a community to recognize, are part of the often
informal but well-developed structures (Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2009) that help to
sustain an acceptable level of cooperative relations despite the stresses of the conflict
environment (Pouligny, 2010). When outside actors intervene in ways that fail to take into account
the nature of existing relationships that make up the broader societal network, they risk increasing
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intergroup conflict within the network (de Coning, 2016), because the resources that outside
actors bring to an even well-meaning convener role can divert attention, status, and social capital
away from locally helpful brokers. This weakening of the helpful brokers undermines their
effectiveness not only on the issue of interest to the firm, but also in their broader role of
mitigating intergroup conflict and maintaining social stability—an outcome that has been welldocumented in the humanitarian (Anderson, 1999), peacebuilding (Anderson & Olson, 2003), and
company-community relations literatures (Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009).
We depict these potentially negative dynamics in Figure 3.5.4B, illustrating an entering
firm that has undermined a locally helpful broker by attempting to independently develop
cooperative relations regarding the distribution of benefits, costs, and risks with stakeholders α
and β, who are members of different identity groups in conflict. Such circumstances are set out by
Bardouille-Crema, Chigas and Miller (2013), who relate the case of a foreign company in Nigeria
that, as a corporate social responsibility project, sunk a borehole on land that it only later
ascertained was owned by a Christian. Conflict erupted between Christians, who believed
themselves to be a disadvantaged group entitled to preferential access to this small benefit, and
the Muslim majority, who believed that they should have equal access to the new water source.
Unaware of a respected local sheikh on whom both religious communities regularly called to
resolve disputes, managers tried to work with a local government widely perceived as illegitimate
to settle the matter, and the conflict escalated into violence.
Conversely, managers can “recognize and work through” helpful brokers (BardouilleCrema et al., 2013: 80)—acknowledging their capabilities and legitimacy in the local context—in
ways that “support and reinforce” them (Anderson, 1999: 146). In Figure 3.5.4C, we depict this
relational strategy by showing that the entering firm has developed a cooperative tie with the
helpful broker; and that managers are building new relationships with other stakeholders under
the guidance of the helpful broker in a way that avoids worsening the network’s preexisting
conflict. The case of ISAGEN in Colombia in its construction of the Amoyá River Hydroelectric
Center (Patiño & Miller, 2016) provides an example. ISAGEN, then a parastatal company,
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decided in 2006 to initiate the project in the Canyon de las Hermosas, which was also the base of
operations for Front 21, one of the oldest of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC
by its Spanish acronym). FARC was borne as a peasant and laborer movement in the MarxistLeninist tradition that engaged in armed struggle in favor of land reform, increased social
services, and an opening of the political order. Front 21’s control over the Canyon de las
Hermosas was so complete that it administered justice, maintained security and civic order,
controlled transit schedules and movement of people, and solemnized marriages. As the
developer of a national infrastructure project that would use large amounts of explosives in the
construction phase, ISAGEN could not proceed without army accompaniment. This meant that
ISAGEN would need to bridge two subcomponents of the broader societal network—one
comprised of pro-government businesses, the army, more right-wing political parties, and the
national government in power; the other comprised of local community groups, human rights
advocates, development actors, and the FARC—which had few points of intersection, and even
fewer positive ones, between them.
At a variety of junctures, ISAGEN worked through existing, locally legitimate, helpful
brokers. Managers identified the Las Hermosas Association for Development towards the Future
(Asohermosas) as a group with particularly deep community roots, as well as the ability to
navigate between government agencies (who would need to sign as guarantors of the benefits
agreement) and the FARC (who would at least informally also need to approve it). Rather than
attempting to set up its own structures, the company provided Asohermosas with offices and a
budget to play its mediation role, including with the company. It was also clear that allegations of
human rights abuses would need to be managed, given the tense relationship between the
national army and the FARC. Managers supported the involvement of the then-Governor of
Tolima, who was a well-respected figure among the authorities and communities in the
municipality. His involvement was instrumental to the establishment of a community-based
Human Rights Observatory to identify and document developments that could affect human rights
or community-army relations, and a Transparency Roundtable in which up to 400 people
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representing civil society groups, the army, international human rights organizations, and the
local, regional, and national government discussed and tracked commitments made with respect
to allegations of army abuse or illegal activity. The company remained an observer, rather than a
principal party, to these processes.
The resulting successful implementation of the hydroelectric project, benefits of local
development, and relative peace experienced in the valley demonstrated how ISAGEN managers
advanced their own business objectives by supporting helpful brokers on whose stronger bonding
and bridging social capital the company could rely. In addition to serving firm ends, this relational
strategy also increased the cooperative stability of actors within the broader societal network,
including between the local communities and the national government, whose relationship had for
decades been characterized by deep mistrust; and between the local FARC and the Colombian
military, who, at least within the bounds of the Canyon de las Hermosas, ceased armed
confrontation.

Proposition 4: The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities across conflictual
network subcomponents, the more a firm supports (supplants) a helpful broker’s ties
across those subcomponents, the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader
societal network.

3.4 Discussion
We develop four propositions that examine how a firm’s relational strategies with its
stakeholders—brokering or convening stakeholders from different subcomponents; managing the
exclusion or inclusion of stakeholders within the firm’s stakeholder network; strengthening or
eroding faultlines within that stakeholder network; and supplanting or supporting “helpful
brokers”—impact conflict risk in conflict-affected areas. Our argument emphasizes that
managerial decisions in pursuit of business prosperity allocate resources (including attention and
conferred status) to various stakeholders in ways that alter the structure of relationships within the
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broader societal network. Within identity groups, these firm relational strategies shape the relative
attractiveness of conflict or collaboration as members consider their impact on group access to,
and control over, economic, political, or social assets. Between identity groups, these strategies
affect conflict risk by fostering (or diminishing) communication, trust, norms, understandings, and
consensus-building that enable (or inhibit) intergroup settlements.
These arguments pose a direct challenge to overoptimistic interpretations of the business
and peace literature (Fort, 2007). Consistent with the inductive theory building of Joseph, Katsos
& Daher (2020), we contend that a direct causal link from private sector development to peace is
misplaced or, at least, is in need of more nuance. Even ethical private sector interventions that
bring jobs, tax revenue, local procurement, knowledge creation, and other productive benefits of
business-led prosperity cannot be presumed to be peace-positive. Rather, in divided societies––
whether along lines of ethnicity, religion, culture, race, political ideology, class, gender, age,
geography, or organizational affiliation (Stewart, 2008)––which identity group’s capacities are
built, whose interpretations of the rule of law are supported, which group benefits from jobs or
contracts, as well as which intergroup bonds are built or broken through private sector activities
will critically impact social cohesion and conflict risk (Joseph et al., 2020; Miklian & Schouten,
2019). We thus join voices calling for more attention to “the vectors through which, in theory,
business actors can affect the prospects, intensity, etc., of peace or conflict” (Ford, 2015: 451),
with particular focus on the structural dimensions of conflict (Idemudia, 2017).
Our propositions specifically highlight managerial decision-making as an explanatory
variable in societal conflict. We thus bridge a gap between scholarship at the firm level and at the
societal level. Theoretical and empirical work at the firm-level has focused on a firm’s impact
within its stakeholder (ego) network, with a dependent variable of conflict in that network. By
contrast, work at the societal level analyzes the impact of a functioning and ethical private sector,
with a dependent variable of conflict risk in society. We integrate the two to show how an
individual firm’s actions can propagate conflict risk from its stakeholder network to the broader
societal network.
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We demonstrate how the impacts of a firm’s relational strategies on intergroup conflict
may outweigh the importance of direct economic impacts in societies characterized by substantial
horizontal inequalities. Presumably, other managerial decisions––across the gamut of strategy,
finance, marketing, organization, human resources, operations, corporate social responsibility,
and so on––also shape whether “groups see each other as being in competition for power,
legitimacy, or resources,” and can similarly “exacerbate grievances, deepen tensions, and widen
the divide among them” (Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013: 80). To the extent that this is true, a firm
operating in a conflict-affected area engages in peacebuilding––or undermines it––not primarily
through any extraordinary efforts to bring parties together, but through its everyday decisions and
actions. This underlines the value of a more focused managerial lens in business and peace
scholarship that not only explores the boundaries of the private sector’s peace-positive role, but
also managerial agency within them.
We also contribute to the business and peace literature by drawing on the tools of social
network analysis to offer a theoretical toolkit with constructs that can be empirically observed and
analyzed in subsequent works. Specifically, given the critical nexus of a firms’ intentional or
unintentional impacts on the structure of relationships among identity groups characterized by
horizontal inequalities, we analyze the implications of managerial actions to form or break ties in a
stakeholder network on conflict risk in the broader societal network. We link the stakeholder
network to that broader societal network through shared identity group membership. Our
approach is consistent with the recent skepticism of top-down institutional design and
peacebuilding efforts that focus on state capacity or national governance (Ganson & Wennmann,
2017) in favor of more micro-level interventions (de Coning, 2016). However, we shy away from
the strong-form critique that such micro-level interventions are so contextually dependent as to
not be analyzable without reference to that context (Loode, 2011). Rather, we argue that the
basic patterns of organizations embedded in stakeholder networks which are linked through
identity group membership is indeed generalizable. We thus provide new theory that opens
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important avenues for empirical analysis that can build from the context-specific insights of extant
qualitative studies.
We further contend that this same pattern manifests even outside of conflict-affected
areas. As a result, scholars of strategic management employing network tools (Burt, 1992, 2000,
2004) may consider the impact of network positions not only on rents and flows of information or
other resources, but also on societal-level conflict risk. While substantial attention has been
focused on related issues in research on diversity, faultlines, and spillovers, that research
remains largely focused on local rather than network-level impacts. Our analysis suggests, by
contrast, that the choices of firms on the management of these issues may have far broader
implications for members of identity groups with whom their employees, customers, suppliers,
and other members of ecosystems or innovation networks share ties.
An important example of such consideration would be to challenge the choices that
stakeholder theorists have made to focus on value creation for stakeholders (Phillips, 2003;
Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). The firm and its stakeholders are not a closed network; rather,
each firm exists on a common platform for negotiation of the terms on which benefits, costs, and
risks are distributed within the broader societal network (Lucea, 2007; Rowley, 1997). Even
where managerial decisions promote communal-sharing relational ethics (Jones, Harrison, &
Felps, 2018) by following principles of fairness (Phillips, 1997) to maximize value-added for their
stakeholders (Garcia‐Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Harrison & Wicks, 2013), “balance and harmony”
(Freeman, 2010: 8) may not extend to the members of the interconnected set of identity groups
with whom stakeholders share preexisting and arguably more fundamental relationships. If
businesses are to contribute more dependably to peace, analyses of the “set of relationships
among groups that have a stake in the activities that make up the business” (Parmar et al., 2010:
5) must encompass relations among identity groups in the broader societal network.
Even more broadly, and speculatively, we perceive similar dynamics of identity group
conflict and firms’ exacerbation thereof to be in play in the fraught national political debates
surrounding free trade, immigration, race relations, and the role of religion in public policy.
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Debates on these topics pit socially constructed identity groups against one another in
increasingly polarized competitions (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018). To the extent that firms’
stakeholders are members of identity groups constructed along socio-economic, ideological, or
religious dimensions with strong in-group homogeneity of preferences on these issues, firms’
relational strategies can contribute to the amelioration (or exacerbation) of tensions between
populist, nativist, and nationalist political forces and those supporting more globalist, progressive,
and universal values.
While we believe that these theoretical implications are substantive, we acknowledge
limitations to our theoretical development and areas for future research. We did not consider the
mechanisms that foster relationship formation, maintenance, or breaking, nor the relative efficacy
across various mechanisms for doing so. We also did not explicitly compare the relative costs in
terms of financial or human resources, the opportunity costs of pursuing these strategies, or the
contextual contingencies or moderators that impact these costs. Nor did we provide the means to
compare the efficacy or cumulative impact of the relational strategies examined in the paper.
Furthermore, we consider these four relational strategies but acknowledge that they are neither
exclusive nor comprehensive. More fundamentally, we focus on firm choices while acknowledging
that civil society and public sector actors also possess agency. They also pursue relational
strategies that have important impacts on horizontal inequities, conflict, and cooperation that
interact with firms’ decisions in ways yet to be explored. In particular, the role of formal and
informal institutions in moderating the impact of horizontal inequalities on conflict in the broader
societal network, as well as the potential benefits of collective approaches by groups of
companies or in concert with civil society actors (Kolk & Lenfant, 2016; Miller et al., 2019), are left
for future research.
Our theoretical implications, though bounded by the aforementioned limitations, have
important and actionable practical counterparts. The first of these focuses on specific
recommendations for conflict-sensitive business practices. Managers in conflict-affected areas
should presumptively tilt their stakeholder relational strategies towards the convening of network
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subcomponents; the bridging of members from different identity groups; the eroding of faultlines
within the firm’s stakeholder network; and the support of helpful brokers in the broader societal
network. Absent such intentional relational strategies, business-generated prosperity is more
likely to have perverse consequences through the exacerbation of grievances and marginalization
of certain identity group members, thereby enhancing conflict rather than peace at the societal
level. By extension, managers attending to stakeholder, employee, customer, supplier, alliance,
network, or ecosystem relations must further expand their field of vision to the relations between
identity groups at the broader societal level in which their stakeholders are embedded. Similar
analysis is required by investors, creditors, and philanthropists seeking to address grand societal
challenges of climate risk, racial and immigrant justice, human rights, and inequality.
Turning to civil society, the public sector, and international organizations, our work
provides a point of convergence for those who promote accelerated private sector growth as a
pathway for economic development and thus for conflict risk mitigation, and those who focus on
restraint and regulation of private sector actors to reduce conflict and injustice. Instead of
debating the net impact of the private sector in the abstract, one can, instead, assess it
contingently by considering how firms’ relational strategies (and, by extension, other managerial
decisions) impact conflict risk between identity groups. Particularly in the presence of substantial
horizontal inequalities, the societal benefits of incentives that support efforts by firms to enhance
intergroup cooperation and that penalize actions that sustain or exacerbate intergroup conflict
may be substantial.
This perspective may increase the possibilities for, and mix of, positive engagement.
Approaches might include unilateral actions by economic, political, or social actors, such as the
acknowledgement and support of helpful local brokers to better manage conflict across network
subcomponents; government mandates to companies, such as requiring the mediation of
environmental and social impact assessments and the inclusion of marginalized identity groups;
or the establishment of observatories through the support of international agencies that increase
the density of networks and act as third parties that bridge faultlines. Such strategies are also
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available to meso-level players such as investors, project finance lenders, and insurers as they
take cognizance not only of vertical inequality across strata of income but also of horizontal
inequalities across identity groups. Together with managerial choices that strengthen intergroup
cooperation, such interventions may help to reduce conflict risk within the broader societal
network in ways beneficial to the market-based economic system in which firms, stakeholders,
governments, and civil society are all embedded.
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3.5 Figures
Figure 3.5.1: Brokerage versus Convening of Network Subcomponents

1A

Firm

1B

Firm
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[The striped-filled nodes indicate stakeholders and other societal actors; and the solid-filled node
indicates a firm. The varying patterns of the nodes highlight that they belong to distinct identity
groups characterized by preexisting horizontal inequalities. In this figure, there are three readily
identifiable subcomponents in the broader societal network. Figure 1A illustrates a firm that
occupies a brokerage position between actors in disparate subcomponents of the broader
societal network. Figure 1B illustrates a firm that is more embedded in a dense network with a
higher degree of network closure.]
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Figure 3.5.2: Pursuing Exclusive versus Inclusive Engagement of Identity Groups
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[The striped-filled nodes indicate stakeholders and other societal actors; the solid-filled node
indicates a firm. The varying patterns of the nodes highlight that they belong to distinct identity
groups characterized by preexisting horizontal inequalities. The solid blues lines represent
cooperative relationships; and the dotted red lines represent conflictual relationships. In this
figure, the size of a node indicates relative power or influence (one dimension of horizontal
inequalities). Relative to the firm in 2B, the firm in 2A has magnified divisions across identity
groups through its preferential engagement with one type of stakeholders, which has increased
conflict between identity groups within the broader societal network over arrangements to
distribute benefits, costs, and risks. In 2B, the firm’s bridging of stakeholders from different
identity groups increases the capacity for greater cooperation between actors in these identity
groups in the broader societal network.]
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Figure 3.5.3: Reinforcing versus Eroding Faultlines Within the Firm’s Stakeholder Network

Firm

3B

3A

Firm

Vs.

Firm

[The striped-filled nodes indicate stakeholders and other societal actors; and the solid-filled node
indicates a firm. The varying patterns of the nodes highlight that they belong to distinct identity
groups characterized by preexisting horizontal inequalities. In this figure, the size of a node
indicates relative power or influence (one dimension of horizontal inequalities). The firm in 3A has
expanded its stakeholder network by including more members of the same identity groups to
which it was already connected, whereas the firm in 3B has expanded its stakeholder network by
building ties to those from new groups. Relative to the firm in 3B, which has coalesced a more
diverse group of cooperative stakeholders within its stakeholder network (who do not sort neatly
into distinct factions), the firm in 3A has a more readily identifiable faultline between two identity
groups in its stakeholder network.]
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Figure 3.5.4: Supplanting versus Supporting Helpful Brokers
4A
Helpful broker
β

α

4B

4C

Entering Firm
Helpful broker

Helpful broker
β

Entering Firm
β

Vs.
α

α

[The striped-filled nodes indicate stakeholders and other societal actors; the solid-filled node
indicates a firm; and specifically the dot-filled node indicates an actor who plays the role of a
“helpful broker” across the two subcomponents within the broader societal network. The varying
patterns of the nodes highlight that they belong to distinct identity groups characterized by
preexisting horizontal inequalities. The solid blues lines represent cooperative relationships; and
the dotted red lines represent conflictual relationships. The thickness of the lines represents the
intensity of those relationships. This environment has two network subcomponents in conflict:
there is a high density of cooperative ties within a subcomponent, but numerous conflictual ties
across two subcomponents. In 4A, the helpful broker is relatively embedded in both
subcomponents, using its strong cooperative relations with actors across the two subcomponents
to try to mitigate conflict. In 4B, the entering firm, being less embedded and hence less capable of
reinforcing information flow, trust, norms, or collective action across the subcomponents, has
undermined the helpful broker’s role in mitigating conflict between stakeholders α and β by
distributing benefits, costs, and risks (independently of the helpful broker) to α and β. In 4C, the
entering firm reinforces the helpful broker’s position and builds cooperative ties with other
stakeholders under the guidance of the helpful broker in a way that avoids worsening the conflict.]
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CHAPTER 4: Mapping Conflict Environments with Media Data: An Application of Natural
Language Processing to Construct Networks of Firm and Stakeholder Relationships
Tony L. He and Anne S. Jamison

4.1 Introduction
Multinational firms that seek entry into conflict-affected areas often face political risks
associated with the contestation of resources between identity groups defined by racial, ethnic,
cultural, and other socially constructed boundaries. In such environments, firms choose not only
how to allocate resources such as jobs, infrastructure investments, and contracts but also how to
manage the relationships with and between stakeholders (Ganson, He, & Henisz, 2022). If these
choices increase horizontal inequalities between identity groups, they can, in turn, exacerbate
intergroup conflicts, as perceived inequalities foster distrust, spotlight grievances, and restrict the
potential for open dialogue and consensus between identity groups (Brown & Langer, 2010;
Ganson, He, & Henisz, 2021; Stewart, 2008). Examining how firms might engage constructively
with actors across identity groups to avoid raising conflict risk, and perhaps even to contribute to
peace-positive economic development, has become a growing area of research in the
management literature.
However, empirical studies that examine firms’ relationships with local stakeholders, and
how the structure and tenor of these ties impact conflict between identity groups, face several
quantitative challenges. First, available datasets on conflict generally record only discrete and
major events such as large protests and physical acts of violence, and datasets that track public
opinions over time rarely examine the sentiments of distinct identity groups towards one another.
Second, although large firms’ overall environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings are
readily available, these data generally do not provide insight into how the subsidiaries of these
firms—especially those operating in emerging markets characterized by historical grievances
between identity groups—are managing their political risks via relationships with local
stakeholders. Third, to have sufficient observations to conduct empirical studies, one must map
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the structure of relationships between a large number of firms and stakeholders and to assess the
level of conflict or cooperation of those ties. These quantitative barriers thus create measurement
challenges in understanding the evolution and impact of firms’ relationships with local actors in
conflict-affect regions.
In this paper, we propose a method to generate a set of quantitative measures about the
structure of relationships between firms and actors of identity groups in conflict-affected areas.
We utilize geo- and time-tagged data from media reports in the Global Database of Events,
Language and Tone’s Global Knowledge Graph (GDELT-GKG) and apply natural language
processing techniques to construct a panel dataset of relationships between firms, political actors,
and civil society actors. Drawing from methods to analyze social networks (Blondel, Guillaume,
Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008; Traag, Waltman, & van Eck, 2019), we also utilize a community
detection algorithm to classify local actors into cooperative clusters, and we examine the reported
conflictual sentiments between these groups to calculate measures of intergroup conflict. This
method provides an advantage over existing databases of global conflicts by examining changes
in the tenor of relationships between groups to detect changes in conflictual sentiments that do
not necessarily culminate into (but can result in) actual physical conflict. In addition, we map the
relationships between firms and actors of different identity groups, showing how firms might
preferentially engage with, or avoid, certain groups. We demonstrate the use of this method by
mapping the network of relationships between actors in Rwanda and qualitatively show how the
network reflects the country’s political environment in 2015 to 2020.

4.2 Firms in Conflict Environments
The role of private sector development in exacerbating conflict in conflict-affected areas
has been examined across different scholarships. In economics and political science, the
resource curse literatures provide evidence that private sector development, under some
conditions, fuels internal conflicts. The discovery and extraction of natural resources can trigger
conflict in low- and middle-income countries (Ross, 2015) by exacerbating grievances from
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groups who bear an outsized cost of development (e.g., the environmental degradation in
traditional homelands) and who are excluded from access to the financial gains and opportunities
of economic growth (Berman, Couttenier, Rohner, & Thoenig, 2017). The positive relationship
between economic development and armed conflicts is stronger in regions with recent histories of
armed violence (Lei & Michaels, 2014) and where resource abundance is concentrated within an
ethnic group (Lessmann & Steinkraus, 2019; Morelli & Rohner, 2015).
In these conflict-affected areas, firms might be incentivized, or forced, to become a direct
participant of ongoing conflicts. Firms might expend resources to improve the security of areas
where they operate, and they might finance or bribe certain armed groups in order to gain
protection (Berman et al., 2017). Groups with control over access to critical infrastructure can also
extort firms in exchange for providing the materials or services needed to continue business
operations. In short, the rents derived from economic activity can be captured by groups to
sustain or escalate conflict (Angrist & Kugler, 2008; Berman et al., 2017).
On the other hand, case studies of firms’ peacebuilding potential also demonstrate that
firms can play a “convening” role by providing space for diverse actors to engage in dialogue
about economic and other interests (Miller, Ganson, Cechvala, & Miklian, 2019: 43). Firms can
also provide resources to support so-called “helpful brokers” who possess the social capital,
knowledge of the local conflict environment, and willingness to help negotiate for peace between
groups in conflict (Ganson et al., 2021).
In addition to such intentional efforts, firms might also unintentionally exacerbate or
mitigate the divisions that underlie conflict through their relationships with local stakeholders
(Ganson et al., 2022). For example, when a large multinational firm builds ties exclusively with
high-powered actors who belong to a majority identity group, this preference engagement—which
might confer status and voice to political or economic elites—can magnify perceptions of
inequality and exclusion from historically marginalized identity groups, leading to increased
conflict risk. But if the firm builds relationships inclusively across identity groups and constructs its
ego stakeholder network in a way that minimizes readily identifiable faultlines (or alliances), such
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a network configuration would not only avoid adding another dimension to the boundaries that
separate social groups but also provide communication channels for them to develop shared
mental models of cooperation and build consensus, thus reducing conflict risk (Ganson et al.,
2021).
However, empirical efforts to examine how the network of relationships between
stakeholders impact, and are impacted by, firms’ relational strategies have mostly involved case
studies of specific firms. For example, Amengual (2018) examines how Sinchi Wayra, a Bolivian
subsidiary of the Swiss multinational mining corporation Glencore, developed exclusive
relationships with a small group of actors in a conflict-affected area with fragmented communities
but networked inclusively across broader interests in another region with cohesive communities,
leading to differential outcomes for both the firm and for the communities. To test the insights
revealed in such case studies in a large-N study, and to study the relationships beyond the firm’s
ego stakeholder network to understand the spillover effects of firms’ relational strategies, an
empirical method to map these relationships at scale is needed. In addition, the study of the
determinants of conflict has primarily relied on datasets that record discrete events of physical
conflict, such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED)
and the Armed Conflict Location Events Dataset (ACLED) (Donnay, Dunford, McGrath, Backer, &
Cunningham, 2019; Eck, 2012; Harari & Ferrara, 2018). Missing is the measurement of the rise
and fall of conflictual or cooperative sentiments between groups to capture positive changes in
their relationships or negative changes that do not necessarily culminate into physical conflict.
Our goal in this paper is to address these empirical gaps in the study of conflict
environments. Rather than use predefined group boundaries, we construct an “emergent”
identification of the actors and their relationships in a conflict-affected region by using media
reports from across the world and applying social network analyses of the ties revealed in those
reports. By doing so, we create a more magnified view of a region’s social and political actors, so
that we can examine not only the level of conflict between groups broadly, but also specifically
how individual actors—persons, such as key politicians or cultural figures, and organizations,
132

such as civil society agencies and political bodies—are connected within and across those
groups. Because media reports document various levels of cooperation (i.e., from a meeting
between two actors to the formal announcement of an alliance) and conflict (i.e., from a public
verbal disagreement to armed conflict) over time, this mapping enables the study of positive and
negative changes in relationships beyond discrete events of physical conflict. As such, we can
observe more closely the evolution of conflictual sentiments that drive parties towards the
physical acts of violence recorded in datasets such as the UCDP GED and ACLED, as well as
the progression towards lasting cooperation or peace. This mapping on how individual actors
relate to one another also allows for the observation of relationships of actors within identity
groups—so as to examine the entrenchment or cohesion of groups—and the identification of
“helpful brokers” or other third parties that, though not central to intergroup conflicts, might
nonetheless play an important mediating role. Furthermore, by including firms as potential conflict
actors, we aim to understand how firms develop relationships with local actors—which actors they
befriend or antagonize, which identity groups they include or exclude, and how these firmstakeholder ties might change the relationships between social actors.

4.3 Constructing Networks of Relationships
4.3.1 Data
To construct networks of relationships between actors in a conflict environment, we utilize
geo- and time-tagged data from media reports in the Global Database of Events, Language and
Tone’s Global Knowledge Graph (GDELT-GKG). GDELT is an open platform supported by
Google Jigsaw that collects, monitors, and analyzes media from news outlets across the world to
examine the evolution of global events and sentiments. Specifically, GDELT-GKG is a structured
database that processes unstructured text from the media to extract the named entities (persons
and organizations), locations, themes, and overall tone (emotion/sentiment) of each article. With
over 200 million records dating from February 2015 to the present day, GDELT-GKG provides
comprehensive metadata about almost every piece of publicly available news from global
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sources. Each GDELT-GKG record contains the metadata of one article, including location tags,
identities of persons and organizations named in the article, and the website address of the
article.

4.3.2 Construction of Edge Lists
We define an actor as either a person or an organization (e.g., a firm, a civil society
organization, or a government agency). In our network model, a node represents a single actor,
and an edge represents an undirected relationship between those actors. The sign and weight of
the edge is a number ranging from -10 to 10 that represents the level of conflictual (negative) or
cooperative (positive) relations between two nodes, with -10 representing a most conflictual
relationship, 0 representing a neutral relationship, and 10 representing a most cooperative
relationship.
Our goal is to construct an undirected graph to describe the conflict environment of a
given region. The first step in building such a network involves identifying the most relevant public
actors (the nodes). From GDELT-GKG, we extract all metadata records that include a location tag
for only the region of interest. 36 Next, we conduct a frequency count of persons and organizations
in that extract of metadata records and generate a preliminary list of the 200 most frequently
mentioned persons and the 200 most frequently mentioned organizations. From this preliminary
list, we manually examine every person and organization to filter out any foreign actors (often
foreign celebrities) that do not play a participatory role in the region’s social or political events. 37
From this process, we create a finalized list of the most frequently mentioned, and socially
relevant, actors in the region of interest. This finalized list of actors comprises the nodes of our
network.
Suppose that the region of interest in Rwanda. We extract from GDELT-GKG all records that include
only “Rwanda”.
37
For example, a region might be a former member of the British Empire that retains a strong interest in the
British royal family, and so “Meghan Markle” would appear as one of the most frequently mentioned actors
in that region’s media. Because such foreign actors neither reside in the region nor plays a participatory
role in the identity group conflicts of the region, we remove them from the list of relevant conflict actors in
subsequent data extraction and analyses.
36
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With the nodes of our network identified, the following steps specify how we construct the
edges. First, we return to the GDELT-GKG database and extract all metadata records that
include any of our nodes at least once in the article. In this extraction, we also require that the
article have at least one location tag for the region of interest, though we relax the previous
requirement that the region of interest be the only location tag. By doing so, we aim to capture
both how local and foreign media might portray these actors. We then utilize a web scraper to
download the full text of every article in this extract of metadata records.
From the full text of each article, we isolate sentences that include co-mentions of any
two nodes. For each sentence, we assign a score ranging from -10 (most conflictual) to 10 (most
cooperative) to the co-mentioning sentence according to the Goldstein scale (Goldstein, 1992).
For example, according to the scale, a “military attack” between two actors would be -10.0, a
“threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction” would be -5.8, to “issue formal complaint or
protest” would be -2.4, to “explain policy” is 0.01, to “assure” or “receive visit” is 2.8, to “promise
material support” is 5.4, and to “extend military assistance” is 8.3 (Table 4.6.1).
We utilize natural language processing methods—specifically, zero-shot learning
(Pelicon, Pranjić, Miljković, Škrlj, & Pollak, 2020; Romera-Paredes & Torr, 2015)—to assign this
Goldstein score for each co-mentioning sentence. We start by converting each textual sentence
and the event labels of the Goldstein scale into sentence embeddings (or dense vector
representations). A sentence embedding is a vector of real numbers that represents the “DNA
fingerprint” of the text. For example, the word “king” could be represented by the vector [0.50,
0.69, -0.60, -0.02, …, -0.51]. The value in each dimension of this vector represents a “hidden
state” that is akin to some quality of the English language, such that the hidden states of
sentences with similar meanings have similar values. To uncover these hidden states and thus
enable a mapping from any English word or sentence into a numeric vector representation, we
utilize a sentence transformers model called Sentence-BERT, originally developed by a research
group at Google (Devlin, Chang, Lee, & Toutanova, 2019; Reimers & Gurevych, 2019). In pretraining, Sentence-BERT (specifically, with the pre-trained model “all-MiniLM-L6-v2”) ingests
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more than 1 billion English sentences across sources such as scientific papers, Wikipedia
articles, Reddit comments, and Stack Exchange content and utilizes a set of algorithms to
optimize the ability to predict the next token (word, phrase, or sentence) for each preceding
token. In doing so, the model learns which words or sentences are most similar in meaning to one
another, and it outputs a mapping from text to vector such that similar texts have the highest
cosine similarity in their vector representations (Reimers & Gurevych, 2019).
For each co-mentioning sentence in our data, we calculate the cosine similarity between
the transformed sentence embedding with each one of the Goldstein label embeddings to derive
a similarity score. We select the top 4 highest scoring events, normalize the similarity scores so
that they sum to 1, and then calculate a weighted average of the 4 normalized cosine similarity
scores (weighted by the Goldstein scale). For example, given the sentence “A and B failed to
resolve their disputes across a wide range of issue areas.”, the algorithm finds the following most
related events and their normalized cosine similarity scores with the sentence: P(make complaint
(not formal)) = 0.389, P(issue formal complaint or protest) = 0.220, P(halt negotiation) = 0.200,
and P(break diplomatic relations) = 0.191. We then weigh these 4 normalized cosine similarity
scores to derive the Goldstein score for the sentence: 0.389*−1.9 + 0.220*−2.4 + 0.200*−3.8 +
0.191*−7.0 = −3.364.
If an article includes a single sentence that co-mentions two nodes, we take the Goldstein
score of that sentence as an observation about the relationship between them. Following the
example above, if “A and B failed to resolve their disputes across a wide range of issue areas.” is
the only co-mentioning sentence between nodes A and B in the article, then we obtain one
observation of -3.364 for relationship between them. If an article includes multiple sentences that
co-mention the nodes, then the average score of those sentences is taken instead as one
observation. Each article with sentences that co-mention any two nodes thus contributes to one
article-level observation about their relationship.
To determine the overall level of conflict or cooperation between two nodes in a time
period, we take the average of the Goldstein scores of all articles with co-mentions of those
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nodes in that period. This average Goldstein score gives us both the sign and weight of the edge
between those nodes in our subsequent network analyses.

4.3.3 Detection of Communities
A community is a group of nodes that are more densely connected internally than to
nodes outside of the community (Leskovec, Lang, & Mahoney, 2010). Given a signed graph with
both positive (cooperative) and negative (conflictual) edges, the intuition is that within a
community, positive edges are relatively dense but negative edges are relatively sparse; and that
between communities, positive edges are relatively sparse but negative edges are relatively
dense. A general approach in both the social and physical sciences to identifying communities is
to utilize an algorithm that minimizes the Hamiltonian, or the “energy”, of the configuration of
nodes (Traag & Bruggeman, 2009). At the start of the algorithm, each node is assigned to its own
unique community (i.e., each node begins as an isolated “island”). At each iteration of the
algorithm, a node is picked at random to join another node, and the Hamiltonian of the new
network configuration is then compared to the Hamiltonian of the original. A positive link between
two nodes in the same community lowers the Hamiltonian, whereas a negative link between two
nodes in the same community increases the Hamiltonian. The algorithm’s goal is to iterate
randomly over nodes to find the optimal assignment of nodes to communities that minimizes the
Hamiltonian.
Following Traag and Bruggeman (2009), the optimization problem is formalized as
follows: Consider a network graph with n nodes and m edges. Let m+ be the total number of
positive (cooperative) edges and m− be the total number of negative (conflictual) edges. Let pij+ =
m+/n(n-1) and pij− = m−/n(n-1). Let the entries of the adjacency matrix of the network be denoted
by Aij, such that Aij = 1 if a positive edge exists between nodes i and j, Aij = −1 if a negative edge
exists between nodes i and j, and Aij = 0 if there is no edge between them (in implementation, this
adjacency matrix can also be weighted by the strength of the positive or negative relationship).
Let Aij+ = Aij if Aij > 0 and Aij− = Aij if Aij < 0. Let there be c communities in the set σi ∈ {1, …, c};
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each of the n nodes is to be assigned into one of c communities. Let δ(σi, σj) = 1 if σi = σj. The
positive and negative Hamiltonians are then defined as:

If there are no negative edges between nodes in a network, the optimization problem is
simply to find a specific clustering of nodes {σ} such that the positive Hamiltonian is minimized.
When there are both positive and negative edges, as in our case, the optimization problem is to
find a specific clustering of nodes {σ} that minimizes the combined Hamiltonian:

To detect communities of actors in our conflict environments, we implement the Leiden
community detection algorithm, which minimizes the combined Hamiltonian of a network as
defined above, that has been developed and used by researchers in the physical sciences
(Barber, 2007; Mucha, Richardson, Macon, Porter, & Onnela, 2010; Traag & Bruggeman, 2009).
After implementation, we generate a community assignment for all nodes in our edge list, and we
calculate the sum of positive or negative links between and within communities. The summation
of intergroup (inter-community) positive or negative links between communities is our measure of
the level of cooperation or conflict between groups of actors in a conflict environment.

4.3.4 Assumptions and Limitations
We acknowledge several key assumptions and limitations in this network model of actors’
relationships.
First, by representing all relationships as undirected edges, we make no distinction
between directed and undirected sentiments captured in the media. For example, we do not
distinguish between “Actor A has declared war on Actor B.”—a sentence with directionality from A
to B—and “Actors A and B are at war with each other.”—a sentence implying reciprocity of action
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between A and B. In building our network model, both sentences would imply a conflictual
(negative) relationship between A and B. In other words, our undirected network assumes that all
relationships captured in the media are symmetric, meaning that media evidence of A directing a
sentiment towards B implies that the same sentiment from B to A also exists.
Second, as our data is gathered from media sources, both the nodes identified and the
edges constructed might reflect media bias. In particular for regions with poor institutions that
restrict an independent media, and where the reporting of local events by foreign media is
challenging, certain key conflict actors might not be identified as a relevant node via our methods
due to media suppression. Conflictual relationships between actors might also become
underreported in such circumstances. In ongoing work, we aim to leverage multiple sources other
than media sources to augment our network construction.
Third, as our algorithm detects only non-overlapping communities, we abstract from the
reality that an actor can belong to more than one community. Fourth, by taking the average
article-level Goldstein score of articles that co-mention any two actors, we assume that actors
cannot be in both cooperation and conflict with each other. We model relationships as being of
either primarily in cooperation or in conflict. Finally, as we do not account for the number of
articles with co-mentions that were collected to generate the average Goldstein score of each
edge, our network model does not consider the relative importance or prominence of actors in the
media landscape—in other words, the edge between two prominent actors with many comentions in the media are treated just the same in the Hamiltonian minimization problem as the
edge between actors with few co-mentions in the media.

4.4 Case: Rwanda
We construct the network of relationships between actors in Rwanda. From the GDELTGKG metadata, we identify the top 60 most frequently mentioned Rwandan persons in the media
from 2015 to 2020. Using data from fDiMarkets, a database of major foreign direct investments,
we also identify 20 firms that have made a significant investment in Rwanda in the same time
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period and that are also found in the GDELT-GKG. Together, these 80 actors comprise the nodes
of our network. We extract 56,385 articles that mention any of these 80 actors during the time
period of study, and from which we find 5,914 sentences that mention any two of these actors
together. From these co-mentioning sentences, we apply the Goldstein scoring procedures
described in the previous section to measure the relationship (i.e., construct the edges) between
the nodes and we implement the Leiden community detection algorithm to assign each node to a
cluster.
Figure 4.7.1 presents the results of our network for Rwanda. Each square-shaped node
represents a person, and each circle-shaped node represents a firm or organization. Blue edges
(lines) indicate cooperative relationships between nodes, and red edges indicate conflictual
relationships. The thickness of the edge indicates relative strength of the cooperation or conflict
according to the Goldstein conflict scale (thus, a thick red edge indicates a highly conflictual
relationship, and a thick blue edge indicates a highly cooperative relationship). The color of the
node indicates the community assignment of the node according to the Leiden community
detection algorithm 38; we detect 19 communities, of which 13 are singleton communities (i.e.,
peripheral actors of the network that are not strongly connected with any other node).
The network in Figure 4.7.1 depicts a number of relationships that are consistent with the
conflict environment in Rwanda from 2015 to 2020. Some of the most conflictual relationships are
between Paul Kagame, the president of Rwanda since 2000, and opposition political actors. For
example, the network shows strongly negative relationships between Paul Kagame and 1) Diane
Rwigara, an activist who has challenged Kagame’s authoritarian politics and ran in the 2017
presidential election as an independent candidate against Kagame; 2) Victoire Ingabire, an
opposition leader who was imprisoned for 8 years (released in 2018) for charges that
international observers have called politically motivated; 3) Paul Rusesabagina, the former
manager of the Hôtel des Mille Collines (the subject of the film Hotel Rwanda) and a vocal critic of
We used positive and negative resolution parameters of 0.3. As robustness checks, we also tested with
resolution parameters between 0.01 and 1. The general clustering of nodes remained relatively stable, in
particular with the two largest communities detected in Figure 4.7.1.

38
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Kagame who has been imprisoned since 2020 on charges that observers have also called
politically motivated; 4) Juvenal Habyarimana, a former president and military leader who fought
against Kagame in the Rwandan Civil War, 5) Kizito Mihigo, an activist who was sentenced to
prison on conspiracy charges, and 6) Frank Habineza, the chairman of the opposition Democratic
Green Party of Rwanda who has been elected into the Parliament of Rwanda. Of note, although
Habyarimana had died in 1994 (from an assassination that some observers believe had been
ordered by Kagame), Habyarimana remained a top-mentioned actor in the Rwanda media from
2015 to 2020, likely due to his historical significance.
The structure of network communities in Figure 4.7.1 also reflects the consolidation of
political power that Kagame and his allies have achieved in the past decade (Lyons, 2016;
Matfess, 2015). The three living actors who share the most conflictual relationship with Kagame—
Diane Rwigara, Victoire Ingabire, and Paul Rusesabagina—are all singleton communities without
strongly cooperative ties with other actors in the network. The peripheral positions of these
conflict actors in the network reflect their isolation in the political environment, as other actors
avoid building cooperative ties with them in order to avoid openly challenging Kagame’s regime.
Our implementation of the Leiden community detection algorithm resulted in two major
communities, depicted in yellow and in green in Figure 4.7.1. The yellow community includes
Kagame and some of his closest allies who are also top political figures in Rwanda, such as
Vincent Biruta (Minster of Foreign Affairs), Uzziel Ndagijimana (Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning), and Edouard Ngirente (Prime Minister of Rwanda). The green community also
includes numerous allies of Kagame, with many of them holding positions related to the country’s
infrastructure and local development, such as James Musoni (Minister of Infrastructure), John
Rwangombwa (Governor of the National Bank of Rwanda), Vincent Munyeshyaka (Minister of
Trade and Instrusty), Francis Kaboneka (Minister of Local Government), Jean Bosco Mugiraneza
(CEO of the Rwandan Energy Group), and Alexis Nzahabwanimana (Minister of State in charge
of Transport). Although these two communities are seemingly segregated by a few weakly
conflictual ties, such as the red edge between Biruta (in the yellow community) and Kaboneka (in
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the green community), they primarily reflect differences in the type of political positions held.
Indeed, the two largest communities in this network consist primarily of Kagame’s allies, thus
highlighting Kagame’s consolidation of power in Rwanda: Kagame’s primary challengers (e.g.,
Rwigara, Ingabire, and Rusesabagina) are isolated whereas his allies are mostly cooperative with
one another. Overall, consistent with the characterization of Rwanda’s political environment by
observers in recent years (Lyons, 2016; Matfess, 2015), Figure 4.7.1 depicts an authoritarian
environment with no prominent groups of opposition actors.
Nodes that represent firms or organizations that have made foreign direct investments in
Rwanda according to the fDiMarkets database are depicted as circles. The African Development
Bank, East African Development Bank, African Trade Insurance Agency, and Tanzania Ports
Authority (a parastatal public corporation) are clustered into the same (green) community as the
infrastructure and development officials (e.g., Musoni, Rwangombwa, Munyeshyaka, Kaboneka,
Mugiraneza, and Nzahabwanimana), a result that is consistent with the shared aims of those
organizations and officials in economic development. Almost all other firms, such as Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu, First Data, Access Bank, and Visa International, are clustered into the same
(yellow) community as Kagame and his close allies. Of the 20 investing firms or organizations in
our data, only AstraZeneca and Starbucks are not clustered with one of the two central
communities. Overall, these are consistent with a literature in stakeholder theory that highlights
the incentives of managers in prioritizing relationships with stakeholders with the most power and
legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Particularly because the Rwandan environment is
characterized by a consolidated bloc of political elites and weak rule of law, managers might find
a status-climbing relational strategy with high-status stakeholders to be attractive in securing
resources (Nartey, Henisz, & Dorobantu, 2018).
In Figure 4.7.2, we quantify the level of intergroup conflict over time in our constructed
network of actors in Rwanda. To facilitate interpretation, we take the inverse of the raw Goldstein
score in our sample of 5,914 sentences (we multiply the raw Goldstein score by -1) and calculate
the sum of those scores in each month of the study period for sentences that mention two actors
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from different communities to create a monthly intergroup conflict score. The y-axis in Figure
4.7.2 thus represents the level of intergroup conflict; a higher value indicates greater conflict. In
Figure 4.7.3, we standardize this monthly intergroup conflict score by its sample standard
deviation and plot it against the monthly number of ACLED conflict events (also standardized by
the sample standard deviation). Although peaks from both our constructed monthly intergroup
conflict score and ACLED conflict events line up well in mid-2017 and late-2019, there is no
statistically significant correlation between the two measures over the entire 2015 to 2020 period.
There are two main reasons for this lack of correlation between the two measures: First, the
ACLED database records protests, riots, and other violent events in all of Rwanda, whereas our
network captures intergroup conflict between a limited group of actors, so our intergroup conflict
measure would not detect ACLED events that involve actors outside of our identified nodes.
Second, our intergroup conflict measure captures the rise and fall of conflictual sentiments that
may or may not culminate into actual conflict, and so would encompass more types of conflictual
relationships than what ACLED aims to capture.
Finally, of the 5,914 co-mentioning sentences for which we used natural language
processing to calculate the Goldstein score of the relationship between two actors, the direction
(sign) of that score is opposite of the GDELT-GKG’s overall article tone score for 1,427 of those
sentences. In other words, in 1,427 instances, the GDELT-GKG metadata would suggest that an
article’s overall sentiment is positive (negative) when the actual sentence within that article that
mention two given actors suggests conflict (cooperation) between them.

4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss a method using natural language processing to construct a
descriptive network of conflict actors using media data. We apply this method to map the political
environment in Rwanda and find that our constructed network broadly reflects Paul Kagame and
his allies’ consolidation of power in the country. We also find that firms are more likely to engage
in cooperative relationships with central clusters of social and political actors than with peripheral
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actors in this environment. Our current methods face a number of limitations. In particular, the
analysis of the conflict environment is limited by which actors we include in the network
construction process as nodes, and future work is needed to assess the level of media bias in the
relationships examined. Nonetheless, we show that whereas existing databases of global
conflicts generally record discrete events of violent conflict, we can utilize the media to assess the
tenor of relationships between individual actors to detect a finer level of conflictual sentiments
between groups in the social and political environment.
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4.6 Tables
Table 4.6.1: The Goldstein Scale
Score
-10.0
-9.2
-8.7
-8.3
-7.6
-7.0
-7.0
-6.9
-5.8
-5.6
-5.2
-5.0
-4.9
-4.9
-4.4
-4.4
-4.1
-4.0
-4.0
-3.8
-3.4
-3.0
-2.4
-2.2
-2.2
-1.9
-1.1
-1.1
-0.9
-0.2
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.1

Event
Military attack; clash; assault
Seize position or possessions
Nonmilitary destruction/injury
Noninjury destructive action
Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup
Break diplomatic relations
Threat with force specified
Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit
Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction
Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive
Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on
Order person or personnel out of country
Expel organization or group
Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance
Threat without specific negative sanction stated
Detain or arrest person(s)
Reduce routine international activity; recall officials
Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow
Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat
Halt negotiation
Denounce; denigrate; abuse
Give warning
Issue formal complaint or protest
Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove
Cancel or postpone planned event
Make complaint (not formal)
Grant asylum
Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position
Deny an accusation
Comment on situation
Urge or suggest action or policy
Explicit decline to comment
Request action; call for
Explain or state policy; state future position
Ask for information
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0.6
0.6
1.0
1.2
1.5
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.5
2.8
2.8
2.9
3.0
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.6
4.5
4.5
5.2
5.4
6.5
6.5
7.4
8.3

Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest
Yield position; retreat; evacuate
Meet with; send note
Entreat; plead; appeal to; beg
Offer proposal
Express regret; apologize
Visit; go to
Release and/or return persons or property
Admit wrongdoing; apologize, retract statement
Give state invitation
Assure; reassure
Receive visit; host
Suspend sanctions; end punishment; call truce
Agree to future action or procedure, to meet or to negotiate
Ask for policy assistance
Ask for material assistance
Praise, hail, applaud, extend condolences
Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal support
Promise other future support
Promise own policy support
Promise material support
Grant privilege; diplomatic recognition; de facto relations
Give other assistance
Make substantive agreement
Extend economic aid; give, buy, sell, loan, borrow
Extend military assistance
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4.7 Figures
Figure 4.7.1: Network of Rwandan Actors (2015-2020)

Notes: Each square-shaped node represents a person, and each circle-shaped node represents
a firm or organization. Blue edges (lines) indicate cooperative relationships between nodes, and
red edges indicate conflictual relationships. The thickness of the edge indicates relative strength
of the cooperation or conflict according to the Goldstein conflict scale (thus, a thick red edge
indicates a highly conflictual relationship, and a thick blue edge indicates a highly cooperative
relationship). The color of the node indicates the community assignment of the node according to
the Leiden community detection algorithm.
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Figure 4.7.2: Media-Reported Intergroup Conflictual Sentiments Over Time in Rwanda
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Notes: This graph plots the monthly summation of the Goldstein scores of the sentences that comention actors from two different communities. The Goldstein score is negative for conflictual
events. To facilitate interpretation, the y-axis is derived from the inverse of the raw Goldstein
score (we multiply the raw Goldstein score by -1) to create a monthly intergroup conflict score. On
this graph, a high number represents greater intergroup conflict.
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Figure 4.7.3: Correlation Between Media-Reported Intergroup Conflictual Sentiments and ACLED
Events
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Notes: This graph plots 1) the monthly summation of the Goldstein scores of the sentences that
co-mention actors from two different communities (in blue) and 2) the monthly summation of
events recorded in the ACLED database (in red). To facilitate interpretation, we take the inverse
of the raw Goldstein score (we multiply the raw Goldstein score by -1) to create a monthly
intergroup conflict score; and both the intergroup conflict score and the number of ACLED events
have been standardized with their sample standard deviation.
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CONCLUSION
From this dissertation, a central managerial implication is that firms must be attentive not
only to their own relationships with stakeholders, but also to the relationships between
stakeholders and other actors in the broader societal network. Firms are embedded in a web of
relationships with social and political actors whose familial, professional, and identity group
connections carry rich histories of cooperation and conflict. Understanding the relationships that
firms’ customers, suppliers, employees, and other primary stakeholders hold with one another
and with others in the broader societal network can help practitioners recognize opportunities to
gain competitive advantage and manage conflict risk in the nonmarket environment.
This dissertation forms the beginnings of my research in the areas of nonmarket strategy,
stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility, and international business. In the first two
chapters, I examine how firms, under different institutions, utilize relationships with political
agents or with nonprofit organizations to seek rents and shape political outcomes; and in the last
two chapters, my coauthors and I examine how the structure of firm-stakeholder relationships
affect information flow, intergroup coordination, and the institutional capacity to manage problems
of collective interest. This dissertation’s empirical contributions will be further developed to
explore more questions about corporate political activities and firm-stakeholder relationships. In
ongoing work, I aim to build upon my findings on corporate political connections (Chapter 1) to
examine 1) which and how institutions matter in determining the impact of corporate political
connections in non-democratic and emerging market contexts; 2) the role of transnational political
ties in how multinational corporations and their subsidiaries seek rents and drive (global)
regulatory convergence; 3) how firms incorporate the use of political connections with other
market and nonmarket strategies to form a portfolio of integrated strategies; and 4) how electoral
and activist campaigns might be combined to pressure both sides of business-government
relationships. In addition, the mapping of conflict environments (Chapter 4) could enable empirical
inquiries examining the private sector’s role in social and political conflicts, such as how the influx
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of foreign direct investment might exacerbate horizontal inequalities between competing identity
groups, and how managers can identify and partner with “helpful brokers” to mitigate conflict risk.
Another direction is to explore whether, and how, firms’ decisions in managing the
nonmarket environment might align with stakeholders’ interests in advancing solutions to address
societal challenges. In particular, recent scholarship in international political economy has
documented cases of multinational corporations driving regulatory convergence on market
policies across the world due to incentives to standardize operations and outcompete less
innovative rivals. Future work could examine this phenomenon around issues of, for example,
climate change to uncover the incentives that motivate certain firms to leverage political
strategies to advocate for (or fight against) the adoption of stricter environmental standards
across jurisdictions. Examining these motivations and the mechanisms by which firms influence
social and political outcomes can contribute to our understanding of when incentives in the
private sector might complement social collective action—research that would strengthen our
knowledge about how firms can cooperate with other societal actors to address grand challenges.
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